1/ They've said this many times before, Noah, but things have been getting consistently worse, not better. The amount of debt it takes to generate a unit of GDP has been growing rapidly, even as GDP growth has slowed, and within Beijing there is a fierce debate about whether...
2/ or not they should take aggressive steps to get debt under control, even if this results in much slower growth and a rise in unemployment. Last year for example there was a big debate over whether to target 6% GDP growth or something much lower. If they did not think the...
3/ debt were a serious problem, and if they believed that Chinese growth was healthy, real and meaningful, why would they even bother having this debate?
The biggest disagreement I have with the Economist, I would say, is over their failure to understand the sources of...
4/ Chinese debt and why the debt burden matters. They seem to think that the fact that China has avoided a financial crisis means that debt isn't that big of a problem, whereas I would argue that China was never likely to have a financial crisis, not because debt isn't a...
5/ problem but rather because financial crises are balance-sheet events, and with its closed banking system and strong regulators, Beijing can restructure liabilities at will and so can quite easily prevent a balance-sheet crisis.
The real test is whether it is possible for...
6/ China to maintain high growth rates without much faster growth in the debt that must fund huge amounts of non-productive investment. These two are related, of course, because if most debt goes to fund investment, and if the investment is productive, there is no way a...
7/ country's debt-to-GDP ratio can grow so rapidly and for so long.
But if anything is clear, it is that China simply cannot tolerate any slowdown in the growth in debt without suffering a very, very sharp slowdown in GDP growth. We know from the history of investment-driven...
8/ growth "miracles" that the problem always arises once total debt stops growing faster than GDP. In that case the country either adjusts in the form of a crisis or in the form of "lost decades" of much slower growth, and a considerable part of that adjustment consists of...
9/ writing down years and years of misallocated investment that was capitalized when it should have been expensed (similar to what Galbraith referred to as the "bezzle").
That, by the way, is one of the main differences between growing debt in China and growing debt in...
10/ the US, Europe and elsewhere. In the former case the expenditures are capitalized and show up as increases in wealth, but not in the latter cases.
We have no idea of how long China can sustain this growth in debt, but we also know that the longer it goes on, the more...
11/ difficult the adjustment will be. Until then, nothing has really changed, in my opinion.
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1/4 Brad Setser explains why China didn’t truly de-dollarize—it just shifted its dollar holdings from official reserves at SAFE to less transparent state entities like banks and investment funds.
@Brad_Setser cfr.org/articles/china…
2/4 But his explanations will probably continue to be ignored in favor of much more exciting stories about the collapse of USD as a reserve currency. That's because as long as the PBoC shifts out of its direct holdings of US Treasuries (mainly, it seems, into indirect...
3/4 holdings through custodian accounts), something that is relatively easy to measure, confused analysts will ignore everything else that is happening in the direct and shadow reserves and take this shift as representing the full story of China's reserve management.
1/9 Interesting SCMP article: "China’s top market regulator is intensifying its crackdown on debt-laden “zombie companies” – rolling out a pilot programme in seven economic hubs to facilitate the forced exit of unprofitable firms." sc.mp/q2aq0?utm_sour…
2/9 Developing a robust bankruptcy framework in China is among the most important steps Beijing can take to reduce the role of non-productive investment in driving the economy. Hard budget constraints are what force economic activity to remain economic value creating.
3/9 But it's not so easy to do this. The fact that China has far more "zombie" companies – highly inefficient businesses that are kept alive only by surging debt – than any other country is not an accident or an oversight.
1/8 Brendan Greeley on the development of the eurodollar. If Beijing truly wants CNY to be more widely used in international finance, the eurodollar market provides one potentially useful model to show how that might happen. ft.com/content/be3459…
2/8 From the 1960s through the early 1980s, the eurodollar was a separate offshore dollar market and not simply an extension of the onshore USD markets. it was a way for dollars to circulate outside US regulation and US control. Its separation was created by...
3/8 a series of frictional costs between the onshore market and the offshore needs of foreigners, including US capital controls, US bank regulation, and the refusal of Soviet bloc nations to hold their badly-needed dollars in onshore US banks.
1/5 It's true that China was able to withstand the effects of the Iran war better than many other countries because it had stockpiled commodities. But it is a little silly, perhaps even a little orientalist, to say that it did so because of strategic thinking. bloomberg.com/news/features/…
2/5 We forget that Japan also stockpiled massive amounts of commodities in the late 1980s, and given the subsequent fall in commodity prices (driven in part by ja[an's own economic slowdown), this later turned out to be an additonal drag on economic performance.
3/5 In both cases, the country was running enormous trade surpluses that had to be recycled, and were causing increasing concern abroad. In both cases, perhaps in order to disguise reserve accumulation, part of the reserve accumulation occurred through state banks.
1/6 Good Steven Barnett piece. He points out that "targeting growth rates inconsistent with productivity trends leads to distortive policies", and argues instead for a "dramatic, permanent payroll tax cut" to boost consumption. ft.com/content/d078c7…
2/6 This would certainly work, as would any other policy that increases the disposable income of average Chinese households relative to GDP. China's extraordinarily low consumption share of GDP is mainly a consequence of the low household income share.
3/6 Notice however that unless the cut in payroll taxes were matched by higher taxes on households or businesses, or by cuts in spending to either sector, a reduction in payroll taxes would have to be balanced dollar for dollar by more government debt.
1/4 Several people have asked for more information about the Maekawa Commission report and its reception. There is a wide variety of sources, but I am attaching three memoranda on the topic written by the CIA in 1986. I find these especially helpful in illustrating perceptions at the time.
2/4 From the summary of the April 9 memo: "A United States request that Japan alter its macroeconomic structure to reduce its propensity to run ever larger trade surpluses will probably bring a claim from Japanese officials that the country has already embarked on a process of structural change. Despite the nod this week's Maekawa Commission report gives to structural adjustment, Tokyo would probably resist major adjustments in savings, consumption, and investment incentives that did not also serve its industrial policy goals. Only the prospect of closed foreign markets or deep recession at home, neither of which Tokyo believes likely in the near term, would change this view." cia.gov/readingroom/do…
3/4 From the October 20 memo: "The impact on Japan's international competitiveness and on workers' spending patterns will depend in large part on whether the reduced hours are accompanied by the same or lower earnings. If wages are cut back along with hours, production costs will not necessarily rise, and Japanese workers might not increase their spending." cia.gov/readingroom/do…