Some thoughts on this deep dive by the @EconomicTimes into the making of the Data Protection Report (article unfortunately paywalled, but honestly, just this one alone is worth the subscription).
@EconomicTimes When the Data Protection Report came out, many of us voiced concern about how surveillance reform was completely excluded.
Now it turns out that the same people who were drafting the Data Protection Report were also advising government on NATGRID.
(2/N)
@EconomicTimes And not to mention, had argued against the right to privacy in the Supreme Court.
You may have the best will in the world, but simultaneously advising the government on how to facilitate a national surveillance database, while drafting a data protection report...?
(3/n)
This is like putting the wolf in charge of the sheephouse. The wolf may be a nice guy. He's still a wolf.
(4/n)
It was also pointed out when the Data Protection Report came out that it seemed to be explicitly drafted to "save" Aadhaar. Someone sarcastically called it the "Aadhaar Saving Report." Well, the people drafting it had facilitated the Aadhaar Act and defended it in Court.
(5/n)
What you effectively get in the end, therefore, is not "independent" work, but - and there's a lot in the ET report that indicates this, including comments by committee members - work that is beholden to government and private interests, such as NATGRID, Aadhaar etc.
(6/n)
Closing this thread by emphasising once again that this is not about individuals.
This is about a broken system of lawmaking, defined by opacity and backdoor facilitation of government interest under the mask of framing an "independent" Data Protection law.
(7/n)
In conclusion, repeating yesterday's point: the moral and ethical responsibility of wielding law as a weapon against people's rights is a heavy one.
Don't be the drafters of India's equivalent of the torture memos.
(8/8)
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I can’t stress how important it is to understand that this is the result of a deep structural flaw in the Indian Constitution’s design, and not just a temporary “aberration.” Brief thread. 👇🏼
Most modern Constitutions guarantee the independence of “fourth branch” or “guarantor” institutions, such as election commissions, within the constitutional text, setting up appointment and composition requirements that provide a layer of insulation from the executive.
The Indian Constitution, for reasons I discuss at length elsewhere, does not do so: the original Constitution is a heavily “executive-trusting” document, which leaves powers of appointment of all major institutions to the executive. It “trusts” the executive to do right.
One discussion that is important to have is the link between institutions such as the Election Commission, their independence, and constitutional design. 🧵
Most modern constitutions recognise that there is a set of institutions (broadly known as “fourth branch institutions”), performing a set of tasks that require them to be independent of the other branches of State (legislature, executive, judiciary).
For example, an information commission that will be processing a large amount of claims for information *against* administrative bodies should naturally not be under the control of the executive.
And in the case of the election commission, this is even more obvious.
I remember how, one of the very first instances of our indoctrination into the glories of US First Amendment law was the “vagueness doctrine” - that US courts would come down hard on attempts to restrict or penalise speech through vaguely worded laws. (1/n)
Along with that we studied the “over-breadth doctrine” - that US courts would strike down laws that were worded so broadly that, in their application, they could be applied to both protected and unprotected speech. (2/n)
So we read the ringing pronouncements in landmark cases like Grayned v Rockford, which linked anti-vagueness to the precepts of the rule of law, and we read the eloquent arguments of scholars like Vincent Blasi, with his “pathological perspective” on free speech. (3/n)
Pending longer analysis on the blog (not be me), a couple of quick clarifications about today’s sub-classification judgment.
1. SC hasn’t said that states *have* to sub-classify. It has said that they *can* sub-classify, based only on empirical data of relative marginalisation.
2. The only question before the SC in these proceedings was whether the previous judgment in EV Chinnaiah’s case - which said that sub-classification is *unconstitutional* - was correct or not. The SC said it wasn’t correct, based on the wording of Art 341 of the Constitution.
3. There was no other question before the Court, including “creamy layer.” Nor have the four judges who’ve (unnecessarily) talked about “creamy layer” issued any binding or enforceable directives to the State. At the highest I think these have no more legal force than advisories.
Just re-read the 2013 judgment of the Gauhati HC that declared the CBI to be unconstitutional, primarily on federalism grounds. So well-researched and reasoned.
No wonder it was immediately stayed by the SC, which hasn't touched it in the last 11 years:
Interestingly, the judgment of the Gauhati HC came exactly a month after the Bombay HC passed a diametrically opposite judgment upholding the validity of the NIA. The federalism arguments raised in both cases were almost identical (Entry 8 List I, etc).
The difference between the two judgments was that the Gauhati HC based its analysis on a close reading of history (including the CA Debates) to arrive at its interpretation of how the federal scheme deals with policing. The Bombay HC did not.