@MarcAndreChart1 @kfacciol @Simberg_Space Oh, I agree. From a safety standpoint, in both design and management, Shuttle was seriously flawed from the beginning. I discuss that in the book. But we can't just say "safety first," or have a one-size-fits-all approach for probability of loss of crew. It depends.
@MarcAndreChart1 @kfacciol @Simberg_Space Let's talk a minute about Apollo 13, and "Failure is not an option" (which Kranz never actually said). Once the LOX tank did a rapid unscheduled disassembly, mission control had no choice, except to do everything possible to get the crew back alive.
@MarcAndreChart1 @kfacciol @Simberg_Space In that circumstance, "failure is not an option" is a good attitude to have.
But when you're planning a mission, or deciding to launch, "Failure is not an option" is a recipe for inaction, and caution, and failure by not performing the mission.
But when you're planning a mission, or deciding to launch, "Failure is not an option" is a recipe for inaction, and caution, and failure by not performing the mission.
@MarcAndreChart1 @kfacciol @Simberg_Space And that is exactly the mode we've been in since 2011. We could have been flying American crews on American vehicles, and ended our dependence on the Russians years ago. Why didn't we? Because "safety first," and "failure is not an option."
@MarcAndreChart1 @kfacciol @Simberg_Space Because of that attitude, NASA came up with a one-size-fits-all number for probability of loss of crew. It was a number that was arbitrary, completely unverifiable, and we'll never know whether or not we achieved it. But the requirement has kept us grounded for almost a decade.
@MarcAndreChart1 @kfacciol @Simberg_Space What would the sane approach have been?
Get a vehicle ready to fly. Calculate the LOC probability. Evaluate the importance of the mission. Inform the crew of P of LOC. Decide whether the risk is worth the mission value.If it is, fly. If not, try to improve odds.
Get a vehicle ready to fly. Calculate the LOC probability. Evaluate the importance of the mission. Inform the crew of P of LOC. Decide whether the risk is worth the mission value.If it is, fly. If not, try to improve odds.
@MarcAndreChart1 @kfacciol @Simberg_Space In each case, since Shuttle retirement, the mission value was (at a minimum) to end our dependence on a hostile power, and stop shipping it money that we could have been using to fly our crew on our own vehicles, and continuously improve their safety over time.
@MarcAndreChart1 @kfacciol @Simberg_Space If we had done that, is there a possibility that we could have lost a crew?
Sure. We flew with that possibility every single flight in the 60s. On Apollo 13, it came very close to happening. But it didn't keep us from flying.
Why not? Because it was important.
Sure. We flew with that possibility every single flight in the 60s. On Apollo 13, it came very close to happening. But it didn't keep us from flying.
Why not? Because it was important.
@MarcAndreChart1 @kfacciol @Simberg_Space And clearly, it was important in a way that ending our dependence on Russia for access to space has never been. And continues to not be. Because we continue to have the stultifying attitude that "safety is the highest priority."
