1/ They've said this many times before, Noah, but things have been getting consistently worse, not better. The amount of debt it takes to generate a unit of GDP has been growing rapidly, even as GDP growth has slowed, and within Beijing there is a fierce debate about whether...
2/ or not they should take aggressive steps to get debt under control, even if this results in much slower growth and a rise in unemployment. Last year for example there was a big debate over whether to target 6% GDP growth or something much lower. If they did not think the...
3/ debt were a serious problem, and if they believed that Chinese growth was healthy, real and meaningful, why would they even bother having this debate?
The biggest disagreement I have with the Economist, I would say, is over their failure to understand the sources of...
4/ Chinese debt and why the debt burden matters. They seem to think that the fact that China has avoided a financial crisis means that debt isn't that big of a problem, whereas I would argue that China was never likely to have a financial crisis, not because debt isn't a...
5/ problem but rather because financial crises are balance-sheet events, and with its closed banking system and strong regulators, Beijing can restructure liabilities at will and so can quite easily prevent a balance-sheet crisis.
The real test is whether it is possible for...
6/ China to maintain high growth rates without much faster growth in the debt that must fund huge amounts of non-productive investment. These two are related, of course, because if most debt goes to fund investment, and if the investment is productive, there is no way a...
7/ country's debt-to-GDP ratio can grow so rapidly and for so long.
But if anything is clear, it is that China simply cannot tolerate any slowdown in the growth in debt without suffering a very, very sharp slowdown in GDP growth. We know from the history of investment-driven...
8/ growth "miracles" that the problem always arises once total debt stops growing faster than GDP. In that case the country either adjusts in the form of a crisis or in the form of "lost decades" of much slower growth, and a considerable part of that adjustment consists of...
9/ writing down years and years of misallocated investment that was capitalized when it should have been expensed (similar to what Galbraith referred to as the "bezzle").
That, by the way, is one of the main differences between growing debt in China and growing debt in...
10/ the US, Europe and elsewhere. In the former case the expenditures are capitalized and show up as increases in wealth, but not in the latter cases.
We have no idea of how long China can sustain this growth in debt, but we also know that the longer it goes on, the more...
11/ difficult the adjustment will be. Until then, nothing has really changed, in my opinion.
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1/8 Robert Skidelsky, who has written great books on Keynes' life and work, wrote (with Vijay Joshi) a really good essay—way back in 2010—on the problems of unbalanced trade, and why Keynes' bancor proposal at Bretton Woods made so much sense.
@RSkidelsky robertskidelsky.com/2010/06/23/key…
2/8 As the revival of interest in Keynes' bancor proposal gathers pace, it is worth pointing out the similarities to his proposal and to more recent proposals in the US and elsewhere that deficit countries place a kind of Tobin tax on all capital inflows.
3/8 The way bancor worked was by taxing the capital flow component of persistent surpluses. Surplus countries, of course have to acquire foreign assets to balance their surpluses, in the same way that deficit countries must give up claims on assets.
1/6 Reuters: "Chinese government advisers are stepping up calls to make the household sector's contribution to broader economic growth a top priority at Beijing's upcoming five-year policy plan."
2/6 Reuters continues: "Household consumption currently accounts for 40% of gross domestic product - some advisers propose China should aim for 50% over the next two five-year cycles."
3/6 It's worth noting that China is such an outlier, that even if it does raise the household consumption share of GDP by ten percentage points, it will still have among the lowest household consumption shares of any major economy in the world.
1/6 Good Caixin article on developer debt resolution: "As China’s real estate slump drags on with no recovery in sight, distressed developers are shifting toward more aggressive debt restructuring for survival, forcing creditors to swallow deep losses."
2/6 "For three years," Caixin continues, "developers relied on an “extend and pretend” approach, rolling over debt in hopes of a market rebound. But home sales have collapsed, worsening property companies’ finances."
3/6 This is the classic debt resolution process, familiar to me from my early years running LDC bond-trading desks. At first, both creditors and obligors pretend that what they have is a liquidity problem, not a solvency problem, and that all is needed is time and forbearance.
1/12
A Tsinghua-related think tanks argues that "China should issue 30 trillion yuan in treasury bonds to swap local governments’ hidden liabilities to re-energise growth momentum and cut off financial risks at their root."
via @scmpnewssc.mp/gz8bj?utm_sour…
2/12
This would help in two ways, according to the report. It would transfer debt from local government balance sheets to the central government balance sheet, giving them more breathing space to prop up the economy, and it would reduce interest payments.
3/12
But this is what comes of treating a systemic issue incrementally. The problem is not that local governments have too much debt. The excessive debt burden of local governments is actually a symptom of the real problem. ft.com/content/630f82…
1/8 A China Finance 40 Forum research piece by Yu Fei and Guo Kai argues that when adjusted for purchasing power and for volumes, Chinese consumption is much higher than the current consensus. pekingnology.com/p/chinas-consu…
2/8 They are probably right, although I would caution that using purchasing power adjustments in a system in which producer prices are highly subsidized by households is likely to substantially overstate the real extent of the purchasing power adjustment.
3/8 But while Yu and Guo do not misconstrue the implications of their work for China's internal and external imbalances, I suspect that quite a few analysts will argue that this study shows that China does not have an underconsumption problem.
1/6 A decision by China to offer more debt relief could be a “game changer for the poor and the system,” said Kevin Gallagher, the director of the Boston University Global Development Policy Center. “It’s really in China’s strategic interest to do that.”
2/6 Ironically, debt relief is also in the economic interest of creditor countries, especially if, as in the case of China, the economy is highly dependent on export surpluses.
That's because capital flows are just the reverse of trade flows.
3/6 To put it another way, every dollar an overly-indebted developing country earns from its exports must be recycled, either in the form of debt repayment or in the form of imports. The less that goes to the former, the more that is available for the latter.