Chapter 12: Ridgway Was Right
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This was a time when the threat of apocalypse blanketed the country like a dark cloud of angst.
This was a time when the threat of apocalypse blanketed the country like a dark cloud of angst.
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It was a time rife with delusions, absurdities, secrets, and lies. It was a time of covert action, opportunism, and paranoia.
It was a time rife with delusions, absurdities, secrets, and lies. It was a time of covert action, opportunism, and paranoia.
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It was a period that saw the rocketship rise of the military-industrial complex and the slow decay of social trust in American government.
It was a period that saw the rocketship rise of the military-industrial complex and the slow decay of social trust in American government.
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But it was also a time of brilliant innovation. Of creative imagination. Of naked patriotism.
But it was also a time of brilliant innovation. Of creative imagination. Of naked patriotism.
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So, let’s try to make sense of these conflicting streams.
So, let’s try to make sense of these conflicting streams.
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In chapter 12, let’s try to draw some broader lessons.
In chapter 12, let’s try to draw some broader lessons.
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There is so much wisdom within this dark era. Leaving it all unpacked would be sinful.
There is so much wisdom within this dark era. Leaving it all unpacked would be sinful.
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We've seen that Ridgway and Gavin were really the most among thoughtful, visionary leaders of their time.
We've seen that Ridgway and Gavin were really the most among thoughtful, visionary leaders of their time.
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They both made principled stands against Eisenhower. Gavin even gave up a 4th star to retire in protest.
They both made principled stands against Eisenhower. Gavin even gave up a 4th star to retire in protest.
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Ridgway, in particular, was able to see the future of warfare.
Ridgway, in particular, was able to see the future of warfare.
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Ridgway was right: American technology and nuclear capability negated many of the symmetric advantages granted to the communist powers (USSR and China) through their enormous military strength.
Ridgway was right: American technology and nuclear capability negated many of the symmetric advantages granted to the communist powers (USSR and China) through their enormous military strength.
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So, just as Matthew predicted, the USSR and China sought asymmetric advantages and used those to exploit gaps.
So, just as Matthew predicted, the USSR and China sought asymmetric advantages and used those to exploit gaps.
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The communists could not fight a limitless war, so they fought a series of limited wars.
The communists could not fight a limitless war, so they fought a series of limited wars.
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And, yes, we won the Cold War under Eisenhower’s philosophy of containment. But history proves Ridgway’s astute prognostication
And, yes, we won the Cold War under Eisenhower’s philosophy of containment. But history proves Ridgway’s astute prognostication
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You see, historically, great-power competition often manifests in conflict through proxy wars.
You see, historically, great-power competition often manifests in conflict through proxy wars.
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And by divesting a portion of America’s landpower capabilities, the White House rendered the nation unprepared for a growing number of limited conflicts.
And by divesting a portion of America’s landpower capabilities, the White House rendered the nation unprepared for a growing number of limited conflicts.
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Of course, this isn’t as simple as a binary argument. We gave this chapter a provocative title, but we’re not intellectually lazy enough to say that because Ridgway was right, that Ike was wrong.
Of course, this isn’t as simple as a binary argument. We gave this chapter a provocative title, but we’re not intellectually lazy enough to say that because Ridgway was right, that Ike was wrong.
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Eisenhower was right to anchor his ship on the dock of containment.
Eisenhower was right to anchor his ship on the dock of containment.
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He was right to focus on a balanced federal budget as a critical component of national security.
He was right to focus on a balanced federal budget as a critical component of national security.
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But Ike was WRONG to make the USSR the SINGULAR threat around which to establish a national defense apparatus.
But Ike was WRONG to make the USSR the SINGULAR threat around which to establish a national defense apparatus.
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He was wrong to limit the country to nuclear retaliation.
He was wrong to limit the country to nuclear retaliation.
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Many of you are going to ask: but what about the disastrous Vietnam War? Doesn’t that prove that Ridgway was at least partially wrong in his belief in limited war.
