THREAD: My comments on Xinjiang's first-ever effort to counter allegations of forced labor, through a White Paper. Has some interesting new figures.
Keys to getting the most out of it (and avoiding false readings): 1. context, 2. read between lines /1 scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Do…
First: this does NOT easily reveal numbers of persons in internment camps. Rather, it gives us a possible scope of coercive labor through the centralized, militarized training of rural surplus laborers (what my research describes as "flow 2"): /2 jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-cam…
XJ did 1.29 million "person-times" ("人次") trainings (annual average 2014-19), of them 451,000 in southern XJ. This is less than 1.29 million persons trained per year (some would have been trained more than once/year). Refers to training of rural surplus laborers. /3
Since late 2016, this training and the related labor transfer became very coercive and centralized, consisting of 1/3 military drill, 1/3 "thought education" and 1/3 vocational skills. See /4 jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-cam…
The White Paper actually quite bluntly confirms this when it says that “To solve its problem of employment in the long term, Xinjiang must further...improve the quality of the workforce, and change people's outdated mindset.” (lit. "transform", 转变, term used in re-education) /5
Xinjiang's policy says that military training phase of this vocational training must last at least one month. It includes singing red songs and is intended to increase the workers’ discipline, obedience to factory management and to “develop standardized behavior” 行为规范养成. /6
“From 2014-2019, the total number of people employed in Xinjiang rose from 11.35 million to 13.3 million, an increase of 17.2 percent.” - The 2014-19 range conceals a real problem for Xinjiang: employment grew by only 0.85% in 2018 & 19, far less than the 4-8% of previous yrs /7
This is likely a reflection of the negative impact of the police state on XJ's socio-economy and demographics, with many Han leaving since 2015/16. The report glosses over that and boasts about jobs for the rural poor. BJ's priorities in Xinjiang are stability over economy. /8
"From 2018 to 2019, 155,000 people from...poor households...found employment outside their hometowns [and 211,000 by June 2020]".
This figure would contain a significant share of persons released from vocational internment camps. Note the high 66k for 1st half of 2020... /9
...nearly as much as the 2018/19 average of 77.5k per year. Shows a) ongoing strong rural labor transfer, b) ongoing training and successive release of persons from vocational internment camps. Rural south XJ poor households are core target of the internment campaign. /10
Many of them at least initially are placed into jobs near the internment camps, often within the same industrial parks. Some can then return home. But while this figure relates to the camps, it does NOT tell us how many are or were in the camps! That data is not there. /11
“Since 2014, 117,000 people in Xinjiang have achieved employment with higher income in other parts of the country.”
A realistic transfer figure outside of XJ to eastern China. E.g. the target for 2019 was 25,000, of which by 1st half of 2019 15,459 had been transferred. /12
Roughly speaking, about 80-85% of trained surplus laborers are put into jobs near home (same county), about 10% or so and transferred within XJ, and a few percent are transferred outside. Those are the approximate ratios. /13
More detailed rural disposable income data (not in this report) shows that this scheme reduces rural incomes from business/trade (farmers selling own produce etc.), and shifts it to wage income. Mirrors shift from traditional livelihoods to state-mandated wage-labor. /14
In sum, the forced labor scheme kills 3 birds w/ 1 stone:
a)Lifts people out of poverty (defined by income)
b)Puts them into closed environments where state has far more control over them
c)Often removes them from families, promoting intergenerational separation /END
Addendum: detailed paper on the three coercive labor schemes in Xinjiang, including rural surplus labor training and transfer (also w/ some visual evidence) is: jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-cam…
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On Saturday, China's Ministry of Civil Affairs casually announced new standardized Chinese names for 30 locations in "South Tibet" (藏南), together with an updated map (below).
"South Tibet" is India's state of Arunachal Pradesh.
Thread:🧵
India promptly responded, affirming that the state is an "integral" part of India.
This was the PRC MCA's 4th announcement, resulting in a total of 62 Chinese place names. Links in next post.
@SophieDRich Related op-ed by @benedictrogers, arguing that member states must be clear and specific in pointing out Beijing's egregious human rights violations. He suggests 10 points that could be raised. ucanews.com/news/chinas-ri…
BREAKING: U.S. sanctions first Chinese central government official over atrocities in Xinjiang:
Hu Lianhe, who defended the camps at the U.N. in 2018.
Hu is a deputy head of the central government's Xinjiang Leading Small Group and of the United Front. home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
The justification for sanctioning him follows closely my analysis of Hu's role in my research article from 2021.
The Xinjiang LSG he co-leads was closely involved in the De-Extremification Regulation, which justified the re-education camps. jamestown.org/program/eviden…
Specifically the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (中央新疆工作协调小组办公室) was closely involved in supervising the draft of the original Regulation, published in March 2017, and its revision, published in October 2018. Thus, he had close knowledge of the camps.
New Xinjiang Police Files evidence shows that Uyghurs were sent from re-education camps directly to vocational institutions that organized job fairs with Volkswagen & advertise degrees with Volkswagen as a typical work destination. One victim: the Uyghur Adiljan Hashim. /1
Police records show that Adiljan Hashim was detained in October 2017, then placed into the Xinjiang Light Industry Technical College (新疆轻工职业技术学院) in January 2018. This "release" was highly controlled and based on pre-agreed conditions (担保释放人员).
The Xinjiang Light Industry Technical College offers majors in fields such as automobile manufacturing (汽车制造). The college lists examples of a cooperation with companies including FAW-Volkswagen Xinjiang on its website, and advertises Volkswagen as a graduate employer.
Pleased to publish another peer-reviewed article today on Xinjiang forced labor (4th this year), arguing why this forced labor requires reversing the burden of proof.
I would like to thank the Journal of Human Trafficking (@JournalOfHT) for publishing this article.
It's important to have work on Xinjiang forced labor published in a journal that specializes on forced labor, human trafficking, and modern slavery.
The article advances the to-date first systematic review of: (1) the evolution of ILO efforts to measure forced labor, and of (2) the suitability of the ILO’s 2012 Survey Guidelines in several Central Asian state-imposed forced labor contexts (XJ, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Taj).
Major investigative report uncovers how large corporations including @bp_plc, Hilton & Spotify bought carbon credits at direct risk of Uyghur forced labor.
My team provided crucial research findings, implicating the world’s largest carbon consultancy: 🧵 theguardian.com/environment/20…
The Bachu carbon project developed by the world's largest carbon consultancy @southpoleglobal in Kashgar burns cotton stalks to generate climate neutral power.
These stalks are sourced from a region with multiple coercive labor transfers targeting Uyghurs to pick cotton.
Bachu is part of Xinjiang's most coercive labor transfer policies, see .
Our research identified multiple specific local cases of coercive state transfer efforts within the 50km radius within which the plan sources cotton stalks.tandfonline.com/doi/permission…