By my reckoning, the Government has so far attempted in five ways to justify clauses 42 and 43 of the Internal Market Bill, which, if enacted, would allow Ministers to make regulations in breach of the Withdrawal Agreement /…
1. The powers would breach international law but only in a ‘limited and specific’ manner (Brandon Lewis, Northern Ireland Secretary) — but this is not a distinction the law draws: a breach of international law is a breach of international law /…
2. The powers are needed in case the Government needs rapidly to implement safeguards under Art 16 NI Protocol (Lord Keen, Advocate General) — but the clause 42–3 powers bear little relation to the matters with which Article 16 is concerned /…
3. The powers are needed in case the Government rapidly needs to do what Article 62 of the Vienna Convention allows (Lord Keen) — but Article 62 requires a fundamental change of circumstance and permits only withdrawal/termination, not repudiation of individual obligations /…
4. The Withdrawal Agreement is a ‘special’ form of treaty because it presupposes a Future Relationship Agreement, so it’s ok to breach the WA if no FRA materialises (various Ministers) — this is just wrong /…
5. The Internal Market Bill would amount to an ‘acceptable’ rather than an ‘unacceptable’ breach of the rule of law (Robert Buckland, Lord Chancellor) — but the law draws no distinction between these two forms of breach /…
So: five attempts to justify clauses 42–3, none of which is satisfactory as a matter of law.
Sixth time lucky? /ends
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This story by @cazjwheeler in the Sunday Times undermines the narrative that the government — including the Prime Minister — has energetically sought to advance over the the last week, and suggests the CPS adopted an indefensibly rigid approach. /1 thetimes.com/uk/politics/ar…
If it really is the case that the CPS dropped the case because the Deputy NSA declined to adopt a particular form of words in his evidence, that implies an extraordinarily rigid approach that it will be hard for the Director of Public Prosecutions to defend. /2
Meanwhile, the Prime Minister told the House of Commons last week that the evidence of the Deputy NSA, Matthew Collins, was produced without any particular input or interference whatsoever. /3
I am puzzled by the apparent position of the PM on the dropping of the prosecutions in the alleged China spying cases. I am not an expert in this area so am happy to be corrected. But it seems to me that two things are being conflated. /1
Under the (now repealed) Official Secrets Act 1911, as interpreted by the courts (including by the Court of Appeal in Ivanova[2024] EWCA Crim 808, the 'enemy' in question must have been an 'enemy' at the time the offence was committed. That much is uncontroversial. /2
The meaning of 'enemy', according to the Court of Appeal, includes 'a country which represents a current threat to the national security of the UK' and involves questions of 'fact and degree' that are ultimately for the jury. /3
2. Academics (including, it seems, @AdamJTucker and me) are implicitly accused of being 'wildly irresponsible' by 'invit[ing] the Supreme Court to overthrow' parliamentary sovereignty:
1. The UK Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights (@HumanRightsCtte) has published a preliminary analysis of the Rwanda Bill. Here's a short thread with some key excerpts. committees.parliament.uk/publications/4…
2. The Committee notes that if Rwanda remains unsafe, the effect of the Bill would be to permit removals nevertheless and to prevent courts from stopping them, thus breaching Articles 3 and 13 ECHR.
3. The JCHR observes, as others have also pointed out, that if the Government was confident that the UK-Rwanda Treaty satisfactorily addressed the Supreme Court's concerns, the Bill would be unnecessary unless the aim was simply to speed up the operationalisation of the policy.
2. Key concern relates to clause 4, which permits challenges on individual grounds (as opposed to on the general ground that Rwanda is an unsafe country).
3. Also concerned that clause 5 (Ministers can ignore ECtHR interim measures) may make matters worse (from perspective of those who want maximally restrictive regime).
Constitutional lawyers may find suggestions that parliamentary sovereignty is an 'assumption' less surprising, since the suggestion emanates not from four KCs who have just written to a newspaper but from judges themselves. (1)
Indeed, one of the leading theoretical accounts of parliamentary sovereignty, published by Sir William Wade in the Cambridge Law Journal in 1955, insists that the sovereignty of Parliament lies 'in the keeping of the courts'. (2) cambridge.org/core/journals/…
More recently, some senior judges have argued that parliamentary sovereignty is not 'absolute'. See, eg, Lord Steyn in Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [102]: (3) bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/…