summarizing a bit of brilliance from @BCynamon, it's a big problem that the FDA evaluates things like tests only in terms of individual safety and effectiveness, rather than benefit to public health, which amount to very different criteria. 1/
a cheap, fast, unreliable test is much worse than a high-quaity PCR test, from the perspective of a hypothetical individual who might choose either (and can get the PCR results expedited). 2/
but getting everybody frequent cheap, fast, unreliable tests would let us measure, in real time and with great precision, the state of the disease, and conditioning our behavior on a "bad" test result is not so costly if we'll have another test tomorrow. 3/
In general, it seems like US medical regulation implicitly adopts a hypothetical, if I am an individual who can choose the best existing treatment under the best existing conditions, would this new thing constitute an improvement. 5/
At an individual, ethical level, there's something understandable in that. It seems icky to encourage a market for substandard but cheap things rather than find a way to deliver the best care for all. 6/
But when "expensive" refers to real resources (rather than artificial scarcities like patents whose constraints should be weakened) and the pervasiveness of an intervention has positive public health externalities, cheap becomes not second rate but a prerequisite to effective. 7/
Thanks again to @BCynamon, with whom I speak too infrequently, who argued this case with such verve that I find myself compelled to repeat it. (If I've said anything dumb, of course that's just me.) /fin
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@scottsantens@aaronfhamlin@StevenHill1776 I think this piece is off about a couple of things. At a normative level, it presumes that it’s wrong somehow if a 55% 1st preference doesn’t win. But what if the other 45% detest that candidate, and there’s a third candidate 80% would be okay with? 1/
@scottsantens@aaronfhamlin@StevenHill1776 I’d argue the health of our polity is better served (in single winner elections) by the voting system that chooses the consensus candidate rather than a polarizer who can command a small majority. 2/
@scottsantens@aaronfhamlin@StevenHill1776 strategic voting (“bullet voting” for approval voting) is indeed a problem. but it is also a problem for ranked choice voting, where it often makes sense to support the candidate whose other supporters would favor the shittiest second-choice, lest a victory over that… 3/
I see a lot of blame of Russians for complicity—they should have checked their vicious ruler long ago. Maybe, though in a complicity olympics we all have a very great deal to answer for. 1/
But going forward, we want Russians NOT to rally behind Putin as their country collapses out of modernity. We want to them to know there is a world community that would welcome them under a political order that lives in peace with its neighbors. 2/
“Why do we need a world if Russia is not in it?” Putin famously asked, signaling his willingness to destroy the world if his idea of Russia is sufficiently threatened. But we all need a world, and we need one with Russia in it. 3/
A way to understand it is that, under US antitrust, it’s dangerous for participants in concentrated industries to restrict “ordinary” supply, but nothing prevents them from designing *inflexible* supply. i/
Inflexible supply has two desirable characteristics:
(1) it’s cheaper and narrowly more “efficient” to arrange, reducing costs and increasing profit in ordinary times; and
(2) it offers firms a convenience yield in the form of pricing power during spikes in demand. ii/
When there are spikes in demand, the structure of production forces the very supply restrictions that an antitrust regulator would otherwise attack. You get thrown by circumstance into the briar patch of the old-school profiteering US antitrust still plainly forbids… iii/
.@MattBruenig suggests a very direct form of competition policy: when an industry is concentrated, have the state buy and manage one of the oligopolists in the public interest. peoplespolicyproject.org/2022/01/04/why…
i/
Two concerns immediately spring to mind:
(1) How do you set the price of the acquisition? (The premium demanded over prior-to-government-interest market cap will be very high if you just let the sellers name their price.)
ii/
(2) As an institutional matter, how should such a firm be managed, so that it neither behaves as a pure profit maximizer (which would just continue the oligopoly squeeze) nor is captured by one stakeholder (industry peers, vendors, customers) at the expense of others?
When demand increases, two things typically both happen: quantities supplied increase and price increases. There is a name in economics for the quantitive relationship between these two effects: "price elasticity of supply". 1/
A good "infinitely" elastically supplied would see no price change at all in response to an increase in demand. All of the effect would be absorbed by an increase in quantity supplied. 2/
A good completely inelastically supplied would simply be price-rationed. In response to an increase in demand, no additional units would be produced at all, the fixed quantity supplied would just be allocated to the highest bidders, pushing all response into price. 3/
there’s a sense in which Donald Trump’s administration was the best thing that could happen to the professional-managerial class that most loathed him. he drew all kinds of fire that otherwise would turn towards them. 1/
i found this particularly striking with respect to @jbarro, who five years ago, in the wake of Trump’s election, became a pretty full-throated defender of elites and deference to elite guidance. 3/