1/ They've said this many times before, Noah, but things have been getting consistently worse, not better. The amount of debt it takes to generate a unit of GDP has been growing rapidly, even as GDP growth has slowed, and within Beijing there is a fierce debate about whether...
2/ or not they should take aggressive steps to get debt under control, even if this results in much slower growth and a rise in unemployment. Last year for example there was a big debate over whether to target 6% GDP growth or something much lower. If they did not think the...
3/ debt were a serious problem, and if they believed that Chinese growth was healthy, real and meaningful, why would they even bother having this debate?
The biggest disagreement I have with the Economist, I would say, is over their failure to understand the sources of...
4/ Chinese debt and why the debt burden matters. They seem to think that the fact that China has avoided a financial crisis means that debt isn't that big of a problem, whereas I would argue that China was never likely to have a financial crisis, not because debt isn't a...
5/ problem but rather because financial crises are balance-sheet events, and with its closed banking system and strong regulators, Beijing can restructure liabilities at will and so can quite easily prevent a balance-sheet crisis.
The real test is whether it is possible for...
6/ China to maintain high growth rates without much faster growth in the debt that must fund huge amounts of non-productive investment. These two are related, of course, because if most debt goes to fund investment, and if the investment is productive, there is no way a...
7/ country's debt-to-GDP ratio can grow so rapidly and for so long.
But if anything is clear, it is that China simply cannot tolerate any slowdown in the growth in debt without suffering a very, very sharp slowdown in GDP growth. We know from the history of investment-driven...
8/ growth "miracles" that the problem always arises once total debt stops growing faster than GDP. In that case the country either adjusts in the form of a crisis or in the form of "lost decades" of much slower growth, and a considerable part of that adjustment consists of...
9/ writing down years and years of misallocated investment that was capitalized when it should have been expensed (similar to what Galbraith referred to as the "bezzle").
That, by the way, is one of the main differences between growing debt in China and growing debt in...
10/ the US, Europe and elsewhere. In the former case the expenditures are capitalized and show up as increases in wealth, but not in the latter cases.
We have no idea of how long China can sustain this growth in debt, but we also know that the longer it goes on, the more...
11/ difficult the adjustment will be. Until then, nothing has really changed, in my opinion.
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1/6 According to the WSJ, after a few years in which the earnings of the poor rose faster than the earnings of the rich, in 2025 the earnings of the rich have risen faster. In theory this should have resulted in a lower US trade deficit. wsj.com/economy/us-eco…
2/6 That's because the rich consume less of their income than the poor, and so a shift in the relative income share from poor to rich should have reduced overall US consumption and increased overall US savings, which in turn should have reduced the US trade deficit.
3/6 But the US trade deficit continued to expand. This seems pretty strong evidence that the US trade account isn't driven only by domestic conditions, as most mainstream economists assume. What foreigners choose to do matters just as much or even more.
1/6 SCMP: "President Xi Jinping has called for more efforts to develop a unified domestic market, arguing that it will be crucial to helping China secure an edge in international competition and meet its development goals." scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/6 In a hyperglobalized world, a country gets to choose between economic sovereignty and global integration. The more it chooses to integrate into the global trade and capital system, the less control it exerts over its domestic economy.
3/6 The world is probably better off if every country chooses more global integration (i.e. has more open trade and capital accounts and less control over its external imbalances). This maximizes the benefits of international trade.
1/7 In August, both growth in industrial output and growth in retail sales came in well below expectations, with the former up 5.2% and the latter up 3.4% (compared to 5.7% and 3.7%, respectively, in the previous month). english.news.cn/20250915/7a106…
2/7 As always, the key point is that for all the talk of rebalancing, the proxy for output growth continues to outpace the proxy for consumption growth by quite a large margin.
Meaningful rebalancing requires that consumption outpace GDP growth by roughly two percentage points.
3/7 Some analysts argue that the weaker-than-expected growth in industrial output may be evidence that Beijing’s attempt to rein in involution is starting to work. Industrial output growth in July and August came in at the lowest paces in all of 2025.
1/8 Bloomberg: "China urged Mexico to “think twice” before levying tariffs, a warning that could signal Beijing’s willingness to retaliate over a move it sees as giving into demands from the US." bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/8 Mexico announced plans earlier this week to impose duties of as much as 50% on cars and other products made by China and several Asian exporters.
These are the kinds of stories I think we'll see more of in the next year or two.
3/8 In the past ten years Chinese exports to Mexico have nearly doubled, and its trade surplus has surged, to $71 billion last year.
This bilateral evolution must be understood as part of a global shift.
1/14
Barry Eichengreen warns, correctly, that "The dollar’s international primacy isn’t eternal. To be sustained, it has to be actively fostered and preserved."
But why sustain the dollar’s international primacy? Is this merely a modern monetary fetish? wsj.com/finance/curren…
2/14
While the primacy of the dollar is certainly good for bankers, financiers, and very wealthy owners of movable capital, what's much less obvious is the extent to which it benefits or harms American workers, manufacturers and middle class households.
3/14
Some analysts will argue that being able to transact in dollars benefits American exporters and importers by reducing currency hedging costs, but the more honest ones will acknowledge that the benefits are tiny, at best, and that their lack doesn't seem to hamper rivals.
1/10
Interesting new IMF paper on the extent of industrial policy subsidies to Chinese manufacturers and SOEs (to the extent information is available) and their impact on productivity. imf.org/en/Publication…
2/10
It measures national-level cash subsidies, tax benefits, subsidized credit, and subsidized land, which collectively amount, it says, to a high 4% of GDP. The authors note that other subsidies exist, including sub-national subsidies, but these are harder to measure.
3/10
I'd include in the latter what is perhaps among the biggest subsidies, which is over-spending on logistical infrastructure. To the extent that these cost more in resources than they create in economic value, they represent a large transfer to the users of the infrastructure.