Seeing speculation on double presidential vacancies and the 25th amd. Time for a thread.
1. 25th amd. §§ 3-4 transfer power to the VP when the president is "unable," and transfer it back when he recovers. But they don't apply when a VP acting as president becomes "unable."
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That is, 25A doesn't operate to transfer power further down the line of succession. As my book (tinyurl.com/y4r3xlhy) describes, the amendment's drafters wanted to keep it simpler.
But Article II and the line of succession statute still apply. My book explains how we...
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would likely proceed if the pres. and VP were both "unable": the Speaker would invoke Article II and try to use a process that replicated 25A as closely as possible (Cabinet majority; in a dispute, 2/3 congressional majorities needed to back the Speaker) to legitimize it.
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Postscript: There are constitutional doubts about the 1947 succession law. If circumstances were just so—but only if they were just so—we might see a terrifying power struggle between the Speaker and Secretary of State. That's Ch. 4 of my 2012 book (tinyurl.com/y6ogj45v).
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This gambit is just the latest example of why the statutory line of succession shouldn't include the Speaker.
This isn't a partisan issue; it'd be nuts to have a D Speaker in the line of succession of a R administration, and equally nuts w/ a D administration and R Speaker.
Scholar-commentators (including me) have been arguing for reform here for decades, consistently—regardless of which party was in power.
It makes no sense to have a line of succession that could change partisan control of the presidency like this in the middle of a term.
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The old statute had the Sec'y of State next in line. The current law passed in 1947, favoring the Speaker b/c of a notion that it should be someone elected, not appointed.
But that rationale was demolished in 1967, when 25A2 provided for filling VP vacancies by appointment.
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Thread on late-impeachment related questions asked in the trial.
Q1. Given that some pre-1787 state constitutions provided expressly for late impeachment, does the Framers' failure to do so suggest they didn't mean to allow late impeachment?
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A1: No pre-1787 state constitutions expressly ruled out late impeachment. Some did later—using direct language.
The Framers ruled out *other* things using direct language.
Their silence here thus does not suggest an intent to rule out late impeachment.
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Q2: If disqualification is not derivative of removal, is it possible to disqualify a sitting president without removing him?
A2: No. Art. II, §4 requires removal of sitting officials, separate from anything Art. I, §3 says about DQ and removal.
The article favored late impeachability, but it set out all the evidence I found on both sides--lots for them to use.
But in several places, they misrepresent what I wrote quite badly.
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One odd thing they do is cite me citing other sources instead of just citing those sources (e.g., p.17 & n.47). Another more problematic thing: they suggest that I was endorsing an argument when what I actually did was note that argument--and reject it (e.g., p.21 n.57).
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There are multiple examples of such flat-out misrepresentations. The worst is page 30. They write, "When a President is no longer in office, the objective of an impeachment ceases."79
N.79 starts: "Kalt at 66."
What I actually wrote on 66 (discussion continuing onto 67):