Absolutely on target. Most of the "requirements" in Barr's redundant memos already are part of the post-Horowitz FISA improvements undertaken by the FBI and monitored by the FISC. Misreps to FISC, for example, already must be disclosed under FISC Rules of Procedure. /1
FISA (§ 104) already requires applications to be approved by the AG upon a finding of compliance with FISA statute, and requires that FISA applications include a certification that foreign intelligence information sought cannot be acquired by normal investigative techniques. /2
Memo reduces maximum surveillance period for U.S. persons to 60 days (FISA permits up to 90 days), but FISC always has had authority to limit the period. 30-day reports are similar to Title III mandate, but FISC always had authority to require such reports as well. /3
Only "new" mandate requires that before FISA surveillance is sought against “(1) a federal elected official or staff members of the elected official, (2) a declared candidate for federal elected office or staff members or advisors of such candidate’s campaign /4
(including any person who is “an informal advisor to the campaign”) - then the FBI Director must first consider a “defensive briefing” (a term undefined in the memo with no specific direction as to the location of the appropriate definition) /5
of the target or document in writing why such a “defensive briefing” is not appropriate. Now, set aside, for the moment, the definitional issues relating to the utterly opaque terms “staff member” or “informal advisor” in terms of who is now eligible for consideration of a /6
“defensive briefing.” Definitional issues aside, tipping off the target is no way to conduct a counterintelligence investigation - and the distinction between criminal and counterintelligence investigations always has been lost in Barr’s campaign to validate Trump’s claim /7
that he was “spied on.” This is particularly curious since this same AG is on record as believing that the existing scheme found in FISA is “too restrictive and posed significant problems for counterterrorism efforts” due to the regrettable belief that “national security /8
issues could be dealt with within the framework of our criminal justice system or pursuant to carefully-hedged, detailed procedures derived from that system.” Trying to shoehorn counterintelligence considerations into the the “carefully-hedged” procedures of the criminal /9
justice system is equally bad judgment - unless your principal purpose is supplying an excuse to decry the “spying” on the Trump campaign. So, in the end, the goal of Barr's poorly drafted memos is simply to furnish him with another platform from /10
which to proclaim that “what happened to the Trump presidential campaign and his subsequent Administration after the President was duly elected by the American people must never happen again.”
It's always comforting to see the AG use a superfluous set of new "standards" /11
regarding one of the nation's most important foreign intelligence tools as agitprop in a partisan stunt - especially considering that these new "rules" arguably would not apply to surveilling someone like Carter Page since Page was neither a staff member nor a formal or /12
informal advisor to the Trump campaign when the first FISA surveillance of him was approved in October 2016. Good work, we can all feel safer now. /13
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There really is no reason for professed "bafflement" here. Sacrificing any semblance of principle in favor of crude opportunism, the Brennan Center allied itself with the likes of Gaetz, Boebert, Biggs, Roy, and Taylor Greene - a group that couldn't develop a coherent /1
explanation of the 4th Amendment if you supplied them with a tutor, texts, and 2 weeks of study.
The 4th Amendment is predicated on the concept of reasonableness - it guarantees that Americans will be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures. Federal courts have /2
repeatedly held that the warrant is a law enforcement construct and is not a tolerable proxy for reasonableness in the foreign intelligence context. Instead, the 4th Amd, requires a balancing of the government's interest in protecting the national security against the /3
So, let me understand this line of bulls#it. If Trump carried a document upstairs with his cheeseburger and the information in that document was, just to cite a few examples: (1) derived from NSA having decrypted a complex foreign encryption system used to transmit information /1
unavailable from any other source where disclosure of the document would compromise this critical intelligence source; or (2) derived from a human intelligence source with unique access whose safety would be compromised by disclosure of the document or its information; /2
or (3) derived from an overhead system where disclosure of the document or its contents would compromise the closely guarded capabilities of this overhead system - I'm supposed to believe that there was a standing "order" that the document and its contents were considered /3
We're not writing on tabula rasa here. E.O. 13526 prescribes, at times in excruciating detail, the handling of classified information. Without disappearing into the weeds on whether a president can unilaterally declassify information (yes) without following any of the /1
notification procedures of E.O. 13526 (unlikely w/o amending the E.O.), there is no record of Trump declassifying any of the Mar-a-Lago information while president. Once out of office, his access to classified information is fully under the purview of E.O. 13526. This means /2
he needs to establish a "need to know" as required by §4.1(a)(3) of E.O. 13526. While such a requirement can be waived for former presidents (§4.4(a)(3)), there is no indication he ever asked for a waiver and one almost certainly would not have been granted given Biden's /3
Release of the warrant and property receipt, which are the only documents subject to the DoJ motion, may not provide materially more detail other than the criminal statutes identified in the warrant and, perhaps, a more particularized description of the focus of the search. /1
The guts of the predicate for the search will be in the affidavit(s) that accompanied the government's motion for issuance of a search warrant. There seems to be considerable confusion failing to differentiate between the affidavit(s) (likely signed by one or more FBI /2
Frankly, this is just political posturing. Not cheap political posturing, to be sure, because it would cost a fortune to implement, but posturing. Full disclosure, I gave 17 years of military service to spare my (middle class) parents the cost of college and graduate school /1
debt. I then paid full boat to spend my son to college and law school. Now, you want to take my taxes to relieve millions of the decision THEY made to incur college and graduate school debt. Did all these folks get their degrees and can't find any job? /2
I doubt it. If you finished school with a serviceable major, then there are jobs for you in this economy. If you didn't finish school or pursued a degree in a marginal field, that's on you (with the understanding that provisions can be made for those who /3
If the WAPO report is true, coercion of political activity is only one of the problems with this memo. Unprocessed raw collection resides in multiple data bases at NSA and “unprocessed” means not minimized. If these data bases include FISA collection, /1
especially if collected under a FISA section 106 order, then the approval was predicated upon using specific minimization procedures for USP communications because targeting foreign communications almost inevitably produces /2
incidental collection of USP communications. Ignoring those minimization procedures violates FISA, and FISA carries criminal and civil penalties for willful violations. Additionally, even if the collection activity occurred outside the US so that FISA does not apply /3