In my first article for @ChinaBriefJT, I mapped the budget of China's united front, the collection of organizations the CCP leverages to silence political opponents, persecute religious minorities, and acquire foreign tech.
(2/9) For years, Chinese diplomats have insisted that the united front is nothing more than a benign administrative bureaucracy and accused Western analysts of overhyping its role.
But the CCP's own public budget documents belie its claims about the UF's importance and function.
(3/9) For @ChinaBriefJT, I analyzed 160 budget reports from organizations involved in China's central and provincial united front systems.
The central 🇨🇳 government's UF spending exceeds $1.4 billion USD each year—and probably even surpasses the budget of @MFA_China.
(4/9) Next to CPPCCs, Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commissions (ERACs) in each province receive the most funding of any UF organization. They are official gov offices dual hatted with CCP staff, tasked with persecuting religious minorities, especially in the Western provinces.
(5/9) Let's not pretend like this isn't the point of the united front. This public, **1,800-page** CPPCC Work Manual lays out the UF's goals quite clearly. Plenty of other internal docs cited in my @ChinaBriefJT paper highlight the UF's goals and MO. web.archive.org/web/2020062216…
(6/9) UF budget documents state explicitly that Hong Kongers, Taiwanese, and and overseas Chinese are the UF's primary targets outside China, and are subject to its monitoring and influence.
Before it was absorbed, the central OCAO had a budget of $376 million USD just for this.
(7/9) In light of the facts, I'd ask this question:
If there's really nothing nefarious going on with the united front, why do some provinces feel compelled to classify information about their UFs as secret? And why does an "admin org" occupy so much of the 🇨🇳 gov's resources?
(8/9) For full transparency, I am releasing the 160 united front budget documents I analyzed in the course of this report, for the central CCP and all 31 provinces of China.
I encourage other analysts to comb through them with keener eyes than mine.
I'm leaving the U.S. government after 2 years as @StateDept's main contact with the Chinese Embassy in Washington — the most challenging and rewarding experience of my life.
More soon on what's next. But first, a few thoughts on diplomacy and America’s role in the world:
2/ I’m sad to leave what must be the most interesting job in Washington, and a team that includes some of the United States' most talented and devoted public servants.
I am and always will be grateful to countless mentors who taught me the American way of diplomacy.
3/ But these 2 years spent helping build and launch @USAsiaPacific’s “China House” have aged me a decade.
After serving as an Economic, Tech, and Political Officer — and managing nearly 300 conversations between the governments — it's time to pass the torch to someone else.
2/ @HASCRepublicans, @HASCDemocrats, @SASCGOP, and @SASCDems should use this NDAA cycle to build the Department of Commerce into a juggernaut, expand open-source intelligence collection and analysis, and/or instantiate new, flexible export control authorities within DoD.
3/ In October, we @CSETGeorgetown identified 273 companies selling AI systems and related components to the Chinese military.
At the time, only 22 — 8% — were listed in @CommerceGov's Entity List or Military End User List.
2/ Our latest report and data visualization map nearly 500 of China’s “SKLs” across varying fields and physical locations.
It's absolutely packed with findings. But I want to highlight three of our most important conclusions about the state of science and technology in China:
3/ ➡️ First, China is striving to emulate the U.S. laboratory system, but it’s not there yet.
At the top of China's lab system sit 20 National Labs—its answer to e.g. Los Alamos or PNNL.
Since 1984, 🇨🇳's gov has approved the creation of 10 new ones—but only 2 have been built.
Blinken outlines 3 lines of effort for U.S. China policy: 1. Invest to double-down on longstanding American strengths. 2. Align efforts with allies and partners. 3. Compete to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.
Extremely pleased to see Blinken call out the crucial role that Chinese students play in advancing U.S. innovation, including the tendency of so many to stay and contribute to our economy and society.
.@SecBlinken also calls on USG to address its deprecated investments in R&D.
He laments the decline in U.S. R&D spending as a % of GDP.
Specifically calls for investment in AI, biotechnology, and quantum information sciences—the 3 lodestars of U.S. leadership in advanced tech.