Really excited to have this new preprint out ๐, with @HenryDPotter: ๐๐ฒ๐๐ผ๐ป๐ฑ ๐บ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ต๐ฎ๐ป๐ถ๐๐บ โ ๐ฒ๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ผ๐๐ฟ ๐ฐ๐ผ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐๐ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐ถ๐ป ๐ป๐ฒ๐๐ฟ๐ผ๐๐ฐ๐ถ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ osf.io/preprints/psyaโฆ
In neuroscience, our search for the causes of behavior is often just = a search for the underlying neural mechanisms. Especially when we can use tools like optogenetics to show some activity is "necessary and sufficient" for that behavior to occur
This relies (sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly) on a 'driving' metaphor - both of neural inputs driving activation and of neural activity driving behavior
Autism: The Truth is (not) Out There - I wrote this ten years ago and it is, depressingly, as relevant as ever...wiringthebrain.com/2014/10/autismโฆ
The evidence that autism has genetic origins is overwhelming. But we don't do a good job of communicating that. And that void is readily filled with pseudoscience...
The genetics of autism is genuinely complex - involving both genetic heterogeneity (of rare mutations) and a polygenic background of common variants. pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35654974/
I often get asked where I would draw the line of which kinds of creatures have "agency" or "free will"
I tend to only speak of "free will" in relation to humans, put purely because of the historical baggage that comes with the term. "Agency" I see as co-extensive with life...
Though some creatures have more agency than others, or maybe different kinds that vary along several dimensions. (Like behavioral flexibility, ability to cope with novel situations, time horizons of control, etc)
A lot of people ask me about my daily routine for neuro-optimising well-being and productivity*
*Narrator: no had in fact askedโฆ
So here goes:
I wake up at stupid oโclock and curse the darkness of the Irish winter. Will I be getting direct sunlight in my eyes this morning? I will in me hole. We wonโt see the sun again till February.
I grope my way to the bathroom for a hot shower. Yes, hot. Because itโs 2023 and weโre not fucking cavemen.
One motivator for arguing against free will seems to be the problem of moral luck and its undermining of moral responsibility. 1/n
The idea being that people's behavior is really determined by past events, including their genetic make-up, upbringing, social circumstances, and accumulated experiences... 2/n
...so how could it be right to blame or punish them for doing acts we call "crimes" when all these antecedent causes were really the determinants of their actions? 3/n
The concept of โrepresentationsโ offers a crucial bridge between brain and mind โ a way for physical (patterns of neural activity) to manifest as mental; for organisms to be able to *think about things*. 2/13
But representation talk is controversial and laden with baggage. Are they discrete symbolic objects of cognition or distributed states in a dynamic connectionist network? Are they needed at all to explain cognition? How does the meaning of neural patterns get grounded? 3/13