Thread by @18airbornecorps

1 of 50:

Chapter 3: Gods of War

2 of 50: Yesterday, we set the table on Eisenhower’s grand strategy, which focused on defeating the Soviet empire without firing a shot. For more on Ike’s sweeping “New Look” policy, please see Chapter 2.

https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1282738557380157440?s=20

3 of 50: Today we focus on the role of Matthew Ridgway, Eisenhower’s Army Chief of Staff, in New Look.

4 of 50: For more on Chapter 3 read Andrew Bacevich’s 1997 article “The Paradox of Professionalism” and this piece from @WarInstitute:

mwi.usma.edu/ike-vs-ridgway…

5 of 50: For chapter 3, we’re going to focus on the brief period from 1953 to 1955 in which Eisenhower’s term as POTUS overlapped with Ridgway’s term as Army Boss.

6 of 50: During that time, the two gods of war, the airborne leader and the supreme allied commander, would battle over the heart and soul of the Army. The Army Chief of Staff vs. Commander-in-Chief.

7 of 50: It was Ike vs Ridgway

8 of 50: Ridgway felt Eisenhower's faith in new technology was dangerous. Like Ike, Ridgway was a WWII legend. Beyond WWII, the man was almost an institution unto his own.

9 of 50: A legendary paratrooper, Ridgway was the D-Day commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and the commander of the 18th Airborne Corps during the Ardennes Counteroffensive.

10 of 50: Ridgway was also the commander in Korea who rallied a @UN force to push the Chinese out of South Korea in 1951.

11 of 50: Like many of his WWII contemporaries (Patton, Bradley, Collins), Ridgway was a brilliant self-promoter.

12 of 50: He cultivated his image as a tough paratrooper, posing for pictures in a steel pot and live hand grenades hanging from his uniform, even in garrison settings.

13 of 50: During and after WWII, Ridgway worked over members of the press, sending surrogates to play up his image as a hard-nosed leader who could also inspire when it came time to “rally the boys.”

14 of 50: Nothing against Ridgway, but much of the mystique around the man is self-generated myth.

15 of 50: Ridgway was the leader of a group spitefully referred to by many in the Army as the “Airborne Mafia” -- the men who led regiments in the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions into Normandy and Njiemegen.

16 of 50: The Airborne Mafia, which also included Generals Jim Gavin, Maxwell Taylor, Tony McAuliffe, and Rueben Tucker, had an oversized influence in the Army after WWII. (We’ll get to all of them in the coming days.)

17 of 50: Not only was the airborne infantry considered the dominant landpower solution in the late 1940’s / early 1950’s, but the Airborne Mafia lorded over the Army’s top ranks.

18 of 50: To some observers, the limited impact of airborne forces on winning WWII did not justify all this attention and respect bestowed upon this small group. There is certainly a good deal of truth to that criticism.

19 of 50: Nevertheless, the Airborne Mafia carried a lot of weight, and Matthew Ridgway was effectively their godfather. He was a towering figure across the Army.

20 of 50: Ridgway disagreed strongly with Ike. Ridgway believed that, with nuclear war unthinkable, the next war would inevitably manifest on the ground, amongst infantry and artillery forces battling over terrain.

21 of 50: Ike, on the other hand, believed a large land force was a waste of money during the Atomic Age, when nuclear weapons were the key to warfare. After all, what was the point of seizing and holding terrain if that terrain could be wiped off the earth by a bomb?

22 of 50: Ridgway disagreed. He argued for a larger Army resourced with tactical nuclear weapons, capable of fighting in small units in jungles and large units in deserts and cities.

23 of 50: Ridgway saw future conflict as a ground battle integrating airpower, low-yield nuclear weapons, and artillery. He felt his Army was dangerously underprepared for this looming struggle.

24 of 50: The way Ridgway saw it, New Look was too rigid, too narrow a view of the world.

25 of 50: New Look [according to this view] left the country with no real option against the Soviet Union other than nuclear war or capitulation (the sobering phrase was “suicide or surrender”).

26 of 50: Things got real after Ike’s second State of the Union address on January 7, 1954.

pbs.org/wgbh/americane…

27 of 50: During the address, Eisenhower spoke of the need to reduce defense spending by slimming the Army down and relying on airpower.

[Here's the speech: eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/…]

28 of 50: The address enraged Ridgway.

29 of 50: These lines, in particular, drove Ridgway nuts: IKE: “...new weapons create relationships between men and materials.”

30 of 50: IKE: “These relationships permit economies in the use of men as we build forces suited to our situation in the world today. . . . the airpower of our Navy and Air Force is receiving heavy emphasis…”

31 of 50: In essence, the president said that atomic weapons allowed him to cut the Army and stabilize Air Force and Navy budgets. The airborne commander seethed.

32 of 50: Ridgway, out of loyalty to the POTUS, did not publicly express his frustration. In meetings and at the White House, however, he let his concerns be well known.

33 of 50: The general exploded in meetings, including “tank sessions” with President Eisenhower and all other service chiefs.

34 of 50: Ridgway’s view: How could Eisenhower, the brilliant Army General (and former Army Chief of Staff) not see that even in thermonuclear war, only soldiers on the ground could achieve victory?

35 of 50: After all, Ridgway complained, after an atomic bomb, we are going to need Army units to secure resources and advance America’s political and strategic objectives.

36 of 50: Eisenhower felt his chief just could not grasp the new reality of warfare. To Ike, land war had lost all relevance and Ridgway was too stupid to understand this new reality.

37 of 50: The president felt nuclear weapons created a war with no limits. The Army was still trying to put limits on war. This was dangerous, in Eisenhower’s opinion, and could lead the Soviets to think we aren’t serious about nuclear retaliation.

38 of 50: Plus, Eisenhower felt this guy was starting to grow insubordinate. By the middle of 1955, Ridgway started mouthing off to senate leaders about how wrong Eisenhower was on this issue.

39 of 50: The only purpose for an Army now, the president believed, was to restore order within the US once a Soviet bomb is dropped on our cities. You don’t need a huge Army with expensive weapons to do that.

historyinpieces.com/research/us-mi…

40 of 50: Both Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson publicly ignored their Army chief and privately questioned his intellect.

nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/…

41 of 50: In one meeting with Ridgway (and many other senior leaders) in 1955, the president exploded on his Army chief.

42 of 50: IKE: “The only thing we fear is an atomic attack delivered by air on our cities. God damn it! It would be perfect rot to talk about shipping troops abroad when 15 of our cities were in ruins!”

[for more: history.state.gov/historicaldocu…]

43 of 50: Eisenhower continued: “You would have disorder and almost complete chaos in the cities and in the roads around them. You would have to restore order and that’s what our military is going to do.”

44 of 50: While Ridgway was relegated to a marginal figure in the Pentagon, Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan Twining rose to prominence.

45 of 50: In 1955, Ridgway was effectively fired by Eisenhower, who refused to renew his Chief of Staff of the Army’s appointment after two years.

46 of 50: The ground force that liberated Europe was a fading remnant of a kind of military force long past its purpose.

47 of 50: Washington DC, like much of the country, believed a large Army to be obsolete in the age of missiles and bombers.

48 of 50: The Army needed more than its heroes of WWII, more than memories of victory in Europe, more than even the golden promise of ground combat's glory. The Army needed public relations.

49 of 50: The Army needed folks like @broadcastmike @46alpha and @brianfickel to tell its story.

50 of 50: Thus was born Army public affairs.