8/We covered up this energy technology stagnation with super-cheap oil for a few decades, but 1973 brought that to a halt.
That pushed us from a world of "atoms" innovation to a world of "bits". And here we are today!
9/But of course, productivity was far from the only thing that slowed down in the early 70s.
Here's what happened to real wages. Note that 1973, not 1971, is where the crash begins.
10/Total compensation (including wages + benefits) didn't crash, but it did slow down. And it famously diverged from productivity beginning sometime in the early 70s.
11/Why did real wages fall?
Well, one clue might be found in the fact that NOMINAL wages didn't fall at all. They just kept on growing.
Meaning real wages fell because inflation rose and wages didn't keep up.
12/Inflation was rising in the late 60s, but workers were getting raises to compensate for it.
Then in the early 70s, inflation spiked much higher, and suddenly workers didn't get raises to keep up with inflation!
13/One reason might be that when the economy is doing well, tight labor markets allow workers to bargain for cost-of-living increases to keep pace with inflation, but when there's a recession -- like the one the Oil Crisis caused -- it prevents them from bargaining for raises.
14/Thus, stagflation -- recessions + inflation -- can be a toxic combo for wages.
Economists still argue over how much the Oil Crisis caused stagflation; Fed mistakes probably played a role as well. But the Oil Crisis was almost certainly the trigger.
15/The 70s stagflation led Jimmy Carter to appoint Paul Volcker, a tough inflation-fighter, to head the Fed. Volcker cured inflation but at the cost of 2 sharp recessions in the early 80s.
Those further reduced workers' bargaining power, holding down wages even more in the 80s.
16/So both slowing productivity growth and falling wages -- the two big "WTF?" changes -- can plausibly be attributed to the Oil Crisis of the 1970s.
(Other big changes, like rising inequality and growing budget deficits and trade deficits, actually happened in the 80s.)
17/Now, as I said, a lot more was going on at the time. Union membership was declining.
But even this might have been impacted by the Oil Crisis; weaker bargaining power due to 70s recessions might have accelerated this decline.
18/There was also a huge change in the international monetary system right around 1973: The end of Bretton Woods.
That could have had some effect too, but it's not as clear how that would have worked...
19/The U.S. dollar's strength didn't really change in the 70s, and a big trade deficit didn't open up til the 80s, so I'm inclined to think trade, and Bretton Woods, were not a big factor in the 70s shifts.
20/Really, I think the story of the 70s has to be first and foremost about oil. The end of the age of Cheap Oil, the end of centuries of energy tech improvements, and the resulting disruptions to an economy based on cheap energy.
Feel like Blu*sky is a microcosm for all of American liberalism right now. The entire left-of-center became defined by cancel culture. Now the spaces where that culture exists are shrinking under external attack, but everyone on the left just stays within those shrinking spaces.
There was this big idea that social media was this infinitely powerful tool that allowed a small # of progressives to shame a huge number of Americans into accepting their values. For a decade it seemed to be working. But it overreached and collapsed.
But progressives got addicted to that seemingly infinite power. They forgot everything else. They forgot how to persuade. They forgot how to organize. They forgot how to compromise. They thought the only tool they would ever need again was heckling and shunning on social media.
2/Most of the discourse around China in Western media these days is about U.S.-China competition (e.g. this podcast by @DKThomp and @RushDoshi). But I thought I'd write about something a little more positive -- the idea that China is building The Future.
2/After Covid, there was a general sense that America needed to be REBUILT -- not just from the pandemic, but from the aftermath of the Great Recession, the Rust Belt, and decades of institutional decay.
3/People argued about HOW to rebuild America. Naturally, progressives thought it would be more government-directed, while conservatives thought it would come from the private sector and from defense spending.
This is a very subtle and interesting question. It seems clear that right-wing interest in personal health is a response to the terrible health of non-college Americans. And the rightists are trying to invent an alternative approach that resists the hegemony of academia.
The fact is, college-educated Americans tend to be hypocritical about health. They watch what they eat, get lots of exercise, and try to eat "organic", but they preach fat acceptance and a disability-based approach to poor health. Rightists don't know how to deal with that.
In fact, this is representative of a broader pattern. College-educated progressives get married and stay marriage, but denigrate the idea of marriage. They work hard but denigrate the idea of hard work. Their personal success is based on rampant, galloping hypocrisy.
1/Here's something a lot of people I talk to don't understand about Japanese urbanism, and why Japanese cities are so special.
2/Japanese cities feel different than big, dense cities elsewhere -- NYC, London, and Paris, but also other Asian cities like Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Singapore.
There are many reasons for this, but today I'll focus on one: Zakkyo buildings.
3/When many people think of "mixed-use development", they think of stores on the first floor, apartments on the higher floors. This is sometimes called "shop-top housing" or "over-store apartments".
This is how most cities in the world do mixed-use development.