This Zoom thing is a good time to discuss "threat models". Is Zoom "secure"? Well, that depends upon your threat model. In other words, secure against what, precisely?
Two threat model questions are:
- will it allow hackers to break into your computer/accounts?
- will it allow hackers to eavesdrop on current/previous sessions?
- will it allow hackers to break into your computer/accounts?
- will it allow hackers to eavesdrop on current/previous sessions?
While Zoom can work within a browser, it strong-arms people into installing an app. This is problematic, as browser apps are relatively safe, but installing apps, especially on desktops, is incredibly unsafe. It gives hackers ways of hacking your desktop computer.
In contrast to Zoom is Discord, a very similar app that targets gamers instead of corporate users. It, too, encourages people to install the app on the desktop, but makes it easy to use as a browser app.
Now you can run Zoom solely within a browser, it's just very hard. I've done it, but I haven't documented the steps. When it detects you've got Windows or Mac, it really makes it difficult to use the browser -- it's possible, just not through the normal means.
Thus the answer to this portion of the threat model isn't "don't use Zoom because app dangers" but "figure out how to use it solely within Chrome". Like most threats, the answer is not "don't do it", but "mitigate it".
Now let's talk about eavesdropping. Is Zoom safe enough for remote school classrooms? Absolutely. Is it safe enough for standard business meetings? Probably.
Is it safe enough for important business secrets, national secrets, and cybersex? Probably not.
Is it safe enough for important business secrets, national secrets, and cybersex? Probably not.
There's a good reason why it's not safe enough for cybersex or national secrets: it has to work with the plain old telephone system that is designed to allow for eavesdropping. Most every Zoom conference I've been on has included people who dial in.
Thus, this security flaw is less a problem with the app so much as a problem of the requirements users have, demanding that it allows people to dial in.
If you want secure cybersex sessions that people aren't going to be able to eavesdrop on or record, use Facetime or Signal. That's what these apps are designed for.
And yes, it's a Boomer problem. Corporations are full of old executives and sales people who can't use modern apps and who prefer to use plain old telephone calling. Young people seem to prefer to use apps to make phone calls anyway.
I don't include "Terms and Conditions" or "Privacy Policy" in my threat model. As far as I can tell, they are fiction, using a lot of words to say simply "we can do whatever we want but you can't do thing you want".
That's what "end-to-end encryption" means. ToS doesn't stop them from eavesdropping on your calls/sessions, but end-to-end encryption does. No ToS ever created prevents eavesdropping.
So use end-to-end encryption if you don't want the service provider eavesdropping, otherwise assume that they'll sometimes be eavesdropping, regardless of what ToS says. Zoom doesn't have end-to-end encryption, Signal does.
By that last tweet I mean to demonstrate the principle "I don't know your threat model". I can't either recommend Zoom or recommend you avoid Zoom, because I don't know your threat model. This is probably the greatest lesson of "threat models", that there isn't one for everyone.
This is a good counterpoint:
