Roger Stone’s case put pardons back into the news, so there are lots of questions—and wrong answers—about pardons circulating on Twitter. A thread is in order.
1. A pardon does not necessarily have a legal effect of declaring/admitting guilt.
Johnson and Clinton issued heaps of pardons after being impeached. The pardon power has an impeachment exception, but it’s point is to separate the impeachment and criminal processes and limit pardons’ effect to the latter.
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3. Impeached presidents can still be pardoned for the criminal consequences of the things they were impeached for.
Robert Reich baselessly asserted otherwise in an op-ed that led to a lot of people on Twitter being misled. Here is a longer thread that debunks Reich’s error:
4. It is unclear whether presidents can pardon themselves.
I devoted a whole chapter to this in my 2012 book: amazon.com/gp/aw/d/030012…. Like it or not, there are colorable arguments on both sides, so we can’t know for sure until (God forbid) there is an actual case.
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There are many other questions floating around, so feel free to tweet or DM me about pardons, impeachment, 25th amd., etc.
I have come here to chew bubblegum and correct misconceptions about constitutional procedures concerning the presidency...and I’m all out of bubblegum.
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Post-script: For some reason, #3 in the thread isn't showing up for some people, so here's a direct link to it.
This gambit is just the latest example of why the statutory line of succession shouldn't include the Speaker.
This isn't a partisan issue; it'd be nuts to have a D Speaker in the line of succession of a R administration, and equally nuts w/ a D administration and R Speaker.
Scholar-commentators (including me) have been arguing for reform here for decades, consistently—regardless of which party was in power.
It makes no sense to have a line of succession that could change partisan control of the presidency like this in the middle of a term.
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The old statute had the Sec'y of State next in line. The current law passed in 1947, favoring the Speaker b/c of a notion that it should be someone elected, not appointed.
But that rationale was demolished in 1967, when 25A2 provided for filling VP vacancies by appointment.
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Thread on late-impeachment related questions asked in the trial.
Q1. Given that some pre-1787 state constitutions provided expressly for late impeachment, does the Framers' failure to do so suggest they didn't mean to allow late impeachment?
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A1: No pre-1787 state constitutions expressly ruled out late impeachment. Some did later—using direct language.
The Framers ruled out *other* things using direct language.
Their silence here thus does not suggest an intent to rule out late impeachment.
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Q2: If disqualification is not derivative of removal, is it possible to disqualify a sitting president without removing him?
A2: No. Art. II, §4 requires removal of sitting officials, separate from anything Art. I, §3 says about DQ and removal.
The article favored late impeachability, but it set out all the evidence I found on both sides--lots for them to use.
But in several places, they misrepresent what I wrote quite badly.
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One odd thing they do is cite me citing other sources instead of just citing those sources (e.g., p.17 & n.47). Another more problematic thing: they suggest that I was endorsing an argument when what I actually did was note that argument--and reject it (e.g., p.21 n.57).
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There are multiple examples of such flat-out misrepresentations. The worst is page 30. They write, "When a President is no longer in office, the objective of an impeachment ceases."79
N.79 starts: "Kalt at 66."
What I actually wrote on 66 (discussion continuing onto 67):