For COVID-19 contact tracing technology, proximity-only apps (based on Bluetooth) are more privacy-preserving than apps that use location (based on GPS or cell tower data).
States and public health authorities should avoid any apps that use location.
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States and public health authorities should avoid any apps that use location.
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Location tracking is precise enough to reveal sensitive details about individuals, but not sufficiently precise to show whether two people were close enough together to transmit the virus. 2/7 eff.org/deeplinks/2020…
That’s one of the reasons why we are so disappointed by Utah's Healthy Together app, which tracks GPS location data in addition to proximity and cell tower data. 3/7 kuer.org/post/privacy-c…
Likewise, EFF does not support app models that gather both location data and proximity data, such as MIT @medialab’s Safe Paths. 4/7 safepaths.mit.edu
Instead, if states and public health authorities are going to use contact tracing and exposure notification technology, they should limit their data collection to Bluetooth-based proximity tracking. 5/7 eff.org/deeplinks/2020…
Groups like DP-3T, PACT, and COVIDWatch have proposed decentralized, Bluetooth-only systems designed to minimize inherent privacy risks. Apple and Google’s exposure notification API puts this kind of system into practice. 6/7 eff.org/deeplinks/2020…
Ultimately, however, these technologies are unproven and untested, and must not be a substitute for public health workers’ direct interviews of patients. At best, this technology can serve as only a small part of a larger public health response to COVID-19. 7/7
