The Government has published its proposed amendments to the Internal Market Bill in order to give effect to the so-called climb down that is intended to placate sufficient Conservative MPs.
Here is the first of two short threads on this. /…
Here’s the amendment that’s intended to provide reassurance to MPs about breaching international law. /…
The effect of this amendment is very limited. It simply means that the Ministerial powers to breach the Withdrawal Agreement & NI Protocol don’t become legally exercisable until they are triggered by a vote in the House of Commons. /…
Once the Commons gives the green light, the powers become fully exercisable and can be used by Ministers to make regulations in breach of the UK’s international treaty obligations. /…
In effect, then, by enacting the Bill, Parliament would be making all necessary domestic legal preparations for Ministers to be allowed to breach treaty obligations subject only to the need for a further vote in the Commons to trigger those Ministerial powers. /…
This changes nothing, therefore, in international law terms: if these powers are triggered and exercised by Ministers, the UK will breach its obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement/NI Protocol. /…
Moreover, it is strongly arguable that as soon as the Bill is enacted, the UK would breach its treaty obligations (i.e. even before any exercise of the Ministerial powers in clauses 42 & 43). /…
In particular, enacting the Bill would very likely in itself entail a breach of the good faith provision obligation in Article 5 of the Withdrawal Agreement. /…
The bottom line is that the amendment the Government is proposing to the Bill is political window-dressing — it is not a ‘climb down’ in any meaningful sense. /ends
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This story by @cazjwheeler in the Sunday Times undermines the narrative that the government — including the Prime Minister — has energetically sought to advance over the the last week, and suggests the CPS adopted an indefensibly rigid approach. /1 thetimes.com/uk/politics/ar…
If it really is the case that the CPS dropped the case because the Deputy NSA declined to adopt a particular form of words in his evidence, that implies an extraordinarily rigid approach that it will be hard for the Director of Public Prosecutions to defend. /2
Meanwhile, the Prime Minister told the House of Commons last week that the evidence of the Deputy NSA, Matthew Collins, was produced without any particular input or interference whatsoever. /3
I am puzzled by the apparent position of the PM on the dropping of the prosecutions in the alleged China spying cases. I am not an expert in this area so am happy to be corrected. But it seems to me that two things are being conflated. /1
Under the (now repealed) Official Secrets Act 1911, as interpreted by the courts (including by the Court of Appeal in Ivanova[2024] EWCA Crim 808, the 'enemy' in question must have been an 'enemy' at the time the offence was committed. That much is uncontroversial. /2
The meaning of 'enemy', according to the Court of Appeal, includes 'a country which represents a current threat to the national security of the UK' and involves questions of 'fact and degree' that are ultimately for the jury. /3
2. Academics (including, it seems, @AdamJTucker and me) are implicitly accused of being 'wildly irresponsible' by 'invit[ing] the Supreme Court to overthrow' parliamentary sovereignty:
1. The UK Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights (@HumanRightsCtte) has published a preliminary analysis of the Rwanda Bill. Here's a short thread with some key excerpts. committees.parliament.uk/publications/4…
2. The Committee notes that if Rwanda remains unsafe, the effect of the Bill would be to permit removals nevertheless and to prevent courts from stopping them, thus breaching Articles 3 and 13 ECHR.
3. The JCHR observes, as others have also pointed out, that if the Government was confident that the UK-Rwanda Treaty satisfactorily addressed the Supreme Court's concerns, the Bill would be unnecessary unless the aim was simply to speed up the operationalisation of the policy.
2. Key concern relates to clause 4, which permits challenges on individual grounds (as opposed to on the general ground that Rwanda is an unsafe country).
3. Also concerned that clause 5 (Ministers can ignore ECtHR interim measures) may make matters worse (from perspective of those who want maximally restrictive regime).
Constitutional lawyers may find suggestions that parliamentary sovereignty is an 'assumption' less surprising, since the suggestion emanates not from four KCs who have just written to a newspaper but from judges themselves. (1)
Indeed, one of the leading theoretical accounts of parliamentary sovereignty, published by Sir William Wade in the Cambridge Law Journal in 1955, insists that the sovereignty of Parliament lies 'in the keeping of the courts'. (2) cambridge.org/core/journals/…
More recently, some senior judges have argued that parliamentary sovereignty is not 'absolute'. See, eg, Lord Steyn in Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [102]: (3) bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/…