1/ $PTON Peloton subscriber churn looks to me to be around 20-30% per year. But they reported churn of 0.7%!!
Math with me here.. the reported churn is a 'monthly' churn, calculated as net cancels in the period, divided by 3 months. So 0.7% = 2.1% per quarter, or around 8.4%/yr.
2/ but given the massive growth, of the 500k+ subscribers we get to use in the denominator for churn, we added half those in past 12 months. So we lost 8%+ of the 500K, but that 40-50k really applies to the 250k from last year... BUT... the plot thickens further..
3/ This IPO is exquisitely timed to occur just before lapses can really kick in from the phasing out of the 12-36 month lock-in subscription periods, per p. 67 of the S-1. So some large chunk of the historical "subscriptions" weren't even eligible for cancellation...
4/ So Peloton is now losing subs at a rate of around 40-50k per year on an eligible base that is ALMOST CERTAINLY way smaller than 200k, probably even 150k. Pretty interesting if you ask me. Now push this IPO out the door already and raise that $$$ before the metrics really turn!
5/ Definitions definitions... using that fresh starting monthly sub count each month is one heck of an investor marketing trick. (p 66)
6/ And for the Coup de Grace - let's take the latest quarterly data, a nearly 10% annual churn rate. Let's assume the eligible base is 60% of the subs from a year ago, or 150k (rest of those suckers on 24-36month pre-paid plans). Now we have a churn rate of over 30%
7/ disclaimer: I have no interest or position in peloton, I simply like analyzing investment metrics & statistics. My conclusions are my own assumptions & any/all readers must draw their own conclusions using their own analysis.
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1/ $JOE is a blast from the past. Back in 2005 when I was at Greenlight, we received a call from a sell-side analyst wanting to pitch a long idea. These usually get routed through the trader, who then sends to an analyst. Idea sounded kind of dumb/not in wheelhouse, so...
2/ it went to me, the new guy. The sell-side analyst (still working, won't name names) proceeded to tell me about this great long opportunity in St Joe at $80/share (late '05).
3/ I listened to the pitch for about 30-40 minutes, making notes and doing some math in my spreadsheet while following along in their 10-K and trying to figure it out
1/ Not sure why this is so confusing and controversial, but what *almost certainly* happened is that Robinhood's counterparty/custodians saw too much risk in Robinhood's *aggregate* account on $GME.
The custodians don't "look thru" their client's massive list of accounts...
2/ Let's just say its Bank of New York custodying Robinhood's assets. And say Robinhooders own 60mm shares and Robinhood margin is, idk, $5 billion.
BONY says "Sorry, no more $GME shares for you".
They do *NOT* say, "well, let's look at all 5 million of your accounts that own..
3/ that own $GME stock and handle each one individually."
People realize how absurd that is right?
That said, sucks for ppl who can't trade individually b/c of collective firm problem. But thats the system, those are the rules. Its an extremely rare risk, but its always there
1/ Seems the WSB strategy that is working well is two-fold:
a) Identify high short interest stocks
b) Find ones with (or create) high open interest
This forces two groups' hands: 1) Short sellers 2) Options market makers
Can be a very effective way to force buying
2/ Regarding the 'short squeeze' on short sellers, I think that part is fairly well covered.
What may be less understood is what rapidly rising prices on high OI stocks does to options market makers
3/ Without going into all the greeks, we'll focus on 'delta', which is basically the imputed odds (from IV) that an option will be in the money. So if a stock is at $10, a $15 call may have a delta of 25-30 or so, roughly meaning stock has 25-30% chance of going to $15
2/ Of course, corn supplies need to actually tighten and stay tight for a year or two. Recent increase driven by bad weather in Argentina and Brazil (next 2 largest corn producers) and high demand from China.
Domestically, demand was weak, as feed usage (beef, hogs) low b/c...
3/ of COVID. China demand expected to remain elevated and US should recover. So questions come down to:
a) US acres planted (more = good for $CF)
b) yield (no major droughts since 2012)
If production doesn't cover demand in 2021, $CF almost certainly see 4-5x+ EPS increase.