In my first article for Persuasion, I explain the reasons for launching this community.
Why this project? Why now? And how can a bunch of us really make a difference to the future of free societies in the United States and around the world?
[Thread.]
persuasion.community/p/the-purpose-…
Why this project? Why now? And how can a bunch of us really make a difference to the future of free societies in the United States and around the world?
[Thread.]
persuasion.community/p/the-purpose-…
The key to an answer lies in a short—and obviously highly schematic—history of American intellectual life over the past half century.
Fifty years ago, American institutions enjoyed a degree of legitimacy that's now hard to fathom.
Nearly every American watched the news on network television and had a positive opinion of Princeton or Stanford. Most Members of Congress trusted Brookings and the CFR.
Nearly every American watched the news on network television and had a positive opinion of Princeton or Stanford. Most Members of Congress trusted Brookings and the CFR.
These institutions had much to recommend them.
They created a shared set of facts that formed the basis of political debate. Their operating system was philosophically liberal: decision-makers believed in values like free speech and due process.
But they also had big problems.
They created a shared set of facts that formed the basis of political debate. Their operating system was philosophically liberal: decision-makers believed in values like free speech and due process.
But they also had big problems.
1)
The people they admitted into their gilded halls only represented a small slice of America's population: sexism, racism and homophobia were far more prevalent than they are today.
The views these vaunted institutions thought serious sometimes included the morally abhorrent.
The people they admitted into their gilded halls only represented a small slice of America's population: sexism, racism and homophobia were far more prevalent than they are today.
The views these vaunted institutions thought serious sometimes included the morally abhorrent.
2)
The realm of the “reasonable" was too narrow.
This soon eroded these institutions’ standing. Various bands of malcontents came to believe they could never speak in their own voices in the halls of Brookings or the column inches of the NYT. They cast about for an alternative.
The realm of the “reasonable" was too narrow.
This soon eroded these institutions’ standing. Various bands of malcontents came to believe they could never speak in their own voices in the halls of Brookings or the column inches of the NYT. They cast about for an alternative.
Conservatives were the most influential of these groups.
They methodically built an ideological counter-establishment designed to rival the mainstream: National Review and Heritage, the Federalist Society and Fox News.
Measured by its own ambitions, it was a staggering success.
They methodically built an ideological counter-establishment designed to rival the mainstream: National Review and Heritage, the Federalist Society and Fox News.
Measured by its own ambitions, it was a staggering success.
Other movements took a page out of the same playbook.
In 1960, a libertarian held idiosyncratic views and had no obvious political home. Then Reason, AEI and the IHS took on their modern shape.
By 1980, the influence and self-confidence of libertarians had increased enormously.
In 1960, a libertarian held idiosyncratic views and had no obvious political home. Then Reason, AEI and the IHS took on their modern shape.
By 1980, the influence and self-confidence of libertarians had increased enormously.
The further left always had its counter-establishment institutions.
But it too has of late succeeded in building a more cohesive network of fighting institutions, as Jacobin infused it with fresh energy, universities became more progressive, and the DSA awoke from its slumbers.
But it too has of late succeeded in building a more cohesive network of fighting institutions, as Jacobin infused it with fresh energy, universities became more progressive, and the DSA awoke from its slumbers.
That’s what things looked like ten years ago.
Minoritarian ideological movements had fighting institutions of their own. Though philosophical liberals did not have a comparable home, they dominated mainstream institutions.
But then, those institutions started to change.
Minoritarian ideological movements had fighting institutions of their own. Though philosophical liberals did not have a comparable home, they dominated mainstream institutions.
But then, those institutions started to change.
Enough has been written about these changes in the past months; I won't recap its most worrying manifestations here.
Nor do I suggest the mainstream is now illegitimate: These institutions have not become wholly illiberal. Philosophical liberals should keep fighting for them.
Nor do I suggest the mainstream is now illegitimate: These institutions have not become wholly illiberal. Philosophical liberals should keep fighting for them.
But the changes within mainstream institutions do put philosophical liberals at a serious disadvantage.
An astonishing number of people tell me they can no longer write in their own voices, are counting the days until they get fired, and don't know where to turn if they do.
An astonishing number of people tell me they can no longer write in their own voices, are counting the days until they get fired, and don't know where to turn if they do.
This, to me, is a huge part of the reason why the defenders of the free society have seemed to lack conviction in recent months and years.
Feeling, at best, begrudgingly tolerated by the institutions that employ them, they are always on the back foot.
Feeling, at best, begrudgingly tolerated by the institutions that employ them, they are always on the back foot.
But if these changes explain the lack of resolve among the champions of a free society, they also point to a solution.
* Stop lamenting our loss of control over established institutions.
* Start building our own institutions.
That’s the goal of Persuasion.
* Stop lamenting our loss of control over established institutions.
* Start building our own institutions.
That’s the goal of Persuasion.
One element of this is a venue devoted to debating and defending the values of a free society.
Emulating what Reason, Jacobin and NR do for their own traditions, we seek to create a space in which philosophical liberals can ask hard questions and come up with compelling answers.
Emulating what Reason, Jacobin and NR do for their own traditions, we seek to create a space in which philosophical liberals can ask hard questions and come up with compelling answers.
This requires both a commitment to a set of shared aspirations and enough diversity of opinion to force us to think very hard about how we can make the world a better place.
Persuasion is a space for people who are open to changing their minds but not their fundamental values.
Persuasion is a space for people who are open to changing their minds but not their fundamental values.
But if places like NR and Jacobin had a tremendous influence on America, it’s also because they became the nucleus of a cohesive community.
This is why I take the community element of Persuasion so seriously.
We’re out to build an esprit de corps.
This is why I take the community element of Persuasion so seriously.
We’re out to build an esprit de corps.
Two more things:
1)
We must do what we can to preserve those universities, publications, and think tanks that still operate with fundamentally (small l) liberal assumptions.
1)
We must do what we can to preserve those universities, publications, and think tanks that still operate with fundamentally (small l) liberal assumptions.
For example, I deeply love The Atlantic and will proudly keep writing for it.
A new community for philosophical liberals will never stand in competition with a large general interest magazine whose readership, for good reason, spans a much broader ideological range.
A new community for philosophical liberals will never stand in competition with a large general interest magazine whose readership, for good reason, spans a much broader ideological range.
In fact, one reason why we need Persuasion to articulate the values of a free society as clearly and forcefully as possible is to maximize the likelihood that they will continue to form the implicit operating system of vitally important publications like The Atlantic.
2)
Our ambition needs to extend beyond nostalgia.
Our goal is not to return to a golden age that has, sadly, never existed; it is to build societies that live up to the noble and ambitious values of freedom and justice better than any society of the past.
Our ambition needs to extend beyond nostalgia.
Our goal is not to return to a golden age that has, sadly, never existed; it is to build societies that live up to the noble and ambitious values of freedom and justice better than any society of the past.
The examples I have used here are very American. But the issues at stake are global.
Only if philosophical liberalism can prove that it embodies a truly universal set of principles, with appeal from New York to Nairobi, can it hope to expand its influence in the 21st century.
Only if philosophical liberalism can prove that it embodies a truly universal set of principles, with appeal from New York to Nairobi, can it hope to expand its influence in the 21st century.
If you identify with our mission, please become a member of our community!
Please share this article widely.
Oh, and please follow our new Twitter account: @JoinPersuasion.
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Please share this article widely.
Oh, and please follow our new Twitter account: @JoinPersuasion.
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