Simon Boyi Chen Profile picture
Aug 30, 2020 10 tweets 2 min read Read on X
Assimilation is complicated issue in Chinese history.
The last Imperial Chinese dynasty, Qing, was founded and ruled for its entire duration by Manchus, originally a militarized nomadic society organized around Eight Banners, who secured hegemony in their homeland Manchuria /1
and then invaded and conquered the Han Chinese-ruled Ming Dynasty. Yet, over the centuries following conquest, and replaying an inevitable theme in imperial Chinese history, the conquerors in ways became the conquered, as the Manchu ruling class adopted most Han Chinese /2
cultural practices (with key exceptions including foot binding, which Manchus steered clear of) and Mandarin Chinese language, to such an extent that by early 1900s, in the last days of the Qing Dynasty, few if any Manchus outside the Imperial Palace could even speak or write /3
Manchu, let alone using it in daily practice in life and at work.
Yet, there were subtle and important distinctions between Manchu and the Han who they assimilated into. Positions of power in the Manchu’s homeland, which by 1800s became chock-full of Han Chinese immigrants /4
from North China proper, remained stolidly in Manchu hands. The Manchu side of my family ran the local law enforcement and local jail, for instance—positions for which Manchu ethnicity was essentially required, even though by that point they spoke only Mandarin Chinese and /5
for all intents and purposes were Han Chinese in manner and custom.
But the story of assimilation doesn’t run only in the direction outlined above, and isn’t limited to after the Manchu conquest.
We always thought one side of my family was Manchu. To our great surprise, /6
none of us have Manchu DNA on genetic testing. Who know’s if it was just a flaw of the testing? But there’s a more straightforward and plausible explanation—that all the Manchus in the family have been Han Chinese all along.
Even before the Manchu invasion of China, the /7
Manchu Eight Banners had recruited many Han Chinese and Mongol immigrants in Manchuria into their ranks. For all practical intents and purposes, they became Manchu, were Manchu in attire, custom, and sociopolitical allegiance, and their past—and actual genetic ancestry—no /8
longer mattered. They had been assimilated into the Manchus, while the Eight Banners grew into the formidable force that eventually took on the Han Chinese Ming Dynasty and conquered it.
So, from Han to Manchu because of assimilation, and back to Han again because of /9
assimilation and then the 21st century biotechnological marvel of consumer genetic testing. Has it ever mattered that that side of the family was Manchu, or Han?
Well, calling themselves Manchu had helped in Chinese affirmative action for ethnic minorities.
That’s about it. /end

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