1/ They've said this many times before, Noah, but things have been getting consistently worse, not better. The amount of debt it takes to generate a unit of GDP has been growing rapidly, even as GDP growth has slowed, and within Beijing there is a fierce debate about whether...
2/ or not they should take aggressive steps to get debt under control, even if this results in much slower growth and a rise in unemployment. Last year for example there was a big debate over whether to target 6% GDP growth or something much lower. If they did not think the...
3/ debt were a serious problem, and if they believed that Chinese growth was healthy, real and meaningful, why would they even bother having this debate?
The biggest disagreement I have with the Economist, I would say, is over their failure to understand the sources of...
4/ Chinese debt and why the debt burden matters. They seem to think that the fact that China has avoided a financial crisis means that debt isn't that big of a problem, whereas I would argue that China was never likely to have a financial crisis, not because debt isn't a...
5/ problem but rather because financial crises are balance-sheet events, and with its closed banking system and strong regulators, Beijing can restructure liabilities at will and so can quite easily prevent a balance-sheet crisis.
The real test is whether it is possible for...
6/ China to maintain high growth rates without much faster growth in the debt that must fund huge amounts of non-productive investment. These two are related, of course, because if most debt goes to fund investment, and if the investment is productive, there is no way a...
7/ country's debt-to-GDP ratio can grow so rapidly and for so long.
But if anything is clear, it is that China simply cannot tolerate any slowdown in the growth in debt without suffering a very, very sharp slowdown in GDP growth. We know from the history of investment-driven...
8/ growth "miracles" that the problem always arises once total debt stops growing faster than GDP. In that case the country either adjusts in the form of a crisis or in the form of "lost decades" of much slower growth, and a considerable part of that adjustment consists of...
9/ writing down years and years of misallocated investment that was capitalized when it should have been expensed (similar to what Galbraith referred to as the "bezzle").
That, by the way, is one of the main differences between growing debt in China and growing debt in...
10/ the US, Europe and elsewhere. In the former case the expenditures are capitalized and show up as increases in wealth, but not in the latter cases.
We have no idea of how long China can sustain this growth in debt, but we also know that the longer it goes on, the more...
11/ difficult the adjustment will be. Until then, nothing has really changed, in my opinion.
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1/13
It is helpful to think about Taisu Zhang's list of the EU's perceived weaknesses in the context of global trade, and especially in the context of a global trading system that exhibits the beggar-thy-neighbor characteristics that Joan Robinson warned about.
2/13
To take the first, the EU's lack of political unity means that it cannot respond unilaterally in a world in which its major trading partners (China, Japan, India and, increasingly, the US) are determined to control their external accounts and are able unilaterally to do so.
3/13
A country's ability control its external accounts affects the extent to which it can control its internal imbalances while externalizing their costs, along with the structure of its economy and its mix of manufacturing and services. foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…
1/8 SCMP: "China should add a quantitative target for consumption growth as part of its long-term modernisation goals to help sustain growth momentum as the country’s population declines, a prominent Chinese economist said."
via @scmpnewssc.mp/qmm5m?utm_sour…
2/8 The article continues: "Currently, household consumption accounts for about 39% of China’s GDP, according to Cai Fang, an academician at CASS. Over the next decade it should rise to around 61% as China strives to become a “moderately-developed” country by 2035."
3/8 Most prominent economists in China have already called for increases of anywhere from 5 to 10 percentage points of GDP, and while Cai is right that household consumption of 61% of GDP would indeed make China a more "normal" country, I wonder if he has done the math.
1/8 NYT: "The biggest recipient of Chinese financing over the past two decades has been the United States, where Chinese banks have extended $200 billion in financial support to American companies and projects." nytimes.com/2025/11/18/bus…
2/8 This shouldn't surprise us, even if it seems to go against what we've been reading in headlines in recent years. China is the largest net export of capital in the world, which is just the flip side of its running the biggest trade surpluses in the world.
3/8 While we often read about Chinese capital exports to the developing world, in fact these flows probably peaked in 2015-16, when problems in Venezuela taught Beijing just how risky this can be. This meant surpluses had to be recycled mostly to the advanced economies.
1/8 Good FT piece on the increasing difficulty economists have in understanding, correlating and reconciling Chinese economic statistics. This leads to concerns among many analysts that GDP may be overstated, and fairly substantially. ft.com/content/5b9e74…
2/8 For the FT (and for many others), the biggest puzzle is over how GDP growth can stay constant at 5% even as investment (which plays a bigger role in driving Chinese GDP growth than in any other country in history) is reportedly declining.
4/8 Part of the answer may be that GDP growth has in fact declined, and rapidly, over 2025, albeit from extremely high levels. Another part of the answer may be the surging trade surplus, which is extraordinarily high for such a large economy, and clearly not sustainable.
1/10
Important Benn Steil article on globalization, free trade, and the cost of underwriting both. He cites Wendell Willkie in 1944 as "recognizing how perilous it would be to integrate market economies with state-directed ones."
@ProSyn @BennSteil prosyn.org/LkdDyx7
2/10
"When global prices fail to reflect supply-and-demand dynamics," Steil cites Willkie as arguing, "they distort production and trade flows, killing off more efficient enterprises, fueling imbalances, and breeding resentment."
3/10
This is a point I've often made, although in a different way, including in an upcoming piece in Foreign Affairs.
We start with the widely-recognized insight that every country's internal imbalances must always be perfectly consistent with its external imbalances.
1/7 China's fixed-asset investment declined 1.7% year on year in the first 10 months of 2025, more than twice the expected rate of decline, and well above the 0.5% decline during the first nine months of the year.
2/7 Excluding a 14.7% decline in the property sector, investment rose by 1.7% during the first ten months of 2025, led by a 2.7% rise in manufacturing investment.
As I see it, the weakness in investment growth suggests that the fight against "involution" is working so far.
3/7 It suggests that the post-2022 surge in investment in preferred manufacturing sectors, such as EVs, batteries and solar panels, is being reversed.
But this leaves us with the same questions that we were left with following the post-2022 collapse in property investment.