Thread: In a tense exchange, the three EU leaders at the summit drew Xi’s attention to China’s human rights issues one by one – from Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, bookseller Gui Minhai and Canadians Kovrig and Spavor sc.mp/gw0ft
Xi hit back, saying “every country should first and foremost care about their own business”, according to Xinhua. “We believe the EU can properly resolve its own human rights problems. China does not accept ‘lectures’ on human rights and is opposed to double standards.”
Reportedly, Xi, at this point, began pointing out human rights issues in Europe, including anti-Semitism. EU leaders reportedly pushed back, saying China’s issues were “systemic”.
Michel then asked Xi to arrange a “field visit” to Tibet for EU officials attending a Human Rights Dialogue in China later this year, while calling for access for independent observers to Xinjiang.
@noahbarkin observers that this marks a new focus on human rights, as these types of sensitive issues would have been only discussed behind closed doors in the past.
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@SophieDRich Related op-ed by @benedictrogers, arguing that member states must be clear and specific in pointing out Beijing's egregious human rights violations. He suggests 10 points that could be raised. ucanews.com/news/chinas-ri…
BREAKING: U.S. sanctions first Chinese central government official over atrocities in Xinjiang:
Hu Lianhe, who defended the camps at the U.N. in 2018.
Hu is a deputy head of the central government's Xinjiang Leading Small Group and of the United Front. home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
The justification for sanctioning him follows closely my analysis of Hu's role in my research article from 2021.
The Xinjiang LSG he co-leads was closely involved in the De-Extremification Regulation, which justified the re-education camps. jamestown.org/program/eviden…
Specifically the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (中央新疆工作协调小组办公室) was closely involved in supervising the draft of the original Regulation, published in March 2017, and its revision, published in October 2018. Thus, he had close knowledge of the camps.
New Xinjiang Police Files evidence shows that Uyghurs were sent from re-education camps directly to vocational institutions that organized job fairs with Volkswagen & advertise degrees with Volkswagen as a typical work destination. One victim: the Uyghur Adiljan Hashim. /1
Police records show that Adiljan Hashim was detained in October 2017, then placed into the Xinjiang Light Industry Technical College (新疆轻工职业技术学院) in January 2018. This "release" was highly controlled and based on pre-agreed conditions (担保释放人员).
The Xinjiang Light Industry Technical College offers majors in fields such as automobile manufacturing (汽车制造). The college lists examples of a cooperation with companies including FAW-Volkswagen Xinjiang on its website, and advertises Volkswagen as a graduate employer.
Pleased to publish another peer-reviewed article today on Xinjiang forced labor (4th this year), arguing why this forced labor requires reversing the burden of proof.
I would like to thank the Journal of Human Trafficking (@JournalOfHT) for publishing this article.
It's important to have work on Xinjiang forced labor published in a journal that specializes on forced labor, human trafficking, and modern slavery.
The article advances the to-date first systematic review of: (1) the evolution of ILO efforts to measure forced labor, and of (2) the suitability of the ILO’s 2012 Survey Guidelines in several Central Asian state-imposed forced labor contexts (XJ, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Taj).
Major investigative report uncovers how large corporations including @bp_plc, Hilton & Spotify bought carbon credits at direct risk of Uyghur forced labor.
My team provided crucial research findings, implicating the world’s largest carbon consultancy: 🧵 theguardian.com/environment/20…
The Bachu carbon project developed by the world's largest carbon consultancy @southpoleglobal in Kashgar burns cotton stalks to generate climate neutral power.
These stalks are sourced from a region with multiple coercive labor transfers targeting Uyghurs to pick cotton.
Bachu is part of Xinjiang's most coercive labor transfer policies, see .
Our research identified multiple specific local cases of coercive state transfer efforts within the 50km radius within which the plan sources cotton stalks.tandfonline.com/doi/permission…
My new op-ed argues that Xinjiang's drastic foreign trade growth (over 100% in Uyghur regions) is not a coincidence, but linked to intensified & expanded labor transfers: 🧵 thehill.com/opinion/intern…
Recent data shows that Xinjiang's foreign exports increased by 49% in the first three quarters of 2023. Increases in Uyghur regions were over 100% (for 2022).
I argue that this drastic growth is not by coincidence.
Export growth was driven by a 50 percent increase in labor-intensive products — the types of goods most at risk of involving forced Uyghur labor.
Since 2021, Xinjiang intensified its labor transfer and employment policies - see detailed discussion in tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…