1/ They've said this many times before, Noah, but things have been getting consistently worse, not better. The amount of debt it takes to generate a unit of GDP has been growing rapidly, even as GDP growth has slowed, and within Beijing there is a fierce debate about whether...
2/ or not they should take aggressive steps to get debt under control, even if this results in much slower growth and a rise in unemployment. Last year for example there was a big debate over whether to target 6% GDP growth or something much lower. If they did not think the...
3/ debt were a serious problem, and if they believed that Chinese growth was healthy, real and meaningful, why would they even bother having this debate?
The biggest disagreement I have with the Economist, I would say, is over their failure to understand the sources of...
4/ Chinese debt and why the debt burden matters. They seem to think that the fact that China has avoided a financial crisis means that debt isn't that big of a problem, whereas I would argue that China was never likely to have a financial crisis, not because debt isn't a...
5/ problem but rather because financial crises are balance-sheet events, and with its closed banking system and strong regulators, Beijing can restructure liabilities at will and so can quite easily prevent a balance-sheet crisis.
The real test is whether it is possible for...
6/ China to maintain high growth rates without much faster growth in the debt that must fund huge amounts of non-productive investment. These two are related, of course, because if most debt goes to fund investment, and if the investment is productive, there is no way a...
7/ country's debt-to-GDP ratio can grow so rapidly and for so long.
But if anything is clear, it is that China simply cannot tolerate any slowdown in the growth in debt without suffering a very, very sharp slowdown in GDP growth. We know from the history of investment-driven...
8/ growth "miracles" that the problem always arises once total debt stops growing faster than GDP. In that case the country either adjusts in the form of a crisis or in the form of "lost decades" of much slower growth, and a considerable part of that adjustment consists of...
9/ writing down years and years of misallocated investment that was capitalized when it should have been expensed (similar to what Galbraith referred to as the "bezzle").
That, by the way, is one of the main differences between growing debt in China and growing debt in...
10/ the US, Europe and elsewhere. In the former case the expenditures are capitalized and show up as increases in wealth, but not in the latter cases.
We have no idea of how long China can sustain this growth in debt, but we also know that the longer it goes on, the more...
11/ difficult the adjustment will be. Until then, nothing has really changed, in my opinion.
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1/5 China's March trade numbers were a big surprise, with exports up less than expected and imports way up. Given how volatile things have been, we don't want to read too much into one month's numbers, but if they reflect a new reality, they matter. english.news.cn/20260414/f5b3a…
2/5 Exports were up a measly 2.5% year on year in March, well below the 21.8% surge in the first two months of the year. Imports, driven mainly by higher commodity prices, were up an astonishing 27.8% in March, versus an already high 19.8% in the first two months of the year.
3/5 The result was that China's trade surplus in March ($51.1 billion) was less than a quarter of the trade surplus in the previous two months. If sustained, this will be good for the world, but bad for China, which relies on huge trade surpluses to balance weak domestic demand.
1/9 Very good FT article on why overcapacity is structurally embedded into the Chinese economy. It quotes one (anonymous, of course) investor who notes that "Officials are scared of missing their GDP targets. Nobody is scared of overcapacity."
via @ftft.com/content/7d51a6…
2/9 I was nonetheless impressed by the number of Chinese who spoke openly about the difficulties created by the current growth model. This didn't use to be the case, but the fact that we're seeing more and more of this suggests that we may finally be seeing a change in the way policymakers think.
3/9 One point that I have often made, and that comes out in this article, is that Chinese manufacturers may be incredibly competitive globally, but they might not be particularly efficient once direct and indirect subsidies are considered.
1/15
IMF: "If coordination proves difficult, the best course of action for each country is clear: start addressing domestic imbalances now, regardless of what others do."
This is one of several discordant lines in an otherwise interesting paper.
2/15
It is good that the IMF (along with others) increasingly recognizes the adverse consequences of persistent trade imbalances, and recognizes that "the relevant metric is the overall position of a country against the rest of the world, not bilateral or sectoral balances."
3/15
But I still don't think they understand how imbalances are transmitted. They assume that every country determines and controls its internal imbalances, and so also determines and controls its external imbalances.
But this implies that the world balances by coincidence.
1/7 Martin Wolf, in an important piece on unsustainable current account imbalances, makes a point that most American economists miss: "the counterpart of external deficits tends to be unsustainable domestic borrowing."
via @ftft.com/content/49e38e…
2/7 He goes on to say: "The Keynesian hypothesis looks right: the inflow of net foreign savings, shown in capital account surpluses made big fiscal deficits necessary, because domestic demand in the US would otherwise have been chronically inadequate."
3/7 This, by the way, is consistent with Joan Robinson's argument that trade surpluses are "beggar thy neighbor" when they export unemployment. The difference is that in economies in which credit is not constrained by gold, the alternative to unemployment can be debt.
1/12
Bloomberg: "Canada pitched expanding its financial services presence in the Chinese market as the northern nation aims to increase exports to its second-largest trading partner in a push to diversify from the US." bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/12
The article continues: "Expanding Canadian financial services activity in China is key to achieving the government’s goal of increasing exports by 50% by 2030, according to Finance Minister Francois-Philippe Champagne."
3/12
I am not sure that expanding financial services activity really is key to expanding Canadian exports to China. It might help a little, but what Canadian exporters most lack isn't friendly financing.
This just sounds like the kind of thing a banker would tell policymakers.
1/12
Caixin: "For the first time, China has embedded a dedicated plan to raise household incomes into a top-level national policy document, signaling a change in priorities as policymakers grapple with persistently weak consumer spending." caixinglobal.com/2026-03-30/cov…
2/12
"The diagnosis is widely shared," the article notes, as it quotes Yang Weimin, a former deputy director of the CFEAC, that “The reason for China’s low share of consumption in total demand is mainly the low share of residents’ income in national income.”
3/12
This isn't new. A few of us have been arguing for 10-15 years that China's trade and investment imbalances and its soaring debt are all the result of a highly distorted distribution of income in which households directly and indirectly retain an astonishingly low share.