1/ They've said this many times before, Noah, but things have been getting consistently worse, not better. The amount of debt it takes to generate a unit of GDP has been growing rapidly, even as GDP growth has slowed, and within Beijing there is a fierce debate about whether...
2/ or not they should take aggressive steps to get debt under control, even if this results in much slower growth and a rise in unemployment. Last year for example there was a big debate over whether to target 6% GDP growth or something much lower. If they did not think the...
3/ debt were a serious problem, and if they believed that Chinese growth was healthy, real and meaningful, why would they even bother having this debate?
The biggest disagreement I have with the Economist, I would say, is over their failure to understand the sources of...
4/ Chinese debt and why the debt burden matters. They seem to think that the fact that China has avoided a financial crisis means that debt isn't that big of a problem, whereas I would argue that China was never likely to have a financial crisis, not because debt isn't a...
5/ problem but rather because financial crises are balance-sheet events, and with its closed banking system and strong regulators, Beijing can restructure liabilities at will and so can quite easily prevent a balance-sheet crisis.
The real test is whether it is possible for...
6/ China to maintain high growth rates without much faster growth in the debt that must fund huge amounts of non-productive investment. These two are related, of course, because if most debt goes to fund investment, and if the investment is productive, there is no way a...
7/ country's debt-to-GDP ratio can grow so rapidly and for so long.
But if anything is clear, it is that China simply cannot tolerate any slowdown in the growth in debt without suffering a very, very sharp slowdown in GDP growth. We know from the history of investment-driven...
8/ growth "miracles" that the problem always arises once total debt stops growing faster than GDP. In that case the country either adjusts in the form of a crisis or in the form of "lost decades" of much slower growth, and a considerable part of that adjustment consists of...
9/ writing down years and years of misallocated investment that was capitalized when it should have been expensed (similar to what Galbraith referred to as the "bezzle").
That, by the way, is one of the main differences between growing debt in China and growing debt in...
10/ the US, Europe and elsewhere. In the former case the expenditures are capitalized and show up as increases in wealth, but not in the latter cases.
We have no idea of how long China can sustain this growth in debt, but we also know that the longer it goes on, the more...
11/ difficult the adjustment will be. Until then, nothing has really changed, in my opinion.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/7 China Daily says that now that last week's "Central Economic Work Conference identified the 'vigorous promotion of consumption' as the top priority for 2025", Beijing will "roll out an array of targeted measures to...
2/7 boost consumption", mainly, it seems, expanding the scope and coverage of the the "trade-in" programs, in which Chinese households are given subsidies to trade in their home appliances, home furnishings and automobiles for new ones.
3/7 The article claims that the trade-in program led to new sales of RMB 1 trillion this year, but fails to note that nearly all of these new sales came at the expense of other forms of consumption, so that they only increased total consumption by the amount of the subsidies.
1/9 Lizzi Lee notes that requiring technology transfers and local production in exchange for market access is a way to protect strategically important industries.
She's right, but this only addresses one of the two very different trade-related problems.
2/9 The first problem is that in a globalized world, economies with open capital and trade accounts automatically import their industrial policies as the obverse of the industrial policies of their more aggressively interventionist trade partners.
3/9 If one economy subsidizes its EV industry because it believes it to be strategically important, for example, the global expansion in its EV industry will come at the expense of EV production among its trade partners.
In that case the kind of policies Lee proposes make sense.
1/9 David Fishman notes that "Chinese total exports to "the West" are now smaller than its exports to "not the West", but we have to be careful how we read that. What matters to Chinese surpluses is where the corresponding deficits are located.
2/9 That's because trade clears systemically, not bilaterally. If China runs surpluses with "not the West", there are only two ways to balance these surpluses. One way is that "not the West" in turn runs surpluses with "the West" in order to pay for net Chinese imports.
3/9 In that case China's surpluses continue to depend on deficits in "the West", but imbalances are intermediated through "not the West." It might look like Chinese trade is less dependent on the "the West", in other words, but that is an illusion. It is as dependent as ever.
1/8 Shuli Ren: "Boosting domestic demand is now seen as the only viable way to offset Trump’s tariff blow to exports, the one bright spot in an otherwise anemic economy. In an extreme scenario, if trade tensions...
2/8 escalate and wipe out all Chinese exports to the US, which currently account for 3% of gross domestic product, Beijing will have no choice but to get people to spend to meet its growth ambition."
3/8 Ren is arguing that Trump's policies might be good for China because they "might just accelerate structural economic reforms that Beijing has been slow to enact".
She's right, but it won't be easy. Beijing's failure to restructure the economy is not just an oversight.
1/9 China's aggregate financing rose by RMB 2.34 trillion in November, up 7.8% year on year. While some analysts note than this is a record low rate of growth, it must be compared with nominal GDP growth, which is also at a record low rate. english.news.cn/20241213/00da0…
2/9 The country's debt burden continues to rise rapidly, in other words. By the end of November, the outstanding amount of aggregate financing was RMB 405.6 trillion, or approximately 309% of China's annual GDP. At the end of last year it amounted to 300% of China's GDP.
3/9 Year to date, aggregate financing rose by more than RMB 29 trillion, which means that it took an increase in debt equal to nearly 25 percentage points of year-to-date GDP to boost nominal year-to-date GDP by less than 4 percentage points.
1/10
Important article by Greg Jensen: "Modern mercantilism today is built on four tenets: First, the state has a large role in orchestrating the economy to increase national wealth and strength. Second, trade balances are...
2/10
an important determinant of national wealth and strength, and trade deficits should be avoided. Third, industrial policy is used to promote self-reliance and defense. Fourth, national corporate champions are protected."
3/10
Jensen is effectively channeling Joan Robinson, who argued that in a globalized world, mercantilist policies in one set of countries must eventually be matched by their trade partners if the latter don't want their own economies to be affected by the former's policies.