There is always so much interesting stuff in the @bp_plc energy outlook. Some thoughts on my main take-aways for natural gas. 🧵bp.com/en/global/corp…
At first glance, on slide 5, natural gas looks good: it overtakes coal by 2025 and oil by 2035; renewables surpass it in 2040, but even in 2050, gas is the largest fossil fuel. This supports the thesis that gas will do relatively better in the transition.
But these are percentages. In total consumption, gas defends its position in a rapid transition—growing a bit, then declining a bit. But in a "net zero" world, gas demand is near its peak already. By 2050, consumption is down by a third.
That "net zero" outlook, however, hinges on carbon capture utilization and storage and/or hydrogen. More than a third of gas used in 2050 is for hydrogen; around 3/4 of gas used is carbon abated in one way or another.
The change in how gas is being used is made clear in this chart too—in systems with very high renewables penetration there is a shrinking, not a growing role, for gas.
There has always been this assumption in the gas industry that gas is most “energy-transition-proof” investment it could make. That’s still true. But between the “rapid transition” and the “net zero” world is a shrinking market eventually. (But one that still needs investment.)
It is also a market where gas must become more expensive—in order for the carbon dioxide to be abated. Gas, which has struggled to compete on a cost basis in the last decade, now needs to become more expensive to survive. That's a tough proposition.
Μύθος: Τα ελληνικά νοικοκυριά πληρώνουν τις υψηλότερες τιμές στην Ευρώπη
Τα στοιχεία της Eurostat δείχνουν ότι οι τιμές ρεύματος για τα νοικοκυριά είναι διαχρονικά χαμηλότερες από τον ευρωπαϊκό μέσο όρο. (Το ίδιο δείχνουν και τα δεδομένα του Household Energy Price Index.)
Μύθος: Η ελληνική βιομηχανία χωλαίνει λόγω του υψηλού κόστους ενέργειας
Ο δείκτης μεταποίησης, που έπεσε 30% στα χρόνια της οικονομικής κρίσης, έχει σχεδόν ανακτήσει όλο το χαμένο έδαφος, με μια σημαντική επιτάχυνση μετά το 2021.
On December 19, the energy ministers of the European Union agreed on a Market Correction Mechanism for natural gas. Why do we need such a mechanism? What might it accomplish?
A thread.
The starting point for the intervention is a diagnosis of market failure in European gas:
✅ Prices untethered from fundamentals
✅ Manipulation by a dominant player
✅ Sharp drops in liquidity
✅ Extreme volatility
In this context, the question is *how* to intervene, not if.
The parameters of the intervention were laid out in Article 23 of a proposed Council Regulation published on October 18.
The objectives:
✅ Do not jeopardize supply
✅ Ensure demand keeps falling
✅ Protect gas flows within Europe
✅ Do not trigger added financial stress
The @IEA WEO is always a delight to read—full of beautiful graphs and penetrating insights, a roadmap for building the energy system of the future.
This year, I want to highlight a few charts that really underscore Europe’s energy security predicament. 🧵
The increase in energy prices represents a *massive* macro-economic shock. The global trade in natural gas is usually $200 to $400 bn. This year it might reach $800 bn. Europe accounts for most of this increase on the import side. This is a shock whose ripple effects will last.
I never tire of this chart because 1 ½ years since gas prices started to get out of control this graph can still surprise me. Versus Sept 2020, TTF went up almost 25 times. 25x. Yes it then fell, but it's still hard to fathom what this means. Our systems are not built for this.
The European discourse on energy often conflates two distinct ideas: market forces and market design.
Market forces say that Europe must pay more for energy. But market design can determine how much more.
We cannot escape market forces. But we can design markets differently. 🧵
The European gas market suffers from two market failures. First, a dominant player can easily manipulate prices to serve their political ends.
No government would let a domestic market operate untouched under such duress. Why should Europe?
Second, liquidity is low.
Look at TTF (on August 26). In a few hours, prices swung by €60/MWh. That’s about $100 per barrel of oil equivalent. The “market” changed its view by $100/b in a few hours!
These swings happen often. Yet these limited trades set prices for everyone.
Instant takes can be dangerous in a rapidly evolving situation. We are learning more every hour.
But I’ve appreciated the chance to think out loud before on this platform. So here are some ideas swirling in my head about Russia cutting gas to Poland and Bulgaria.
1/ I wonder if we are tripping over a technicality. European firms are paying in hard currency. The fact that Russia is converting these euros into rubles seems irrelevant to me. (I’ve read plenty on the specifics of the scheme; I am still baffled by it.)
We sanctioned the Russian Central Bank largely to freeze its assets. We have not sanctioned Russian energy. If Europe wants to sanction Russian energy, fine; but we cannot let the mechanics of a financial transaction trigger a policy shift of this magnitude.