The Salisbury convention can only conceivably bite on Bills that *give effect to* the governing party’s manifesto commitments, as distinct from Bills that *renege* on such commitments. /… lordslibrary.parliament.uk/research-brief…
There was a clear commitment in the Conservatives’ 2019 manifesto to ‘get Brexit done’ by implementing the Prime Minister’s ‘great new deal’ as set out in the Withdrawal Agreement & the Northern Ireland Protocol. /… assets-global.website-files.com/5da42e2cae7ebd…
The Government’s view appears to be that other promises about NI access to the GB market trumps this promise about implementing the Withdrawal Agreement. /…
In other words, they seem to be claiming that the manifesto contains contradictory promises and that legislation implementing one of them but breaching the other engages the Salisbury convention. /…
But that’s highly unconvincing — not least because the manifesto commitment to implement (and so to legislate to give effect to) the Withdrawal Agreement was the flagship policy on which the election campaign was fought. It is *literally* on the cover of the manifesto. /…
It follows, in my view, that the democratic basis of the Salisbury convention isn’t engaged by the current issue and that the convention thus supplies no basis for arguing that the House of Lords is obliged to approve the Internal Market Bill as presently drafted. /…
In its briefing paper on Salisbury, the House of Lords Library rightly says that the convention bites on manifesto bills because they have ‘a special form of democratic legitimacy’. A Bill *undermining* a central manifesto promise does not fall into that category. /…
The mere fact that the Government is arguing that the Salisbury convention applies is revealing. It is is consistent with the narrative I refer to in this piece, whereby constitutional counterbalances to the Executive are resisted or delegitimised. /… publiclawforeveryone.com/2020/09/13/the…
The House of Lords (whatever its shortcomings) is a significant counterweight to the Executive-dominated House of Commons and has often acted, entirely properly, as a guardian of fundamental constitutional principle. /…
It would be entirely proper for the Lords to act in such a way on this occasion — by refusing to approve legislation that authorises Ministers to breach international legal obligations and that attempts to shield such Government action from judicial scrutiny. /ends
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2. Academics (including, it seems, @AdamJTucker and me) are implicitly accused of being 'wildly irresponsible' by 'invit[ing] the Supreme Court to overthrow' parliamentary sovereignty:
1. The UK Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights (@HumanRightsCtte) has published a preliminary analysis of the Rwanda Bill. Here's a short thread with some key excerpts. committees.parliament.uk/publications/4…
2. The Committee notes that if Rwanda remains unsafe, the effect of the Bill would be to permit removals nevertheless and to prevent courts from stopping them, thus breaching Articles 3 and 13 ECHR.
3. The JCHR observes, as others have also pointed out, that if the Government was confident that the UK-Rwanda Treaty satisfactorily addressed the Supreme Court's concerns, the Bill would be unnecessary unless the aim was simply to speed up the operationalisation of the policy.
2. Key concern relates to clause 4, which permits challenges on individual grounds (as opposed to on the general ground that Rwanda is an unsafe country).
3. Also concerned that clause 5 (Ministers can ignore ECtHR interim measures) may make matters worse (from perspective of those who want maximally restrictive regime).
Constitutional lawyers may find suggestions that parliamentary sovereignty is an 'assumption' less surprising, since the suggestion emanates not from four KCs who have just written to a newspaper but from judges themselves. (1)
Indeed, one of the leading theoretical accounts of parliamentary sovereignty, published by Sir William Wade in the Cambridge Law Journal in 1955, insists that the sovereignty of Parliament lies 'in the keeping of the courts'. (2) cambridge.org/core/journals/…
More recently, some senior judges have argued that parliamentary sovereignty is not 'absolute'. See, eg, Lord Steyn in Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [102]: (3) bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/…
The Government's ECHR Memo on the Rwanda Bill makes interesting reading. The absence of a s 19 statement of compatibility notwithstanding, the Bill is said to be capable of application compatibly with the ECHR. (1) publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill…
The Government's position, as set out in its ECHR Memo, on clauses 4 and 5 of the Rwanda Bill (dealing with individual circumstances and ECtHR interim measures respectively) seem to me to be particularly strained and/or telling. (2)
It's said that clause 4 is compatible with the ECHR, including the Article 13 right to an effective remedy, because it will be possible for domestic courts to issue suspensive remedies: (3)
A very helpful thread on the Government's statement concerning the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill. I would just add one additional point... /1
The Business Secretary says in his statement that: 'There will no longer be a place for EU law concepts in our statute book.' /2
But that is surely incorrect. As far as I understand it, the Bill addresses only matters concerning 'retained EU Law' within the meaning of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The Withdrawal Agreement, and its domestic legal effects, are a separate matter. /3