1/n Two interesting findings thus far from my analysis of Pew's March 2020 COVID-19 survey. First, white (and especially 'very') liberals are far more likely than all other ideological-racial subgroups to report being diagnosed with a mental health condition.
2/n Somewhat surprisingly, this difference further grows when we add standard controls
3/n We next turn to mean responses to this battery, which asks about the frequency at which respondents experienced specific mental health issues over the previous 7 days
4/n The differences are more modest here, but still significant
5/n They are also robust to several potential confounds (e.g. job loss, pay-cuts, marital status)
6/n However, entering the 'mental health diagnosis' variable into the model does (perhaps naturally) narrow the difference.
7/n In other words, at least some of the differences in the covid-mental health battery between white liberals and others are accounted for by the former's higher likelihood of being diagnosed with a mental health condition.
8/n It's possible that the disparities in self-reported diagnosis are simply or partly a function of white liberals being more likely to seek mental health evaluations. I don't have the data to answer this question. But given that they also tend to score higher on neuroticism..
9/n (and, not to mention, score lower on life satisfaction/happiness), I think at least some of this difference is genuine.
10/n I didn't write this thread to mock white liberals or their apparently disproportionate rates of mental illness (and you shouldn't either). Rather, this is a question that's underexplored and which may shed light on attitudinal differences towards various social policies.
11/n Overall, and with one exception (white moderates), those in 18-29 age group are more likely to report being diagnosed with a mental health condition. The differences among white liberals, though, are striking: almost half of white liberals in this cohort report a diagnosis.
12/n @jean_twenge would like to get your thoughts on this. I know you've studied some of these trends.
13/n Big 5 personality profiles for white libs who report/don't report receiving a mental health condition diagnosis.
14/n One of the things that concern me about liberal social engineering and norm-promotion efforts is that they ostensibly cater to those who are emotionally fragile or those with specific personality profiles. Those with different personality profiles or have higher emotional..
15/n stability are just expected to shut up and deal with it.
16/n Some of you asked for it, so here is the last chart broken down by gender. Biggest gap within age x ideological groups is between white liberal men (33.6%) and women (56.3%) in the 18-29 category
Do Americans broadly oppose military action against Iran?
Recent polling suggests they do. A Reuters/Ipsos survey conducted May 15–18 found that 61% of Americans disapproved of U.S. military strikes against Iran, while 52% said the military action was not worth it.
But generic approval questions may not tell the whole story.
2/10
Our latest @fsuigc survey of 1,059 American adults (also conducted by Ipsos, May 19–28) approached the issue differently.
Instead of asking simply whether military action was “worth it,” we examined how Americans think about the tradeoffs involved—including the perceived threat posed by Iran, the prospects for diplomacy, and the costs people are willing to bear to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
The results paint a considerably more nuanced picture.
A short thread: 👇
3/10
First, baseline attitudes are hawkish on the Iranian nuclear threat itself:
58% of Americans—including 72% of Republicans and 46% of Democrats— say a nuclear-armed Iran would be a Very or Extremely serious long-term threat to the U.S. and its allies.
Only 12% say it’s “not too serious” or “not at all serious.”
1/Thrilled to share @fsuigc’s latest report, based on a national survey of 1,447 U.S. adults we conducted in late September—one week after the assassination of Charlie Kirk.
We examine how Americans think about harmful speech and whether physical violence can ever be justified to stop its public expression.
1/ I'm delighted to finally share some of the work I've done since joining @fsuigc.
Last month, we published a report about political tolerance based on national survey data (N=1,004) we collected during the summer. In this study, we measure political tolerance as the willingness to interact with or accept people with opposing political views across different relational contexts. For comparison, we also measured tolerance towards ex-felons and flat earthers.
2/ As shown in the table below, across all contexts, people are much more willing to engage with people with opposing political views than the other two target groups. Regardless of the target group, though, openness tends to decline as the intimacy of an engagement increases. For instance, whereas 73% would engage in a social/recreational activity with political opponents (ex-Felon: 54%, flat-earther: 49%) without reservation, just 41% would be willing to date them (ex-Felon: 22%, flat-earther: 19%)
3/Consistent with this intimacy 'gradient', our analysis finds that our 7 tolerance items best fit a 3-factor structure, which is depicted in the table below.
1/ Updated racial ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer differentials from the ANES. In sum, while the 'curve has flattened', the attitudinal effects of the Great Awokening persist (at least wrt race). If you thought or hoped otherwise, sorry to disappoint.
2/ In fact, coverage linking Israel to “genocide” now exceeds that of every actual or widely recognized genocide of the last 40 years, including:
Rwanda (1994)
Darfur (2003–2008)
Bosnia (Srebrenica, 1995)
Myanmar (Rohingya, 2017–Present)
Yazidis (ISIS, 2014–2017)
3/ In The New York Times, for example, the spike in 2023–2024 mentions of “genocide” alongside “Israel” is more than 9x larger than the peak for Rwanda in the mid-1990s and nearly 6x the peak for the more recent Darfur genocide.
1/ One of the more counterintuitive findings in my latest article:
Historically, when Democrats only control the House, an average of just over 10 race-conscious provisions are added to the NDAA per year.
When they control both the House and Senate? That number drops to about 4.
But why?
2/ First, what makes the House so powerful here?
Simple: the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) writes the first draft of the NDAA.
If you control the House, you control the blueprint—and the early language that often survives reconciliation. That’s where ideological riders get embedded.
3/But why are more race-conscious provisions added under divided government?
While I can’t say for sure, my reasoning is this: when Democrats only control the House, the NDAA becomes one of the few legislative vehicles guaranteed to pass.
Standalone race-conscious or DEI bills are less likely to survive the Senate.