Lucas Guttenberg Profile picture
Mar 16, 2020 9 tweets 4 min read Read on X
The #Eurogroup has one deliverable today: Signal to markets that 🇪🇺 has the tools and the political commitment to stick together in the coming months. This requires above all clear communication instead of ambiguous Brussels lingo.

Thread:
1/ Market volatility in recent days has shown that the risk of fragmentation is real. This is a symmetric shock that hits all member states, but its impact could very well be very asymmetric, also on bond markets.
2/ No member state needs an ESM programme at this stage. What member states need is insurance - a safety net as @hemker_h and I have called in our proposal. This safety net has to be provided by the ESM via the #Eurogroup and by the @ecb.
delorscentre.eu/en/publication…
3/ The #Eurogroup today does not need to go into the details of which ESM instruments could be used for which situation or how EMU can be further strengthened. These are important considerations, but not for now.

Instead, it should make a few things very clear:
4/ First, we have all the instruments we need to deal with the fallout of this crisis. Second, we have the unanimous political determination to use these instruments if necessary. And third, access to ESM instruments will be free of political costs, i.e. no conditionality.
5/ These three elements would make an important contribution to anchor market expectations about the Eurozone's collective response. But this requires extreme clarity: The #Eurogroup has specialised in constructive ambiguity in recent years. This needs to stop today.
6/ But clarity is not only important vis-à-vis markets, but also for domestic audiences: It needs to be crystal-clear that this time signing an MoU would be a mere formality that does not mean submission to conditionality and a troika-style regime.
7/ This is essential for any government to be able to eventually request ESM assistance and hence for the safety net to be credible in the first place. This is a crisis that does not emanate from policy mistakes and the ESM treaty gives us the flexibility to cater for that.
8/ The #Eurogroup needs to show today that 🇪🇺 is now in full crisis mode and can deliver fast and with determination. This is what the #Eurogroup was built for - it's time to show that it is still up to the task.

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More from @lucasguttenberg

Nov 24, 2021
The 🚦 agreement is actually pretty good news for a number of Eurozone files, including the fiscal rules and EDIS.

Here are the main bits:
1/ Most importantly, the text says that the fiscal rules can be "developed further" to reach three goals: Secure growth, safeguard debt sustainability and foster green investment. They should also become "simpler and more transparent, also to strengthen implementation".
2/ This is pretty big. No red lines here, but an open and constructive opening position for negotiations that can very well include a change to the rules themselves. It will be now up to the Commission and other member states to take up the offer that is in that text.
Read 9 tweets
Sep 13, 2021
Das @_FriedrichMerz-Interview im @handelsblatt ist beeindruckendes Anschauungsmaterial, wie sich ein Teil der Konservativen im europapolitischen Wald verirrt hat und jetzt nicht mehr herausfindet.

Warum das ein Problem ist:
1/ Es geht mit dem klassischen Motiv los, dass man höllisch aufpassen muss, den faulen Südeuropäern (hier stv 🇮🇹🇪🇸) nicht ihr Hallodritum zu finanzieren. Dass gerade diese Länder die ambitioniertesten Pläne zur Verwendung der EU-Gelder vorgelegt haben, bleibt natürlich unerwähnt.
2/ Es geht dann weiter zu den Schuldenregeln. Hier räumt auch Merz ein, dass die Einhaltung für viele Länder schwierig wird. Und dann wird es spannend: Er drückt sich extrem wortreich um eine Antwort herum, ob man die Regeln denn nun wirklich so einhalten sollte.
Read 13 tweets
Sep 6, 2021
Commissioner @PaoloGentiloni announces in @SZ that the Commission will only present its proposal for fiscal rules reform once there is a consensus among eurozone countries. Here's why this is a wise approach and why we are still far away from that point:
sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/eu-…
1/ A weird feeling has grown in recent months that an expenditure rule is the way to go to reform the SGP and that what we basically need now is a Commission proposal that the technocrats then can tweak so that everyone is happy. Everyone is now waiting for that proposal.
2/ In my view, this feeling is a trap and the Commission is now trying to avoid falling into this trap by basically asking member states to come to a consensus what they want before puttting out a proposal.
Read 14 tweets
Jun 21, 2021
CDU and CSU are about to publish their election manifesto. On EU economic governance/fiscal policy, it is in perfect continuity with the Merkel line: No openings, no thick red lines.

Quick overview:
1/ CDU and CSU say they want a "stability and growth union". Who doesn't. They say they want to return swiftly to the fiscal rules but to "develop them further without watering them down." The also want sanctions to be applied and less room for judgment. No surprise here.
2/ On the Recovery Instrument, they insist that it is temporary and a one-off - which is true. They also say it cannot lead to a "debt union" and there cannot be a mutualisation of sovereign debt - both of which are not bound to happen. So no surprises here.
Read 7 tweets
May 18, 2021
The German Constitutional Court today pulled back from the brink and put the case on the ECB's PSPP programme finally to rest. The saga ends with a lot of damage on all sides and a number of open questions.

A first take:
1/ The Court really wanted the plaintiffs to know that it's game over for now. They first declared their request for an intervention inadmissible on formal grounds. But just to get the message through, they also then went into why it was not only inadmissble but also unjustified.
2/ In the original judgment, the Court had faulted the federal government and the Bundestag for not pushing the ECB to perform a proportionality assessment of its PSPP programme. See thread for the full story and for how these two reacted:
Read 15 tweets
May 17, 2021
Ahead of tomorrow's publication of Karlsruhe's decision on whether its judgment on the ECB's PSPP programme has been sufficiently respected, let's take a look back what happened so far in this season:
1/ On 5 May 2020, the @BVerfG delivered its surprise judgment. It is important to keep in mind what the Court actually said: The addressees of the judgment were the German federal government and the Bundestag. These two had violated the rights of the plaintiffs.
2/ How did they do that? Govt and Bundestag did not, in the eyes of the Court, sufficiently pressure the ECB to explain why the PSPP programme (the ECB's quantitative easing tool) was a proportionate measure. That's it, that was the judgment.
Read 20 tweets

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