Many of you are going to ask: but what about the disastrous Vietnam War? Doesn’t that prove that Ridgway was at least partially wrong in his belief in limited war.
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Well, now you’re asking about something we can tweet about all day and night and into next week.
Well, now you’re asking about something we can tweet about all day and night and into next week.
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But, no, this is, again, too complicated for a binary argument.
But, no, this is, again, too complicated for a binary argument.
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Ridgway was right that ground battle did retain its value in the Atomic Age [enduring nature of war and all]. Vietnam, however, was not the appropriate ground on which to test that premise.
Ridgway was right that ground battle did retain its value in the Atomic Age [enduring nature of war and all]. Vietnam, however, was not the appropriate ground on which to test that premise.
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If you follow this account, you know we’ve done DOZENS of threads on Vietnam. You also know that we've pointed to many historians who feel that, given the constraints placed on the military, the Vietnam War could not have been won.
If you follow this account, you know we’ve done DOZENS of threads on Vietnam. You also know that we've pointed to many historians who feel that, given the constraints placed on the military, the Vietnam War could not have been won.
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That is a reflection on that particular situation rather than on a broader philosophy of war.
That is a reflection on that particular situation rather than on a broader philosophy of war.
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One other point here that we didn’t mention because it does not directly relate to the material at hand: Ridgway convinced Eisenhower not to commit US ground troops to Vietnam after Dien Bien Phu (1954).
One other point here that we didn’t mention because it does not directly relate to the material at hand: Ridgway convinced Eisenhower not to commit US ground troops to Vietnam after Dien Bien Phu (1954).
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Eisenhower wanted to send in a ground force in support of an aerial bombing campaign to prop up the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, supported it.
Eisenhower wanted to send in a ground force in support of an aerial bombing campaign to prop up the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, supported it.
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It would have been easy enough for Ridgway to agree, to attempt to prove his theory about the value of limited war, and to win over his difficult President.
It would have been easy enough for Ridgway to agree, to attempt to prove his theory about the value of limited war, and to win over his difficult President.
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Let’s consider the situation as Ike, Ridgway, and Radford saw it.
Let’s consider the situation as Ike, Ridgway, and Radford saw it.
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In the western uplands of what is now North Vietnam, some 14,000 French soldiers were encircled and besieged by Vietnamese Communists.
In the western uplands of what is now North Vietnam, some 14,000 French soldiers were encircled and besieged by Vietnamese Communists.
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France requested a MASSIVE American intervention.
France requested a MASSIVE American intervention.
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Radford wanted a bombing campaign combined with a small but rapid buildup of American troops.
Radford wanted a bombing campaign combined with a small but rapid buildup of American troops.
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Ridgway advised against it.
Ridgway advised against it.
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It would require an enormous force, Ridgway warned Ike. Bombers were not going to cut through the dense terrain in that area and subdue a trained force.
It would require an enormous force, Ridgway warned Ike. Bombers were not going to cut through the dense terrain in that area and subdue a trained force.
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If you go, Ridgway explained, you’d need to send about a million troops and more than 50 engineer battalions just to allow for maneuverability.
If you go, Ridgway explained, you’d need to send about a million troops and more than 50 engineer battalions just to allow for maneuverability.
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You would have to increase the draft above even the Korean War requirements, Ridgway went on, just to manage a country no American has ever heard of in a part of the world no American cares about.
You would have to increase the draft above even the Korean War requirements, Ridgway went on, just to manage a country no American has ever heard of in a part of the world no American cares about.
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Ridgway: Oh, Ike, and that balanced budget you keep carrying on about…..forget it. Blow up the deficit. You’ll be paying for this into your next term. [okay, we’re paraphrasing]
Ridgway: Oh, Ike, and that balanced budget you keep carrying on about…..forget it. Blow up the deficit. You’ll be paying for this into your next term. [okay, we’re paraphrasing]
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Ike relented.
