"Civil War Memory Studies" is a deceptively simple term. It includes how we understand what caused secession and war and how it came about (especially concerning slavery and race); how we understand what the war meant and how it turned out as it did ...
... and what happened during Reconstruction and its legacy for the American polity and population. It's also part of a larger story of expansion and definition as the American Republic wrestled with its founding principles and their unanticipated applications by new stakeholders.
This became terribly clear to me earlier this year while writing the text for an illustrated history of the war to be published in Great Britain next year.
Early on I made it clear that you couldn't tell the history of the war itself without talking about before and after.
That meant a very compressed chapter that distilled how and why I believe the war came. Hint: you can't tell that story without slavery at the center, but it's a lot more than that ... how did the debate over slavery lead to war, and why did war happen when it did?
The middle chapters wrestled with the traditional politics and military operations narrative, with space limitations and popular appeal acting as real constraints. Still, it addresses gender, race, the West, war as revoltion, home front, etc.
That's "revolution," BTW. Ugh.
Writing battle narratives for such a project still resembles sports play-by-play for me (I did some radio announcing back in the day, and I can still inflict my skills on unwilling ears).
The exercise reminded me that however much we honor James McPherson's Battle Cry of Freedom, that synthesis is simply no longer adequate for our overall understanding of the period. Too much has come out since then: we need to discuss what a new synthesis would look like.
Then there was a proposed chapter on Reconstruction that became two packed chapters (still, not quite the exposition I would prefer to offer), and a concluding chapter on how Americans remembered the entire period, in scholarship, popular media (film), and ...
... the ongoing conversation between present and past, all the way down to the events of this past spring and summer.
I was writing about the present as it became the immediate past. That, folks, is an exhilarating if daunting challenge.
I've been playing with ways about how to talk about the past in a way that engages audiences today about those large interpretive issues and why they are important.
I've also been mindful once more over the past few weeks about the challenges Ulysses S. Grant faced as general-in-chief working under Andrew Johnson during Reconstruction.
I never knew my first book on Grant (1991) would continue to be so timely some three decades later.
So how do the rest of you wrestle with these issues at a time when history as a conversation between present and past is as important as it ever has been?
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Time and again critics of Ulysses S. Grant's generalship claim that, above all else, he was "Grant the Butcher," who prevailed because of his superiority in resources (which was seemingly endless) despite a certain mindlessness and dullness.
Grant's supporters counter this charge largely in a statistical fashion. They compare the percentage of Grant's losses versus the percentage of losses suffered by other generals, including Robert E. Lee.
Sometimes these analyses focus on the 1864 Overland Campaign, which in the minds of some people is the only campaign Grant ever fought ... the claims of butcher rely mostly on May-June 1864.
Today's the 160th anniversary of one of the most misunderstood battles of the American Civil War ... Cold Harbor.
The story of the battle has turned into a myth that in turn has long shaped the image of Ulysses S. Grant's generalship.
Make no mistake about it ... Cold Harbor was a significant setback for Grant and US forces during the Overland Campaign. Several US commanders performed poorly that day, especially in not carrying out George G. Meade's orders to reconnoiter the Confederate position.
However, we now know that tales of 7,000 men falling in less than an hour are false. We also know that the quest for a ceasefire to recover wounded and dead between the lines was botched by two prideful commanders.
It's often asserted the as president Ulysses S. Grant destroyed the Ku Klux Klan.
The reality is not nearly as satisfying or uplifting to those who deplore white supremacist paramilitary terrorism as conducted primarily by veterans of the Confederate war effort.
The KKK became a shorthand descriptor for the many forms of white supremacist terrorism that slowly took organized form in the late 1860s. There were other massacres (Memphis) and attacks (New Orleans) against blacks and their white allies in the Reconstructing South.
By 1867 and 1868, when Black men in large numbers exercised the right to vote for the first time, white supremacist terrorism, often defined as KKK activity, targeted Black voters and Republican officeholders.
Visual portrayals of what happened in Wilmer McLean's parlor on April 9, 1865, at Appomattox Court House are worth some study.
Here's a simple early version: two generals, one table.
The table is a curious effort to bring together elements of the two tables involved in the event. Grant said at a brown wood oval table; Lee sat at a squarish marble table. Grant's chair was a swivel desk chair backed in leather, while Lee sat in a high-backed chair.
Yet it took a while for artists to include those four pieces of furniture, let alone to assign them to the general who used them.
As true Americans commemorate the anniversary of Lee's surrender to Grant at Appomattox, let's recall that the events of April 9 marked an end to one of the most successful pursuits in military history ... one that is often underappreciated.
In some sixteen days the US forces under Grant's command repulsed a breakout attempt, severed Confederate supply lines and railroads, forced the evacuation of Petersburg and the the Confederate capital at Richmond.
That's for starters.
They then outmarched a foe determined to escape, blocked any chance of the enemy combining forces in North Carolina, then headed the insurgents off before they could reach the protection of the Blue Ridge Mountains.
In the process the foe suffered nearly 50% losses.