1/ They've said this many times before, Noah, but things have been getting consistently worse, not better. The amount of debt it takes to generate a unit of GDP has been growing rapidly, even as GDP growth has slowed, and within Beijing there is a fierce debate about whether...
2/ or not they should take aggressive steps to get debt under control, even if this results in much slower growth and a rise in unemployment. Last year for example there was a big debate over whether to target 6% GDP growth or something much lower. If they did not think the...
3/ debt were a serious problem, and if they believed that Chinese growth was healthy, real and meaningful, why would they even bother having this debate?
The biggest disagreement I have with the Economist, I would say, is over their failure to understand the sources of...
4/ Chinese debt and why the debt burden matters. They seem to think that the fact that China has avoided a financial crisis means that debt isn't that big of a problem, whereas I would argue that China was never likely to have a financial crisis, not because debt isn't a...
5/ problem but rather because financial crises are balance-sheet events, and with its closed banking system and strong regulators, Beijing can restructure liabilities at will and so can quite easily prevent a balance-sheet crisis.
The real test is whether it is possible for...
6/ China to maintain high growth rates without much faster growth in the debt that must fund huge amounts of non-productive investment. These two are related, of course, because if most debt goes to fund investment, and if the investment is productive, there is no way a...
7/ country's debt-to-GDP ratio can grow so rapidly and for so long.
But if anything is clear, it is that China simply cannot tolerate any slowdown in the growth in debt without suffering a very, very sharp slowdown in GDP growth. We know from the history of investment-driven...
8/ growth "miracles" that the problem always arises once total debt stops growing faster than GDP. In that case the country either adjusts in the form of a crisis or in the form of "lost decades" of much slower growth, and a considerable part of that adjustment consists of...
9/ writing down years and years of misallocated investment that was capitalized when it should have been expensed (similar to what Galbraith referred to as the "bezzle").
That, by the way, is one of the main differences between growing debt in China and growing debt in...
10/ the US, Europe and elsewhere. In the former case the expenditures are capitalized and show up as increases in wealth, but not in the latter cases.
We have no idea of how long China can sustain this growth in debt, but we also know that the longer it goes on, the more...
11/ difficult the adjustment will be. Until then, nothing has really changed, in my opinion.
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1/10
Interesting study suggesting that there is no evidence that higher public debt levels are associated with lower economic growth. I am not especially surprised because there are so many different conditions under which debt can emerge.
2/10
In fact this is one of my main criticisms of much academic economics. Perhaps because of the mathematical tools available to economists, there are far too many studies that try to correlate very complex phenomena against some simple measure, such as GDP growth.
3/10
But this is likely to be meaningless. There are many different types of economies, different types of debt, and different uses for debt. There is also a wide range of relationships between the asset and liability sides of an economy. All of these matter.
1/6 China’s total social financing (the best official measure of debt) rose in the first quarter by 8.8% year on year, to RMB 390.3 trillion. This is the lowest rate of increase in over 20 years, which may at first seem like a good thing from...
2/6 a debt-sustainability point of view, but according to China's NIFD, the country's "macro leverage" ratio, a proxy for debt-to-GDP, "inched up" (according to Caixin) by 6.8 percentage points in the first quarter of 2024, to 294.8%.
http://114.115.232.154:8080/
3/6 In fact that's a very large increase. It rose by just twice that amount, or by 13.5 percentage points, in all of 2023, which already represented a pretty bad year for debt. In the three years before COVID, for example, it rose by 3-4 percentage points a year on average.
1/15
Foreign ministry spokesperson Li Jian says that the U.S. "overcapacity" narrative is a very blunt US policy tool whose purpose is to undermine Chinese industry. He isn't completely wrong: there is a lot of confusion over what "overcapacity" means.
2/15
China's domination of certain industrial sectors, for example, isn't in itself overcapacity. As Li noted, "The US exports 80% of its chips, especially advanced chips, and is a large exporter of pork and agricultural products. Is that 'overcapacity' according to US logic?"
3/15
A week earlier vice finance minister Liao Min said something similar – "the so-called 'overcapacity' is a manifestation of the market mechanism at work, where supply-demand imbalance is often the norm".
1/8 Although Russell Napier is right to identify China's high and soaring debt as a major problem for the economy, he then says: "China needs to not just reflate its economy but to inflate away its debts."
2/8 That would be a terrible mistake, and I think the PBoC understands why.
You cannot just "inflate away" debt. Inflation is just a mechanism for resolving debt by passing on the costs to net monetary savers.
3/8 In China's case, businesses, SOEs and the government are net borrowers, while households are high net savers. Inflating away the debt simply means forcing household savers to subsidize businesses, SOEs and borrowers.
1/6 This NYT article shows just how confused many economists continue to be about trade. They worry that because in recent years a few economies have been implementing trade and industrial policies, this means an end to free trade and free markets.
2/6 This turning away from free markets, they say, will constrain future growth.
Leave aside that industrial and trade policies have often expanded growth, their worries show just how little they understand what free trade and comparative advantage mean.
3/6 The world turned away from free trade decades ago. The large, persistent surpluses that have characterized global trade since the 1980s are largely the consequences of beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies aimed at boosting domestic growth a the expense of trade partners.
1/5 Chinese GDP grew by 5.3% in the first quarter of 2024, well above expectations, reinforcing concerns that GDP growth in China means something quite different than GDP growth in economies that operate under hard-budget constraints.
2/5 While most economists inside and outside China recognize that sustainable GDP growth in China requires that consumption play a stronger role in driving growth, with investment and the trade surplus playing a declining role, the opposite happened in the past three months.
3/5 Retail sales continued to lag in the first quarter, while much of the period's growth was driven by higher investment in infrastructure and (especially) manufacturing and a large trade surplus. China is still having trouble boosting domestic consumption, in other words.