Would be careful with any of those offers. To explain that you need to have a lock on the demographics of potential voters of BXP and their sentiments as well as what Farage probably wants in a future EU-UK relation. /1
For one, that sounds like a very soft pact & as long as people stay against any Conservative MP there'd be competition & losses of votes for Conservatives. It's also unclear to me how you can convince BXP candidates to campaign if they can't make a stand. Sounds nonsensical. /2
Most importantly it's a delusion to believe Brexit is over just you get no deal. The hit would be massive and a deal would still be needed - this time UK would even be under more pressure. I'm not sure whether Farage would stay silent as long as the threat of deal persists. /3
So even no deal guarantees that BXP is killed off. It's more likely that they'll keep on using the betrayal narrative & their preferred branding as 'advocate of the people' - that would work perfectly well before and after Brexit day, regardless whether there's a deal or not. 4/4
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That's not helpful, and quite stupid, really. Devolution isn't abused by SNP, the numbers for independence got stronger in the moment Tories attacked and undermined devolved settlements. /1
One of the biggest misconception, very prominent among Tories by the way, is the idea that devolved settlements can just be "granted" or work out well if all parties are committed to Unionism. That's plainly nonsensical and also not how political institutions work. /2
The best example is the downfall of BP (Bavarian Party) which was quite big in the 50s and committed to Bavarian independence (don't laugh, they existed and had reasonable success). /3
Really interesting thread, to bring in the pol sci perspective: I'm not sure whether caution is the correct term, I would see it as caution and self-constraint. (Small Thread) /1
I'd argue that it doesn't really matter whether you exercise self-constraint & caution or whether you "externalise" it by installing another veto player inform of a) a strong constitutional court checking legislative & executive and b) making constitutional changes difficult. /2
Making it difficult in this context means, that changes require a 2/3 majority (that's a usual threshold). The self-constraint functions in principle in the same way, you just internalise the veto player function. /3
I wonder: Would there be a Brexit in a consensus oriented system (e.g. PR in HoC + HoL w/ similar powers to Bundesrat and regional representation & devolved gov representation). My hunch, no. /1
Even if there would have been a push for a referendum, it's unlikely that NI or SCO dev governments would have agreed to it without regional quorum. /2
And even if there would have been one, it's unlikely that any government would have been one: it would have needed to be binding otherwise any government would have had trouble to implement such a tight result. /3
Looking at the current state of politics and how the negotiations between UK and EU have panned out so far, I think two thinks are striking: The absence of realism in UK's policy approach and its substitution with idealism. /1
Idealism here means the pursuit of what is deemed as an "ideal" state (or something very close to it). It's somewhat telling, that this has been perceived as Corbyn's biggest asset. The authenticity of what he communicates in combination with a radical pursuit of his ideal. /2
I think this part of the political culture in UK is probably the most toxic and somewhat mirrored by it's uncompromising majoritarianism. That having an ideal and not being willing to compromise is seen as something good or admirable. /3
Well, there is always space to make it worse. But it also depends on the time frame, occasion and area. Leopold's reign in Congo is a good example, it was considered as abhorrent at his time (which is why he lost the colony to Belgium). /1
However, compare this to the practices to thee 17th and early 18th century and might have been seen as 'bad' but not significantly worse than the contemporaries of that time. /2
The problem I see with those textbooks (the Life in UK test textbook isn't much better btw), is the lack of context and critical engagement beyond the surface of 'that's good, that's bad'. /3
Lot's of the chatter of EU overplaying it's hand's highly overestimating a) UK's stability as a state, b) overestimating Johnson's position within the party when substantial downsides occur (e.g. UK's integrity as a state is in question) & c) underestimate the patience of EU. /1
The debate assumes that UK is in principle stable, that it can not just buffer any economic short, medium and long term shock but that state institutions who are already under stress (in particular looking at tensions within NI but also SCO-UK) can withstand no deal. /2
That strikes me a wee bit as unfounded optimism, especially post COVID. While probably not as important for EU now (point being here is indeed adhering to red lines), it may become "handy" later, also regarding USA (a clear see border won't go down well with Unionists). /3