1) This is a thread on 'viewpoint diversity' vs. racial, gender, SES, etc. diversity. It's mainly based on the observation that proponents of the former tend to take issue with the latter, or at least to see that latter as 'politicized' and without epistemic virtue. ...
2) Particularly in academic and research contexts, the argument for viewpoint diversity is that study results and their interpretations will be skewed if the people doing and interpreting the studies all have the same values and political views.
3) Some of the fiercest proponents of this view--I'm looking at you in psychology and sociology in particular--hold it up as a rational and epistemically superior alternative to 'social justice' forms of diversity. I think it's fair to say they even argue racial, gender, etc. ...
4) ...diversity *get in the way of* knowledge production, whereas viewpoint diversity is a necessary precondition of reliable knowledge production. However, this view seems completely at odds with the history of and practice of knowledge production.
5) I'll accept the premise that viewpoint diversity is good for knowledge production. Why then should I reject the premise that other forms of diversity (typically more associated with 'left' politics) are good for knowledge production? I shouldn't. Here's why:
6) As historians and philosophers of science make clear (thinking in particular of Naomi Oreskes and Helen Longino), we get better results not just with a multiplicity of political viewpoints in the room, but with a multiplicity of experiential perspectives in the room.
7) Oreskes gives the example of research done exclusively by men suggesting education & work had particularly negative effects on women's health. Likewise for failing to detect links between birth control and depression. These were *empirical* failures as well as political ones.
8) Likewise Longino's concept of 'transformative interrogation,' in short the critical examination of a theory, idea, process, etc. from all angles among a diverse group of scientists, is an argument for *better empiricist practice*, not for 'politicizing' knowledge.
9) Likewise it's little more than common sense that some degree of perspective influences how and what we see. If I'd like to know about the weather in Reykjavik I'd rather hear from someone there than from someone in Los Angeles. Similarly if I'd like to know about ...
10) ...what it's like to be Black in academe, I'm not going to ask a panel of white people. Likewise I'm not going to assemble a group of all-white scholars to investigate that phenomenon. What this amounts to is obviously some degree of what we call 'viewpoint' diversity ...
11) ...is more literal than 'viewpoint' as synonym for 'politics' or 'ideology.' It's also literally what you see and don't see as as a function of who you are or are not, or how you're seen or not seen. This shouldn't be controversial as an account of how empiricism works/fails.
12) This is all to say: The view that it's *either* 'viewpoint diversity' *or* racial, gender, SES, etc. diversity is logically incoherent. The two are clearly linked and, moreover, by the logic of one, should be combined with the other. If ideological contestation strengthens...
13) ..knowledge production, that's just a restatement of Longino's *feminist* account of strengthening empiricism, or Charles Mills's account of 'white ignorance.' The logic of 'viewpoint diversity' is the same as these. The only reason to reject one for the other is...politics!
14) /end
