1/ They've said this many times before, Noah, but things have been getting consistently worse, not better. The amount of debt it takes to generate a unit of GDP has been growing rapidly, even as GDP growth has slowed, and within Beijing there is a fierce debate about whether...
2/ or not they should take aggressive steps to get debt under control, even if this results in much slower growth and a rise in unemployment. Last year for example there was a big debate over whether to target 6% GDP growth or something much lower. If they did not think the...
3/ debt were a serious problem, and if they believed that Chinese growth was healthy, real and meaningful, why would they even bother having this debate?
The biggest disagreement I have with the Economist, I would say, is over their failure to understand the sources of...
4/ Chinese debt and why the debt burden matters. They seem to think that the fact that China has avoided a financial crisis means that debt isn't that big of a problem, whereas I would argue that China was never likely to have a financial crisis, not because debt isn't a...
5/ problem but rather because financial crises are balance-sheet events, and with its closed banking system and strong regulators, Beijing can restructure liabilities at will and so can quite easily prevent a balance-sheet crisis.
The real test is whether it is possible for...
6/ China to maintain high growth rates without much faster growth in the debt that must fund huge amounts of non-productive investment. These two are related, of course, because if most debt goes to fund investment, and if the investment is productive, there is no way a...
7/ country's debt-to-GDP ratio can grow so rapidly and for so long.
But if anything is clear, it is that China simply cannot tolerate any slowdown in the growth in debt without suffering a very, very sharp slowdown in GDP growth. We know from the history of investment-driven...
8/ growth "miracles" that the problem always arises once total debt stops growing faster than GDP. In that case the country either adjusts in the form of a crisis or in the form of "lost decades" of much slower growth, and a considerable part of that adjustment consists of...
9/ writing down years and years of misallocated investment that was capitalized when it should have been expensed (similar to what Galbraith referred to as the "bezzle").
That, by the way, is one of the main differences between growing debt in China and growing debt in...
10/ the US, Europe and elsewhere. In the former case the expenditures are capitalized and show up as increases in wealth, but not in the latter cases.
We have no idea of how long China can sustain this growth in debt, but we also know that the longer it goes on, the more...
11/ difficult the adjustment will be. Until then, nothing has really changed, in my opinion.
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1/4 This OECD study is likely to have an important effect on global trade discussions, but its worth noting that its measure of the extent of Chinese subsidies do not include two of the most important subsidies that drive the global competitiveness of Chinese manufacturing.
2/4 The first and most obvious is the undervalued currency, which is the functional equivalent of a tax on imports and a subsidy for exports. Because it is hard to quantify the exact extent of the undervaluation of the RMB, most subsidy measures exclude it.
3/4 The second is the financial subsidy. The study does try to quantify the extent to which certain manufacturers are able to borrow below "market" rates, but when the market rate itself is repressed, with nearly all credit being directed to...
1/6 Financial Times: "A company-level OECD analysis of government subsidies across 15 key industrial sectors found that nearly 60 per cent of Chinese firms’ global market share gains since 2005 could be attributed to subsidies." ft.com/content/885ca6…
2/6 "The OECD researchers said that while subsidies led to increased market share, they did not contribute to a firm’s productivity or profitability. “Subsidies result in less productive players winning unfairly at the expense of more innovative and efficient ones.”"
3/6 The OECD make two substantial points. First, China's export success is driven not by comparative advantage but by competitive advantage, a function of large household transfers that subsidize manufacturing and that require trade surpluses to clear. michaelpettis858496.substack.com/p/comparative-…
1/5 WSJ: "Labor’s share of gross domestic income (conceptually similar to GDP) sank to 51%, the lowest since records began in 1947. Profits’ share climbed to 12.1%, the highest since 1950."
@greg_ip wsj.com/finance/stocks…
2/5 Greg Ip has a good track record of zeroing in on the key point. The profit share of GDP is rising, he notes, but the wage share is declining. This is a problem, because, as Marriner Eccles explained in the 1930s, it is overall wage growth that sustains production growth.
3/5 If the US were running a trade surplus, it would be net foreign demand that balances the gap between the two. The fact that it is instead running a trade deficit suggests that domestic demand is being propped up by rising fiscal and household debt. nber.org/system/files/w…
1/5 Very good Caixin article on the struggle to manage local-government debt: "With financing squeezed, local governments are turning to a new strategy: revitalizing state-owned resources, assets and funds. Championed by Hubei and Hunan, the idea is to... caixinglobal.com/2026-05-29/in-…
2/5 turn all possible state-owned resources into assets, securitize them, and leverage all state-owned funds. In practice, this means identifying and packaging things from data to reservoir silt to the space under bridges, and then selling or securitizing them to raise cash."
3/5 Is this a good thing? I've long argued that the best way for China to manage a difficult adjustment in the least disruptive way would be to force the adjustment costs onto local governments, who could absorb these costs by liquidating the huge portfolio of assets they own.
1/5 SCMP: "Chinese provinces are scouring their balance sheets to revitalise idle state assets, seeking alternative revenue streams to counter intense debt pressures stemming from the prolonged property downturn." sc.mp/eo0mk?utm_sour…
2/5 "This form of asset-based financing has emerged as a critical fiscal lifeline for regional governments that had relied on land sales for the bulk of their income until that stream was cut off with the onset of China’s property crisis."
3/5 This is important. One of the best things China can do to minimize social costs once it finally begins to adjust is to transfer to households, or otherwise liquidate, local-government-owned assets. It seems it may be starting to do this.
1/8 I just finished reading Chris Miller's excellent book on the collapse of the Soviet Economy. Some people might think that the topic is interesting, but largely irrelevant to global economic conditions today. They would be mistaken. This is a very relevant book.
@crmiller1
2/8 Among the important points it makes is this: "The notion that political and economic reforms were separate processes misunderstands Soviet politics. The most decisive debates during the perestroika period were about the distribution of economic resources."
3/8 Miller notes that China's reforms began in the late 1970s, when its economy was in such terrible shape that they resulted in an immediate surge in productivity, the benefits of which could be used effectively to buy off potential elite opposition (especially in the 1990s).