gilles Moec Profile picture
Jun 30, 2020 11 tweets 2 min read Read on X
Assuming our economies continue to normalise fairly swiftly (which in Europe remains the likely scenario) fiscal policy should shift from emergency “carpet bombing” offsetting the collapse in supply to long-haul demand management 1/11
However industries/businesses were not equal in the face of the lockdown and some of them will need specific protection for long. This is triggering a debate on over-protection/zombification. We think however that sectoral support is part of demand management. 2/11
The new long term part-time unemployement scheme unveiled in France will offer up to 2 years relief to badly hit firms through up to 40% working time reduction subsidized to the tune of 80-85% by the government. More than 25% of their employees pay would be socialised 3/11
This could impair “creative destruction”, i.e the reallocation of labour and capital from the least productive sectors to the most productive ones, depleting potential growth. But we don’t think this applies to our current situation 4/11
Lockdowns do not follow economic logic. They have profoundly affected perfectly viable and productive firms. Allowing them to be “wiped out” could actually deplete aggregate productivity. 5/11
Labour reallocation is a messy process at the best of time, in particular because of skills mismatch across sectors. It would be even worse at the current junction because even “strong” sectors faced with low demand prospects will hesitate to hire more 6/11
Allowing a quick “release” of employees from the worst-hit sectors to an already depressed labour market could trigger a negative spiral on demand, with precautionary saving sky-rocketing 7/11
And the fiscal cost needs to be assessed in net terms. With an average replacement rate of unemployment benefits at 70% of the previous wage in France, avoiding 1 full job loss would financially justify 2.8 APLD beneficiaries. 8/11
It is a fine line of course between over and under protection, but the Schumpetarian approach looks particularly risky in our current environment 9/11
Full weekly musings here 10/11 axa-im.com/content/-/asse…
And Podcast version here (warning: don’t listen if you are allergic to English/Australian singers with a falsetto voice) 11/11 smartlink.ausha.co/macrocast/14

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More from @MoecGilles

Feb 22, 2021
The Euro area is facing contagion from the US bond market reacting to the Biden plan in the form of higher real rates. Now, some overheating in the US may be in the ECB’s interest if it triggers some Euro depreciation 1/6
What happens if the Fed opts for “quick tapering” and US 10y yields go to 3% by 2022? In our model this would take the Euro down 10% against the dollar after 1y relative to the ECB’s baseline. That could bring EA inflation to 1.9% in 2023 from 1.4% in baseline 2/6
BUT it works only if the ECB is active in fighting “market-led tightening in financing conditions”. First because Euro will weaken only if the IR spread widens, and second because the impact of lower Fx on inflation will be lost if the output gap is too big 3/6
Read 6 tweets
Sep 23, 2020
Fabio Panetta’s speech could well be the beginning of the ECB’s response to the Fed’s Average Inflation Targeting - assuming it is embraced by the rest of the Governing Council 1/9
The Fed’s move is based on the notion that it is easier to allow inflation to overshoot in the future amid decent cyclical conditions than to lift infla amid bad cyclical conditions. A pledge to overshoot tomorrow is thus credible and could lift inflation expectations today 2/9
A drawback of AIT is that it can send a signal of powerlessness today, or even justify a certain immobilism in the short run: “since I promised something for the future, don’t ask me to do more today” 3/9
Read 9 tweets
Sep 7, 2020
It’s a swoosh! The global data flow continues to point upward but the pace of normalisation is slowing down. See for instance the deceleration in US private payroll growth and retreat in Euro area PMIs (although still in expansion territory 1/8
This calls for policy support beyond the emergency packages. The French recovery plan participates to this. But at the same time we are surprised by fiscally disciplinarian noises emerging here and there 2/8
The UK is breaking ranks with a debate heating up on tax hikes next year already. We interpret this as the concerns in some segments of the UK government about the status of the UK in international markets post hard Brexit 3/8
Read 8 tweets
Jul 21, 2020
It’s always pleasing to see the British Eurosceptic press defeated again: habemus RRF deal! Rumours of the EU’s death were exaggerated as usual 😊 1/8
Now, on substance, the signals are very positive. The taboo of debt mutualisation is broken. Financial solidarity that does not saddle recipients with more debt is an important political moment 2/8
However, with the grants reduced, and the inherently slow disbursement schedule, the RRF is no macroeconomic game-changer 3/8
Read 8 tweets
Jul 8, 2020
The pandemic acceleration/stimulus debate loop has started again in the US. Real-time data is starting to reflect a relapse in activity. Pumping up more pent-up household demand may not be the solution though 1/11
The HEROES act passed by the House in May legislates for an even more generous “check” to households (4800 USD for a family of 4 instead of 3400). D.Trump signalled openness to make it even bigger 2/11
Still, as of May, total household income was already 3.8% > the pre-pandemic level. The drop in labour income is more than offset by the rise in transfers (even if many families fall through the safety net) 3/11
Read 11 tweets
Jun 23, 2020
A 1% decline in GDP triggers a 6% rise in the non-performing loans ratio. This matters for the public debt trajectory given the size of the loan guarantees offered to deal with the pandemic in some countries 1/9
In the case of Italy, the impact of the ongoing recession would be consistent with 13% of loans turning “delinquent”. With an average guarantee of 80% if all the envelope is used, this could add another 2.5% of GDP to the deficit 2/9
But more fundamentally, this would add to the risk of a premature fiscal consolidation being ultimately counterproductive 3/9
Read 9 tweets

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