I'm just starting to read through the latest report from DoD on China's military power. I may share some quick reactions along the way. #ChinaMilitaryPower2020 media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/20…
This is a good observation on the role of the PLA in China's diplomacy. 
This is one of the more nuanced definitions and characterizations on MCF that I've seen in official American assessments that have been publicly released so far.
On the uncertainty of China's ambition to build a "world-class" military. While that debate continues, I'd say to surpass is the intention, especially in the course of the new 'RMA'
The DoD's assessment on where China has parity with or has surpassed the United States to date is worth noting:
With regard to the PLASSF, it's no surprise to see the U.S. is the prime target, but useful to see an official assessment of that.
On the trajectory of China's nuclear arsenal, the question of whether or what evidence supports the claim China intends to double its nuclear warhead stockpile has provoked and will likely continue to raise intense debate
I'm struck by the language and level of confidence articulated on future Chinese overseas basing as "very likely."
It's interesting to see these specific examples of PRC tech transfer efforts targeting military technologies.
I'll look forward to reading this special topic. I remember when I started talking about "intelligentization" back in 2016, I was afraid that many of my colleagues thought that I was imagining or exaggerating the importance of the concept.
I also testified to USCC on the topic last summer: cnas.org/publications/c…
This report is massive, and my time is limited, but I may continue to raise further reflections once I have time to get back to reading in earnest.
Let's see, turning to the PLA Strategic Support Force, I'm not seeing much new beyond what we've known and assessed since 2016/7, and you can take a look at this paper in @jststs by myself and @CostelloJK for a more detailed assessment. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
As a trivial point of order for those of us who work on this, I have shifted in my own writing and would argue we ought to be consistent in calling the Strategic Support Force the "PLASSF" to avoid confusion with the PLA's South Sea Fleet, which is often referred to as the "SSF."
This piece on PLASSF changes in leadership and recent trends in training is noteworthy, though we're generally tracking on those fronts already. However, I appreciate the confirmation that Lt. Gen. Ju Qiansheng is the NSD commander, as sourcing is rather sketchy on that front.
This paragraph bothers me not only because of the slight typo but also because I believe a claim within it may be factually incorrect. The 311 Base is not the only element of the PLA that engages in psychological operations.
On AI, while I agree with much of this, there's more to be said (and stay tuned for some future writings I'm working on). As a slight quibble, these 'AI champions' are technically referred to as members of China's "national team" in AI.
Is the differentiation between national champions and a national team significant? Arguably so in the sense that these companies weren't picked to be winners but succeeded in their own right and are now being harnessed to advance national objectives.
Now this connection between brain-computer interface research and the possibility of advanced techniques in human-machine teaming is interesting... I've speculated about that as well, but remain skeptical about the distance and difference between a laboratory and the battlefield.
