SIGINT cannot replace psychology (and HUMINT).
In late Chinese Civil War in summer 1949, Hunan (Mao’s home province) saw a showdown between the most capable senior military commanders of the warring sides—Gen. Bai Chongxi of Republic of China Army, and /1
Lin Biao of communist 4th Field Army. The vexing issue confronting Lin Biao was to predict Gen. Bai Chongxi’s intentions that summer.
Unlike most other ROCA generals, Gen. Bai Chongxi’s inner circle was fiercely loyal and essentially impenetrable to /2
communist moles and spies (HUMINT). Intelligence section of 4th Field Army had to resort to interception of radio telegraph transmissions (SIGINT) to piece together Gen. Bai Chongxi’s operational intentions.
They did have a break. A stream of transmissions to the provincial /3
government of Guangxi, Gen. Bai Chongxi’s home province, was picked up by communist 4th Field Army SIGINT, including requests for information regarding grain storage in the province.
All the SIGINT pointed towards Gen. Bai Chongxi withdrawing to Guangxi as a redoubt for a /4
last stand.
But communist commanders knew better. They deeply understood Gen. Bai Chongxi’s personality. He was the best general in ROCA, was justifiably proud, and wouldn’t just hightail over thousands of miles back home. It’d be too cowardly of him.
They were correct. /end
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