The #Eurogroup has one deliverable today: Signal to markets that 🇪🇺 has the tools and the political commitment to stick together in the coming months. This requires above all clear communication instead of ambiguous Brussels lingo.
Thread:
1/ Market volatility in recent days has shown that the risk of fragmentation is real. This is a symmetric shock that hits all member states, but its impact could very well be very asymmetric, also on bond markets.
2/ No member state needs an ESM programme at this stage. What member states need is insurance - a safety net as @hemker_h and I have called in our proposal. This safety net has to be provided by the ESM via the #Eurogroup and by the @ecb. delorscentre.eu/en/publication…
3/ The #Eurogroup today does not need to go into the details of which ESM instruments could be used for which situation or how EMU can be further strengthened. These are important considerations, but not for now.
Instead, it should make a few things very clear:
4/ First, we have all the instruments we need to deal with the fallout of this crisis. Second, we have the unanimous political determination to use these instruments if necessary. And third, access to ESM instruments will be free of political costs, i.e. no conditionality.
5/ These three elements would make an important contribution to anchor market expectations about the Eurozone's collective response. But this requires extreme clarity: The #Eurogroup has specialised in constructive ambiguity in recent years. This needs to stop today.
6/ But clarity is not only important vis-à-vis markets, but also for domestic audiences: It needs to be crystal-clear that this time signing an MoU would be a mere formality that does not mean submission to conditionality and a troika-style regime.
7/ This is essential for any government to be able to eventually request ESM assistance and hence for the safety net to be credible in the first place. This is a crisis that does not emanate from policy mistakes and the ESM treaty gives us the flexibility to cater for that.
8/ The #Eurogroup needs to show today that 🇪🇺 is now in full crisis mode and can deliver fast and with determination. This is what the #Eurogroup was built for - it's time to show that it is still up to the task.
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FAZ reports that the federal president is consulting with the chancellor and the leader of the opposition on next steps if the coalition collapses.
Good moment to run you through the main options and steps that would follow if indeed it's over:
There are essentially two ways this could end. Lindner could just pull the plug. FDP ministers would resign from their posts. Or Scholz runs out of patience and asks the federal president to remove Lindner (and presumably also the other FDP ministers).
The government would have no majority in parliament anymore. But in Germany, you cannot force a chancellor or a government out of office by simple no-confidence vote. The Bundestag would need to elect another chancellor to do that. And there is no majority in sight for anyone.
Draghi hat seinen Bericht zur Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas vorgelegt - und natürlich konzentriert sich die Diskussion in 🇩🇪 sofort auf die Frage neue EU-Schulden ja/nein/vielleicht.
Warum das ein Fehler und dieser Bericht eine große Chance auch aus Berliner Perspektive ist:
Der Bericht ist zunächst eine ziemlich schonungslose Standortbestimmung der europäischen Wirtschaft im globalen Vergleich. Und Draghi sagt: Es sieht nicht gut aus. Als zentrale Gründe macht er fehlende Produktivität und mangelnde Innovation aus.
Außerdem nennt er die Herausforderungen durch Fachkräftemangel, hohe Energiepreise und notwendige Dekarbonisierung. Und eben die globale, teilweise unfaire, Konkurrenz. Klingt alles bekannt aus der deutschen Debatte? Eben.
The Draghi report has just dropped - and it is surprisingly good and low-bullshit.
My initial takeaways:
Such reports tend to be boring to read: Because the authors are mincing their words, because of too many cooks in the kitchen, because the "outside expert" is not really allowed to say what they want or do not know what they want to say.
The Letta report suffered from several of these ailments. The Draghi report suffers from none thereof. The man obviously knows what he wants to say and doesn't mince his words. The report is refreshingly low-bullshit, puts fingers in obvious wounds and largely avoids euphemisms.
The 🚦 agreement is actually pretty good news for a number of Eurozone files, including the fiscal rules and EDIS.
Here are the main bits:
1/ Most importantly, the text says that the fiscal rules can be "developed further" to reach three goals: Secure growth, safeguard debt sustainability and foster green investment. They should also become "simpler and more transparent, also to strengthen implementation".
2/ This is pretty big. No red lines here, but an open and constructive opening position for negotiations that can very well include a change to the rules themselves. It will be now up to the Commission and other member states to take up the offer that is in that text.
Das @_FriedrichMerz-Interview im @handelsblatt ist beeindruckendes Anschauungsmaterial, wie sich ein Teil der Konservativen im europapolitischen Wald verirrt hat und jetzt nicht mehr herausfindet.
Warum das ein Problem ist:
1/ Es geht mit dem klassischen Motiv los, dass man höllisch aufpassen muss, den faulen Südeuropäern (hier stv 🇮🇹🇪🇸) nicht ihr Hallodritum zu finanzieren. Dass gerade diese Länder die ambitioniertesten Pläne zur Verwendung der EU-Gelder vorgelegt haben, bleibt natürlich unerwähnt.
2/ Es geht dann weiter zu den Schuldenregeln. Hier räumt auch Merz ein, dass die Einhaltung für viele Länder schwierig wird. Und dann wird es spannend: Er drückt sich extrem wortreich um eine Antwort herum, ob man die Regeln denn nun wirklich so einhalten sollte.
Commissioner @PaoloGentiloni announces in @SZ that the Commission will only present its proposal for fiscal rules reform once there is a consensus among eurozone countries. Here's why this is a wise approach and why we are still far away from that point: sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/eu-…
1/ A weird feeling has grown in recent months that an expenditure rule is the way to go to reform the SGP and that what we basically need now is a Commission proposal that the technocrats then can tweak so that everyone is happy. Everyone is now waiting for that proposal.
2/ In my view, this feeling is a trap and the Commission is now trying to avoid falling into this trap by basically asking member states to come to a consensus what they want before puttting out a proposal.