Every PMLA offence has two dimensions - predicate offence and laundering. Money laundering is a separate offence independent from the predicate/scheduled offence, Mehta.
Many of the official records that the ED receives are from other countries as India is apart of a global statutory network against money laundering, Mehta
Statute states that there must be a reason to believe based on matetial in possession and such reasons to be recorded by the adjudicating authority in cases of money laundering, Mehta
The threshold before arresting is much higher as under PMLA than under IPC. Only specified officers can make the arrest after reasons are recorded in writing. All ingredients of Article 20 are covered, Mehta
-Only the Director authorised can arrest
-based on reasons to believe an offence is committed
-reasons to be recorded in writing
-based on material in possession
-evidence submitted to adjudicating authority in sealed cover
The evidence should be kept with an independent body and the evidence can be supplied to the accused only after chargesheet is filed, Mehta
The material in possession is sacrosanct and I cannot use it arbitrarily till chargesheet is filed and cannot serve to the other side till then according to the statue, Mehta
It's not done for "humiliation, humiliation, humiliation" as Mr Singhvi said yesterday but only for prevention, prevention, prevention with capital P, Mehta
Overseas banks have given some specific inputs regarding properties, companies etc. We have issued letters rogatory (LR), we have got some, we are awaiting some, Mehta
I request the court to grant my material an exclusion from the accused at this stage of investigation. Evidence copy cannot be shared with the accused before filing chargesheet, Mehta
Justice Banumathi reminds Mehta that case made on P Chidambaram's behalf was inky that the Court should not be presented with evidence that has not been used to confront the accused.
Mehta hands over a substantially large compilation of case laws to the Court and is reading out precedents to support his argument against disclosure of evidence to the accused ahead of filing of a chargesheet.
SG Tushar Mehta also cites the Supreme Court's judgment in the #BhimaKoregaon case on a petition filed by Romila Thapar and Ors. Mehta points out that in that case too, the case diary was places before the Court.
Supreme Court to resume hearing today ED’s writ petition against former West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee and other State officials for their alleged interference in its probe and searches at the Kolkata offices of political consultancy firm I-PAC and its co-founder Pratik Jain.
@MamataOfficial
The hearing is adjourned.
Court: we will hear it after partial working days.
Justice PK Mishra: Mr. Kalyan Banerjee where are you?
Sr. Adv. Kalyan Banerjee: I am here virtually. The Hon’ble Chief Justice directed Monday and Friday will be in virtual, that’s why I’m in virtual.
Justice Mishra (in jest): he has permitted physically also now. Only for you the circular was changed. Now you have to appear personally.
Book launch: “The Constitution is my home” by Senior Advocate Indira Jaising.
CJI Surya Kant and Justice BV Nagarathna to shortly address the event.
Sr. Adv. Indira Jaising: CJI told me that has has been called out by the Prime Minister in relation to the BRICS judicial forum meeting.
Jaising’s discussion with senior journalist Sreenivasan Jain:
Jaising: the constitution is very personal home. In this country, the first question everyone asks is “Where are you from?” I found the answer. I said to myself I belong to the constitution of India.
Jaising: all governments regardless with which party they belong to have tried to shake the foundation of the constitution. The first time we saw it is when the emergency was declared. Currently also I believe that the constitution is under threat.
Court: the court has had detailed interaction with the parties. Today it considered what would be the immediate next step in the exercise undertaken in the present proceedings so as to take some real, effective steps on the ground.
Stray dogs case: Supreme Court to shortly pronounce verdict in its suo motu case to manage stray dog population across the country.
Bench: Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta, and NV Anjaria
The Court had reserved its verdict on January 29 after hearing the final leg of submissions made by various States, the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) and the Animal Welfare Board of India (AWBI).
Court: we have divided the judgement into theee parts. We have given detailed consideration to applications seeking recall of Nov 7 judgement. We have dismissed all the applications.
Court: In para 85 we have concluded- this courts finds no reason to interfere with the Nov SOP by AWBI. The challenge does not merit acceptance in the light of conclusions herein above. All IAs challenging the SoPs stands dismissed.
BCI Chairman, Senior Advocate Manan Kumar Mishra requests CJI led bench to constitute another
High-Powered Election Supervisory Committee similar to the one headed by former Supreme Court Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia to oversee bar council election disputes
#SupremeCourt
Sr Adv Kumud Lata Das: Let BCI not be a member of this committee.
Mishra: this is very very bad
Das: Don't raise your voice against me. You only want to make the women members subservient to you. Please don't shout at me. You are virtually a permanent chairman..from 2010 to 2026 you are the only one who can become the BCI Chairman
Mishra: these are absurd allegations.
CJI: We are constituting two more election tribunals.
Supreme Court today to pronounce judgment in a narco-terror case from J&K, where the accused has spent nearly five years in custody despite no contraband being recovered directly from him
#SupremeCourt
Justice Ujjal Bhuyan: this case raises an important question concerning the interface between Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. More particularly, the issue concerns the propriety of smaller benches progressively hollowing out the constitutional force of a larger bench decision without ever expressly disagreeing with it.
Then, after narrating the facts and the submissions, and also referring to two judgments in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and gumfisha Fatima v. State, we have said in para 26:
There are two judgments of this Court which we need to deal with before proceeding ahead. These two judgments, Gurwinder Singh and gulfisha Fatima, have taken a somewhat divergent view from the clear, distinctive trajectory taken by this Court for grant of bail even under special enactments like TADA, UAPA, and NDPS.
Justice Ujjal Bhuyan: A decision made by a bench of lesser strength is bound by the law declared by a bench of greater strength. Judicial discipline mandates that such binding precedent must either be followed in full, or in case of doubt, be referred to a larger bench. A smaller bench cannot dilute, circumvent, or disregard the ratio of a larger bench.
The position of law emerging from Najeeb and Sheikh Javed Iqbal is therefore clear. Watali cannot be invoked to justify indefinite incarceration of the accused under the UAPA.
For the aforesaid reasons, the attempt in gurminder to read Watali as laying down a general rule of denial of bail notwithstanding the period of incarceration is difficult to reconcile with this Court’s own subsequent clarification of what the ratio in Watali actually meant.
We also note that the bench in Gurwinder formulated the so-called twin-prong test governing grant of bail under the UAPA. It held that inquiry under Section 43D(5) must proceed in two sequential stages. First, whether the accusation is prima facie true, and second, only if the first question is answered in favour of the accused, whether ordinary bail considerations such as flight risk, etc. would justify the relief. If the first stage of the twin-prong test is satisfied against the accused, bail becomes absolutely impermissible.
With respect, this test flows neither from the text of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA Act, nor from Najeeb. In fact, on the contrary, it is in the case of Najeeb where it is categorically stated that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA Act provides no more than another possible ground, namely, that the accusations against the accused are prima facie true, for the competent court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like possibility of tampering with evidence, etc.