1/ Article 7 refers to the possibility of sanctions against a Member State for breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Some thoughts about its interaction with Article 50 in the case of the UK.
2/ I discussed the possibility of Articles 7 and 50 overlapping in a blog post on Article 7 last month. (More in that series of posts soon). At this point I only "imagined" the mess created by the overlap. Guess who the last sentence refers to: eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/07/should…
3/ I did flag up one political risk of using Article 7, ie could Member States feel that their sovereignty is infringed? This might also push a Member State out more quickly. (Final sentence nicked from the film "Enchanted")
4/ Another issue is timing. There's no precise time limit on Article 7 but, in the absence of a military coup, it's doubtful that the EU would act quickly (evidence: the processes re Poland and Hungary are slooow). October 31st is not far away...
Trigger warning for ⚽️phobes
5/ After a red card, the sanctions. Arguable whether they include freezing Art 50 process, as one of the "rights deriving from application of the Treaties".
But that brings us full circle: a Member State with contempt for the rule of law might just say it's leaving anyway.
6/ It would not be easy for the CJEU to resolve this issue, as its jurisdiction over sanctions decisions is limited.
7/ Overall: difficult to apply Article 7 in any case due to its high political nature, perception as being the "nuclear button". Could be exacerbated if applying it in the midst of the Article 50 process.
8/ Also the inherent contradiction in defending democracy by means of a reaction against (usually) a consequence of the democratic process (@MichaelRosenYes put it more eloquently).
9/ Finally: due to the limits on Article 7, arguments about human rights breaches by Member States are increasingly fought by "conventional" EU law means instead. But that has little relevance to a withdrawing Member State.
Conclusion: Article 7 is unlikely to sort out Brexit.
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1/ Imagine taking this guy seriously as a source of interpretation of EU law. In my field, the ultimate example of the Dunning-Kruger effect. Let's look at the claim in more detail.
2/ "illegal": Digital Services Act expressly provides for the possible negotiation of commitments from the platform
"Secret": Art 80 DSA expressly requires publication of those commitments
"Other platforms did a deal": according to the Commission, all other cases are pending
2/ "illegal": Digital Services Act expressly provides for the possible negotiation of commitments from the platform
"Secret": Art 80 DSA expressly requires publication of those commitments
"Other platforms did a deal": according to the Commission, all other cases are pending
2/ EU/UK youth mobility treaty proposal - questions and answers
Note equal treatment in tuition fees, points re traineeships, visa fees, health surcharges, application to all Member States - would UK government accept all this? (Also a question to ask Labour)
3/ EU/UK proposed youth mobility treaty - text of proposed Council decision and explanatory memo
Note it would also include family reunion (not further detailed at this point). Dispute settlement system of the Brexit deal would apply (not the CJEU) commission.europa.eu/publications/c…
2/ The context of the bill is the recently agreed Rwanda treaty. The issues in clause 1.3 *might* be enough to convince courts to change their mind on the safety of Rwanda since the Supreme Court judgment, but as we'll see it's a moot point: the bill dispenses with courts anyway.
3/ clause 1.4.b is correct: an Act of Parliament that breaches international law is still valid *domestic* law. BUT it will remain a breach of international law.
(We are likely to hear from people who do not understand these basic points)
2/ The spiel in the link confuses the two EU courts, which is not impressive. In fact the applicants in this case lost earlier in the EU General Court, then lost their appeal this year to the CJEU. And this omits to point out that the CJEU had ruled on the substance in June 2022.
3/ My comments on the previous judgment: '.
Because the Court ruled here that Brits lost EU citizenship because UK left the EU, it said this year that Brits had no legal interest to sue the EU to challenge the withdrawal agreement to get it back.eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2022/06/its-en…
Profoundly ignorant on both points. A) the Good Friday Agreement requires compliance with the ECHR. That necessarily entails the Strasbourg Court. There's no legal route to saying that it applies but to the peace process only. 1/
2/ And the idea that it applies to the "peace process" but not "foreign nationals" is confused - for the obvious reason that some of those covered by the former ground may be Irish citizens.
3/ The Strasbourg Court jurisdiction is relevant to Northern Ireland for a very, very obvious reason: it had ruled that the UK had breached the ECHR in Northern Ireland after British courts had ruled that it had not. "Just rely on British courts" therefore misses the point.