A second short thread on the Government’s proposed amendments to the Internal Market Bill — this time looking at what is said about judicial review. /…
Clause 45 contains what has widely been taken to be an ouster clause, i.e. ousting the courts’ capacity to judicially review regulations made under clauses 42 & 43. They are given effect ‘notwithstanding’ incompatibility with a wide variety of forms of law. /…
In particular, the reference in clause 45(4) to ‘any rule of domestic law whatsoever’ seems, on the face of it, to rule out judicial review on normal grounds. /…
But placing Ministerial action, including regulations made by Ministers, beyond judicial review is a clear breach of the rule of law. A court would therefore seek, if at all possible, to preserve judicial review. /…
In a blogpost last week, I argued that there were two ways in which a court might approach this matter: either by means of (arguably strained) interpretation or by adopting the nuclear option of refusing to apply the ouster clause. /… publiclawforeveryone.com/2020/09/09/the…
Against this background, the Government’s proposed amendments to clause 45 are noteworthy. /…
The effect of these amendments is to provide that the normal time limits for seeking judicial review cannot be extended when a court is asked to consider the validity of regulations made under clause 42 or 43. This clearly envisages that judicial review *will* be available /…
It is difficult to understand how the Government thinks this relates to the rest of clause 45 which, as noted, say that such regulations have effect even if they are incompatible with domestic, EU or international law. /…
The amendment contemplates courts ruling that clause 42/43 regulations are unlawful and invalid — yet clause 45(1) says that they ‘have effect’ even if incompatible with domestic, EU or international law. /…
One way of reconciling these points would be say that even if a court decided a regulation under clause 42/3 was unlawful and invalid it would nevertheless continue to ‘have effect’ because of clause 45(1). But the idea of effective invalid regulations is legally oxymoronic. /…
An alternative approach would be to adopt the approach I suggested in last week’s post, by saying that regulations are not ‘made under’ clause 42/3 if they breach judicial review principles, because clause 42/3 don’t in the first place authorise such regulations. /…
A further possibility is that a court might seek to reconcile the tensions within clause 45 as amended by holding that the reference to domestic law in clause 45 does not include the grounds of judicial review, thereby enabling sense to be made of the clause as a whole. /…
Either way, the amendments to clause 45 *are*, I think, a climb down of sorts, because they clearly contemplate the possibility of judicial review — even if the disjunction between the original clause and the amendments create a number of conceptual uncertainties. /ends
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
2. Academics (including, it seems, @AdamJTucker and me) are implicitly accused of being 'wildly irresponsible' by 'invit[ing] the Supreme Court to overthrow' parliamentary sovereignty:
1. The UK Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights (@HumanRightsCtte) has published a preliminary analysis of the Rwanda Bill. Here's a short thread with some key excerpts. committees.parliament.uk/publications/4…
2. The Committee notes that if Rwanda remains unsafe, the effect of the Bill would be to permit removals nevertheless and to prevent courts from stopping them, thus breaching Articles 3 and 13 ECHR.
3. The JCHR observes, as others have also pointed out, that if the Government was confident that the UK-Rwanda Treaty satisfactorily addressed the Supreme Court's concerns, the Bill would be unnecessary unless the aim was simply to speed up the operationalisation of the policy.
2. Key concern relates to clause 4, which permits challenges on individual grounds (as opposed to on the general ground that Rwanda is an unsafe country).
3. Also concerned that clause 5 (Ministers can ignore ECtHR interim measures) may make matters worse (from perspective of those who want maximally restrictive regime).
Constitutional lawyers may find suggestions that parliamentary sovereignty is an 'assumption' less surprising, since the suggestion emanates not from four KCs who have just written to a newspaper but from judges themselves. (1)
Indeed, one of the leading theoretical accounts of parliamentary sovereignty, published by Sir William Wade in the Cambridge Law Journal in 1955, insists that the sovereignty of Parliament lies 'in the keeping of the courts'. (2) cambridge.org/core/journals/…
More recently, some senior judges have argued that parliamentary sovereignty is not 'absolute'. See, eg, Lord Steyn in Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [102]: (3) bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/…
The Government's ECHR Memo on the Rwanda Bill makes interesting reading. The absence of a s 19 statement of compatibility notwithstanding, the Bill is said to be capable of application compatibly with the ECHR. (1) publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill…
The Government's position, as set out in its ECHR Memo, on clauses 4 and 5 of the Rwanda Bill (dealing with individual circumstances and ECtHR interim measures respectively) seem to me to be particularly strained and/or telling. (2)
It's said that clause 4 is compatible with the ECHR, including the Article 13 right to an effective remedy, because it will be possible for domestic courts to issue suspensive remedies: (3)
A very helpful thread on the Government's statement concerning the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill. I would just add one additional point... /1
The Business Secretary says in his statement that: 'There will no longer be a place for EU law concepts in our statute book.' /2
But that is surely incorrect. As far as I understand it, the Bill addresses only matters concerning 'retained EU Law' within the meaning of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The Withdrawal Agreement, and its domestic legal effects, are a separate matter. /3