Ike relented.
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So Ridgway understood that limited war could serve the Nation….but only in the right time and place with the right mission against the right enemy and with the will of the people…
So Ridgway understood that limited war could serve the Nation….but only in the right time and place with the right mission against the right enemy and with the will of the people…
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[@notabattlechick: this sounds like Ridgway read that Clausewitz rectangle thing or whatever it is]
[@notabattlechick: this sounds like Ridgway read that Clausewitz rectangle thing or whatever it is]
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Just kidding, we love Clausewitz.
Just kidding, we love Clausewitz.
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Ridgway was also right that the Soviets were absolutely not going to start a nuclear war.
Ridgway was also right that the Soviets were absolutely not going to start a nuclear war.
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And there’s a lot of application to today’s global security environment in his insights.
And there’s a lot of application to today’s global security environment in his insights.
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[By the way, if you think we are Ridgway fanboys, just ask @jtw_ngc98 about some of the things we wrote in Chapter 3]
[By the way, if you think we are Ridgway fanboys, just ask @jtw_ngc98 about some of the things we wrote in Chapter 3]
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So, let’s look at the Wisdom of Ridgway and what it means for today.
So, let’s look at the Wisdom of Ridgway and what it means for today.
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The parallels to today’s global security situation are clear: a small group of states has a technological advantage over much of the rest of the world.
The parallels to today’s global security situation are clear: a small group of states has a technological advantage over much of the rest of the world.
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A global war of great powers is a nightmarish proposition in which entire cyber, space, domestic, and international military infrastructures are at risk.
A global war of great powers is a nightmarish proposition in which entire cyber, space, domestic, and international military infrastructures are at risk.
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To prepare for Large Scale Combat Operations with a high-tech adversary, Army leaders must maintain sufficient traditional capability to either compel an enemy to avoid a land fight or crush enemies who desire to engage in one.
To prepare for Large Scale Combat Operations with a high-tech adversary, Army leaders must maintain sufficient traditional capability to either compel an enemy to avoid a land fight or crush enemies who desire to engage in one.
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There is a line of thinking among national security circles that a high-tech war will be quick. There is no guarantee of that.
There is a line of thinking among national security circles that a high-tech war will be quick. There is no guarantee of that.
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High-tech weaponry breaks when it goes up against high-tech weaponry. There is no industrial base ready to quickly push out low-earth orbit satellites, AI systems, or unmanned platforms in waves like we did with ships and tanks in WWII.
High-tech weaponry breaks when it goes up against high-tech weaponry. There is no industrial base ready to quickly push out low-earth orbit satellites, AI systems, or unmanned platforms in waves like we did with ships and tanks in WWII.
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So, high-tech war might devolve into a long, slow, slough of attrition [yeah, we read your books @peterwsinger]
So, high-tech war might devolve into a long, slow, slough of attrition [yeah, we read your books @peterwsinger]
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So, the Army must set the conditions to acquire capabilities necessary to gain an advantage at the outset of conflict and maintain conventional capabilities to fight in a degraded environment afterward.
So, the Army must set the conditions to acquire capabilities necessary to gain an advantage at the outset of conflict and maintain conventional capabilities to fight in a degraded environment afterward.
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In the event of a major theater war, there will be no time to shift the force from competition to conflict.
@Strategy_Bridge @richganske
In the event of a major theater war, there will be no time to shift the force from competition to conflict.
@Strategy_Bridge @richganske
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The potential transition from a high-tech competition to a traditional shooting conflict may occur without warning. Our enemies will not give the United States the time needed to develop and hone traditional warfare skills if we are not ready to go.
The potential transition from a high-tech competition to a traditional shooting conflict may occur without warning. Our enemies will not give the United States the time needed to develop and hone traditional warfare skills if we are not ready to go.
END OF CHAPTER 12:
But, hey, what do we know?
But, hey, what do we know?
