The main reason that one sees so many tweets about the 25th Amendment (§4) is that so many people think it works like this:
Step 1: Someone invokes the 25th Amendment.
Step 2: The president is removed from office.
But it doesn't work like that.
1/6
First, it requires incapacity. Not impairment, ineptitude, or extreme badness. Full-on incapacity. That's a high bar.
Second, it's invoked by the VP and Cabinet. 25A's drafters thought they'd be reluctant to move against their boss. For the drafters, this was a plus.
2/6
(Don't say "25A is unavailable b/c the whole Cabinet is 'acting.'" Only 1 of the 15 is acting, and even if there were more it wouldn't pose a problem.)
Third, if 25A4 is invoked, the president isn't removed. He can come back—and 25A4 stacks the deck heavily in his favor.
3/6
In a contested case 25A4 requires more votes in Congress than impeachment/removal. If not enough folks want him gone to make impeachment work, 25A4 will fall even shorter.
In essence, 25A4 requires a big chunk of the president's backers to think that he's already gone.
4/6
Fourth, this means invoking 25A4 likely would only sideline a resistant president for a few days.
Now imagine what the aftermath of his return would look like.
The probable net effect of invoking 25A4 doesn't seem likely to please Trump opponents. It's not the right tool.
5/6
Bottom line: Any time a president is able to contest a 25A4 action, 25A4's design *protects* the president and makes it hard to push him aside. People who want to be rid of Trump would be better off seeking more fruitful avenues.
This gambit is just the latest example of why the statutory line of succession shouldn't include the Speaker.
This isn't a partisan issue; it'd be nuts to have a D Speaker in the line of succession of a R administration, and equally nuts w/ a D administration and R Speaker.
Scholar-commentators (including me) have been arguing for reform here for decades, consistently—regardless of which party was in power.
It makes no sense to have a line of succession that could change partisan control of the presidency like this in the middle of a term.
2/5
The old statute had the Sec'y of State next in line. The current law passed in 1947, favoring the Speaker b/c of a notion that it should be someone elected, not appointed.
But that rationale was demolished in 1967, when 25A2 provided for filling VP vacancies by appointment.
3/5
Thread on late-impeachment related questions asked in the trial.
Q1. Given that some pre-1787 state constitutions provided expressly for late impeachment, does the Framers' failure to do so suggest they didn't mean to allow late impeachment?
1/
A1: No pre-1787 state constitutions expressly ruled out late impeachment. Some did later—using direct language.
The Framers ruled out *other* things using direct language.
Their silence here thus does not suggest an intent to rule out late impeachment.
2/
Q2: If disqualification is not derivative of removal, is it possible to disqualify a sitting president without removing him?
A2: No. Art. II, §4 requires removal of sitting officials, separate from anything Art. I, §3 says about DQ and removal.
The article favored late impeachability, but it set out all the evidence I found on both sides--lots for them to use.
But in several places, they misrepresent what I wrote quite badly.
1/4
One odd thing they do is cite me citing other sources instead of just citing those sources (e.g., p.17 & n.47). Another more problematic thing: they suggest that I was endorsing an argument when what I actually did was note that argument--and reject it (e.g., p.21 n.57).
2/4
There are multiple examples of such flat-out misrepresentations. The worst is page 30. They write, "When a President is no longer in office, the objective of an impeachment ceases."79
N.79 starts: "Kalt at 66."
What I actually wrote on 66 (discussion continuing onto 67):