1/ They've said this many times before, Noah, but things have been getting consistently worse, not better. The amount of debt it takes to generate a unit of GDP has been growing rapidly, even as GDP growth has slowed, and within Beijing there is a fierce debate about whether...
2/ or not they should take aggressive steps to get debt under control, even if this results in much slower growth and a rise in unemployment. Last year for example there was a big debate over whether to target 6% GDP growth or something much lower. If they did not think the...
3/ debt were a serious problem, and if they believed that Chinese growth was healthy, real and meaningful, why would they even bother having this debate?
The biggest disagreement I have with the Economist, I would say, is over their failure to understand the sources of...
4/ Chinese debt and why the debt burden matters. They seem to think that the fact that China has avoided a financial crisis means that debt isn't that big of a problem, whereas I would argue that China was never likely to have a financial crisis, not because debt isn't a...
5/ problem but rather because financial crises are balance-sheet events, and with its closed banking system and strong regulators, Beijing can restructure liabilities at will and so can quite easily prevent a balance-sheet crisis.
The real test is whether it is possible for...
6/ China to maintain high growth rates without much faster growth in the debt that must fund huge amounts of non-productive investment. These two are related, of course, because if most debt goes to fund investment, and if the investment is productive, there is no way a...
7/ country's debt-to-GDP ratio can grow so rapidly and for so long.
But if anything is clear, it is that China simply cannot tolerate any slowdown in the growth in debt without suffering a very, very sharp slowdown in GDP growth. We know from the history of investment-driven...
8/ growth "miracles" that the problem always arises once total debt stops growing faster than GDP. In that case the country either adjusts in the form of a crisis or in the form of "lost decades" of much slower growth, and a considerable part of that adjustment consists of...
9/ writing down years and years of misallocated investment that was capitalized when it should have been expensed (similar to what Galbraith referred to as the "bezzle").
That, by the way, is one of the main differences between growing debt in China and growing debt in...
10/ the US, Europe and elsewhere. In the former case the expenditures are capitalized and show up as increases in wealth, but not in the latter cases.
We have no idea of how long China can sustain this growth in debt, but we also know that the longer it goes on, the more...
11/ difficult the adjustment will be. Until then, nothing has really changed, in my opinion.
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1/4 Total social finance grew in April by RMB 1.16 trillion, a little less than expected. Some analysts suggest that this is because of a weak economy, but it could also reflect higher-quality growth, i.e. one driven less by non-productive investment. english.news.cn/20250514/ff688…
2/4 Overall debt numbers still remain very worrying. Total TSF grew by RMB 16.3 trillion in the first four months of 2025, which suggests that it required an increase in debt equal to 35% of GDP to boost nominal GDP growth by 4%. Of course debt increases in the first four...
3/4 months of the year typically account for roughly 40% of the annual increase, but if this pattern holds in 2025, it suggests that it will still require an increase in debt equal to 29% of GDP to boost nominal GDP growth by 4%. That's a lot of debt per unit of growth.
1/10
There will be a rush to declare yesterday's trade agreement a total success or an abject failure, but its main consequence will be to partially reopen the trade conduits without changing underlying dynamics much. caixinglobal.com/2025-05-12/chi…
2/10
The fact is that as long as China is unable to substantially raise the consumption share of GDP, reluctant to raise the investment share, and continues to pour support into production, it will have to continue running massive trade surpluses.
3/10
Bloomberg reports that as part of yesterday's deal, China may have agreed to remove non-tariff barriers to US imports, but while these reductions may benefit specific US imports, it is China's internal imbalance that is driving down import growth, not import restrictions.
1/4 In a new piece published today, I argue that the reasons Keynes and other prominent economists opposed the unfettered flow of international capital are just as valid today as they were when he was alive.
2/4 For every country, external and internal imbalances are always aligned, just as every country's eternal imbalance are always aligned with the imbalances of the rest of the world. Because—except in the starry-eyed world of "Econ 101"—international capital doesn't...
3/4 flow from less productive investments to more productive investments, i.e. from where it is less needed to where it is more needed, national economies, especially those with open capital and trade accounts, must constantly adjust to accommodate non-economic capital flows.
1/6 As one of Beijing's main policies to boost domestic consumption has been to force banks, since earlier this year, to increase their consumer lending, this very interesting investigative report in Caixin is especially timely.
2/6 "China’s personal lending market," Caixin writes, "is under mounting pressure. What began as a slow-burning concern in early 2024 has become an acute worry in 2025. Housing mortgages, consumer loans, credit card...
3/6 debt and, most critically, small business loans — collectively known as personal loans — are slipping into delinquency at rates not seen since the 2008 financial crisis. Banks across the country are scrambling."
2/9 It's also the word the SCMP used, and several other newspapers. Since March I've argued that the word will be trotted out every month in relation to Chinese exports, mainly because unless the US is able to reduce its trade deficit sharply this... scmp.com/economy/china-…
3/9 year (which I don't expect), we are far more likely to see a shift in trade rather than a contraction. So while China's trade surplus with the US declines, along with its exports, it will be replaced with a rising trade surplus (and rising exports) with the rest of the world.
1/8 A translation (by Fred Gao) of a very interesting recent speech by Liu Shijin, a former Deputy Director of the Development Research Center of the State Council. Liu begins by acknowledging how astonishingly low China's consumption share of GDP is.
2/8 "I want to emphasize a concept here." Liu says. "China's insufficient consumption is not an acceptable deviation from international average levels, but a significant gap of 20 percentage points, which can be described as a "structural deviation.""
3/8 He proposes several solutions, but to me by far the most interesting is when he discusses government-owned assets: "In 2022, the Chinese government sector's net assets accounted for 38.6% of society's total net assets, significantly higher than other countries."