One factor that bears mentioning, although it is purely speculative, is the possible weight that a unused Chinese pathogen might exist could exert on the strategic calculus.
Coronavirus demonstrated the lower bound of what China is scientifically capable of simply from nature.
Coronavirus demonstrated the lower bound of what China is scientifically capable of simply from nature.
It is not completely implausible to assume that a much more potent virus may exist, in China's labs or elsewhere. But it can only have a deterrent, stabilizing effect if its existence were publicly known. If it remains suspected it's just another Big Black Swan.
I argued that the major argument for universal contact tracing and testing was to act as a detection and verification system for biowarfare treaty violations.
pjmedia.com/richardfernand…
pjmedia.com/richardfernand…
"This creates the opportunity to link the bioweapon research verification problem to the proposed surveillance programs warning of coronavirus and future pathogens, in the process fixing some of the problems of each. ...
"Surveillance programs can provide a powerful means of detecting the traces of illegal experiments, escaped pathogens, or tests of bioweapons in populations. But to be useful, the data must be verifiable and shared."
It seems to be a forlorn hope now. States, especially China, are treating pandemic information like national security data. Sanitized. Tweaked for political effect. If there's large scale vaccine testing in China will it be detectable?
