1/ They've said this many times before, Noah, but things have been getting consistently worse, not better. The amount of debt it takes to generate a unit of GDP has been growing rapidly, even as GDP growth has slowed, and within Beijing there is a fierce debate about whether...
2/ or not they should take aggressive steps to get debt under control, even if this results in much slower growth and a rise in unemployment. Last year for example there was a big debate over whether to target 6% GDP growth or something much lower. If they did not think the...
3/ debt were a serious problem, and if they believed that Chinese growth was healthy, real and meaningful, why would they even bother having this debate?
The biggest disagreement I have with the Economist, I would say, is over their failure to understand the sources of...
4/ Chinese debt and why the debt burden matters. They seem to think that the fact that China has avoided a financial crisis means that debt isn't that big of a problem, whereas I would argue that China was never likely to have a financial crisis, not because debt isn't a...
5/ problem but rather because financial crises are balance-sheet events, and with its closed banking system and strong regulators, Beijing can restructure liabilities at will and so can quite easily prevent a balance-sheet crisis.
The real test is whether it is possible for...
6/ China to maintain high growth rates without much faster growth in the debt that must fund huge amounts of non-productive investment. These two are related, of course, because if most debt goes to fund investment, and if the investment is productive, there is no way a...
7/ country's debt-to-GDP ratio can grow so rapidly and for so long.
But if anything is clear, it is that China simply cannot tolerate any slowdown in the growth in debt without suffering a very, very sharp slowdown in GDP growth. We know from the history of investment-driven...
8/ growth "miracles" that the problem always arises once total debt stops growing faster than GDP. In that case the country either adjusts in the form of a crisis or in the form of "lost decades" of much slower growth, and a considerable part of that adjustment consists of...
9/ writing down years and years of misallocated investment that was capitalized when it should have been expensed (similar to what Galbraith referred to as the "bezzle").
That, by the way, is one of the main differences between growing debt in China and growing debt in...
10/ the US, Europe and elsewhere. In the former case the expenditures are capitalized and show up as increases in wealth, but not in the latter cases.
We have no idea of how long China can sustain this growth in debt, but we also know that the longer it goes on, the more...
11/ difficult the adjustment will be. Until then, nothing has really changed, in my opinion.
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1/10
President Macron says "We must acknowledge that these imbalances are both the result of weak EU productivity and China’s policy of export-driven growth."
2/10
Countries don't run trade deficits because of low productivity, any more than they run surpluses because of high productivity. That is not at all what global trade imbalances around the world tell us, and that is not why countries have lower or higher saving rates.
3/10
American productivity, to take one obvious example, is higher than that of Europeans, and several times higher than that of the Chinese, and yet it is the US that runs huge deficits and China, with the highest saving rate in the world, that runs huge trade surpluses.
1/8 It's hard to find anything good in the November economic data for China, just as it is hard to find anything new to say. All the important indicators continue to weaken, as they have throughout the year, in some cases even decelerating further. english.news.cn/20251215/a5915…
2/8 Retail sales, for example, were expected to grow a very disappointing 2.9% year on year in November. In fact they only grew 1.3%.
For all the talk of a greater role for consumption in driving growth, in the first 11 months of the year, retail sales were up just 4.0%.
3/8 Meanwhile industrial output rose 4.8% in November, a little below expectation and well below the 6.0% growth in the first 11 months of the year.
For me the main worry is the gap between the two, with the former so far this year growing 2 percentage points more slowly than...
1/8 Caixin: "While concerns about weak demand and external uncertainties persist, this year's Central Economic Work Conference, which concluded on Thursday, marked a shift in tone. The official readout framed China's core economic challenge as... caixinglobal.com/2025-12-12/chi…
2/8 a “prominent contradiction between strong supply and weak demand” — a structural issue rather than just insufficient consumption."
"The change" Caixin writes, "suggests Beijing sees supply-side imbalances, not just inadequate consumption, as a constraint."
3/8 Perhaps, but the only way you reduce a “contradiction between strong supply and weak demand” is either by reducing GDP growth, which Beijing doesn't seem to want, by increasing growth in consumption, which for all its efforts Beijing has been unable to do, or by increasing...
1/4 WSJ: "President Trump’s barrage of tariff increases threatened to chill global trade flows, but commercial exchanges continued to increase as most of the international commerce system functions as it did before the onslaught."
via @WSJwsj.com/economy/trade/…
2/4 Contrary to what WSJ says, Trump's tariffs never really threatened to "chill global trade flows" except in the view of those (including far too many economists) who mistakenly thought of trade in incremental terms rather than in systemic terms.
3/4 As I wrote two years ago, the word "resilience" was going to be used over and over to describe trade as Trump's tariffs shifted trade and trade imbalances around without fundamentally changing them. That's because the only way the US can cause a reduction in its trade...
1/4 The IMF formally recognizes that it is a depreciating RMB, not rising manufacturing efficiency, that drives China's growing trade surplus. ft.com/content/9c92aa…
2/4 That's because a depreciating currency is both a subsidy for manufacturing (and tradable goods) and a tax on consumption. It works by reducing the household share of GDP, especially when reinforced by other production subsidies paid for directly or indirectly by households.
3/4 The net result of boosting manufacturing with subsidies and restraining consumption with taxes is to force the production of manufactured goods to grow faster than consumption – which also means forcing up the saving rate.
1/4 China's CPI was up 0.7& year on year in November, the biggest monthly increase in nearly two years, but those who see this as a revival of inflation are getting it wrong. On the contrary, after four months of flat to positive month-on-... english.news.cn/20251210/cd188…
2/4 month changes, CPI prices were actually down 0.1% month on month in November. Even that was flattered by higher food prices caused by bad weather and a surge in gold prices that drove the “miscellaneous goods and services” category up by more than 14%.
3/4 I credited the stable or rising prices between July and October to the fight against involution, but expected deflation to resume early next year as investment shifted out of the involuted manufacturing sectors to the non-involuted sectors.