1/n One of the goals of my recent survey was to get a better understanding of this phenomenon.
2/n In the end, I find that the strongest predictor of rating racial minorities more warmly than whites are feelings of white (moral) shame, followed by white-directed anger.
3/n Here is how I measured these variables (which were taken from previous literature on collective moral emotions)
4/n As predicted by existing theory, collective moral shame also has large indirect effects (about a 1/3 of its total effects) via ingroup-directed anger.
5/n Some of you might be wondering the diff between 'shame' and 'guilt'. The distinction between the two has been a matter of scholarly debate. And the two emotions tend to be moderately to highly correlated (r=0.82 in the current data). But they are, in fact, distinct emotions.
6/n The best way I can explain it is that feelings of guilt tend to follow from neg. appraisals of immoral ingroup *actions* or *behaviors*. Feelings of shame tend to follow from negative *global* appraisals of ingroup moral *character*. For example, I can feel 'guilty' that..
7/n ...I stole from someone. And I can also feel ashamed to the extent that I perceive that this reflects my moral character (i.e. I feel guilty for stealing--> and I'm a bad/immoral person because I stole).
8/n Thus, theoretically speaking, 'white shame' is linked to appraising whites as a whole as suffering from a moral defect. Such motivates a desire to morally distance (socially and psychologically) oneself from one's ingroup--which is why shame tends to elicit..
9/n feelings of anger towards one's ingroup as well as a wide array of pro-outgroup behaviors. In the absence of shame, guilt tends to motivate more limited attempts at correcting for the wrongful ingroup *actions* (as opposed to atoning for its immoral character as a whole)
10/n Some have thus argued that the prosocial effects of guilt are more superficial--that it only predicts support for 'token' compensatory measures directed at specific outgroups. And, indeed, while guilt tends to significantly predict pro-black policies, I find that shame...
11/n .. predicts such policies AND also support for policies that have nothing to do with assisting blacks (such as support for large increases in immigration; preferring non-euro to euro immigrants).
12/n Anyways, just thought I'd give you all sneak peek at some of my dissertation research.
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Do Americans broadly oppose military action against Iran?
Recent polling suggests they do. A Reuters/Ipsos survey conducted May 15–18 found that 61% of Americans disapproved of U.S. military strikes against Iran, while 52% said the military action was not worth it.
But generic approval questions may not tell the whole story.
2/10
Our latest @fsuigc survey of 1,059 American adults (also conducted by Ipsos, May 19–28) approached the issue differently.
Instead of asking simply whether military action was “worth it,” we examined how Americans think about the tradeoffs involved—including the perceived threat posed by Iran, the prospects for diplomacy, and the costs people are willing to bear to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
The results paint a considerably more nuanced picture.
A short thread: 👇
3/10
First, baseline attitudes are hawkish on the Iranian nuclear threat itself:
58% of Americans—including 72% of Republicans and 46% of Democrats— say a nuclear-armed Iran would be a Very or Extremely serious long-term threat to the U.S. and its allies.
Only 12% say it’s “not too serious” or “not at all serious.”
1/Thrilled to share @fsuigc’s latest report, based on a national survey of 1,447 U.S. adults we conducted in late September—one week after the assassination of Charlie Kirk.
We examine how Americans think about harmful speech and whether physical violence can ever be justified to stop its public expression.
1/ I'm delighted to finally share some of the work I've done since joining @fsuigc.
Last month, we published a report about political tolerance based on national survey data (N=1,004) we collected during the summer. In this study, we measure political tolerance as the willingness to interact with or accept people with opposing political views across different relational contexts. For comparison, we also measured tolerance towards ex-felons and flat earthers.
2/ As shown in the table below, across all contexts, people are much more willing to engage with people with opposing political views than the other two target groups. Regardless of the target group, though, openness tends to decline as the intimacy of an engagement increases. For instance, whereas 73% would engage in a social/recreational activity with political opponents (ex-Felon: 54%, flat-earther: 49%) without reservation, just 41% would be willing to date them (ex-Felon: 22%, flat-earther: 19%)
3/Consistent with this intimacy 'gradient', our analysis finds that our 7 tolerance items best fit a 3-factor structure, which is depicted in the table below.
1/ Updated racial ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer differentials from the ANES. In sum, while the 'curve has flattened', the attitudinal effects of the Great Awokening persist (at least wrt race). If you thought or hoped otherwise, sorry to disappoint.
2/ In fact, coverage linking Israel to “genocide” now exceeds that of every actual or widely recognized genocide of the last 40 years, including:
Rwanda (1994)
Darfur (2003–2008)
Bosnia (Srebrenica, 1995)
Myanmar (Rohingya, 2017–Present)
Yazidis (ISIS, 2014–2017)
3/ In The New York Times, for example, the spike in 2023–2024 mentions of “genocide” alongside “Israel” is more than 9x larger than the peak for Rwanda in the mid-1990s and nearly 6x the peak for the more recent Darfur genocide.
1/ One of the more counterintuitive findings in my latest article:
Historically, when Democrats only control the House, an average of just over 10 race-conscious provisions are added to the NDAA per year.
When they control both the House and Senate? That number drops to about 4.
But why?
2/ First, what makes the House so powerful here?
Simple: the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) writes the first draft of the NDAA.
If you control the House, you control the blueprint—and the early language that often survives reconciliation. That’s where ideological riders get embedded.
3/But why are more race-conscious provisions added under divided government?
While I can’t say for sure, my reasoning is this: when Democrats only control the House, the NDAA becomes one of the few legislative vehicles guaranteed to pass.
Standalone race-conscious or DEI bills are less likely to survive the Senate.