Delighted to say that @nullnein and I won second prize in the @demokratieghst essay competition (ghst.de/essaypreis/)! The essay will be published in @wiwo the coming weeks, hopefully in German and English. In the meantime, here’s a rough sneak peek at our argument (1/n):
Capitalism and democracy have a complicated relationship. Particular institutional and normative settlements have stabilised it in the past, but none durably so. We sketch 1) the current settlement 2) how we got here 3) why it's failing/flailing and 4) what might come next (2/n)
What’s the current settlement? Many details matter. We zoom in on fiscal-monetary-political nexus. Core feature: independent central banks exercising “governance over gvts”. But CBs=veto players not true sovereigns, ltd by thr mandates/tools. Result: nobody truly in charge (3/n)
How did we get here? 1970s, Nixon closes gold window + Great In/Stagflation = “Democracy can’t handle its own money.” Ulysses & the sirens, solution => self-bondage to the mast, surrender control, central bank independence w inflation mandate. (4/n).
But CBs experienced mission creep. Turn to credit driven growth model (@luciobaccaro and Pontusson) leads to recurring financial crises (Minsky). B/c credit essential for growth, bailouts needed. Only CBs have unltd firepower, hence bigger & bigger burden falls on them. (5/n)
Mission creep drives failing & flailing of current settlement: more and more consequential decisions taken by CBs. Also: financial markets, not democracy, revealed as main drivers of instability. Justification of CBI => hollowed out. (6/n)
Plus: unprotected treasuries, deprived of market-shielding formerly offered by CBs, unable to tackle big issues (inequality, insecurity, climate, etc). Depoliticisation creates fertile ground for destabilisation of mainstream politics. (7/n)
So what should be done/what next? Re-politicise & democratise central banking! As @stefeich and @adam_tooze show EVERYONE hated inflation in 1970s and still does today. This is a key(!) insight. Means we can put CB back in political process w/out fearing inflation explosion.(8/n)
Will it be a smooth ride? Probably not. Will it solve every problem? Definitely not. But it’s not like we’re merrily cruising along right now. And in our financialised economies, the governance of money is the lock and key to many an issue. (9/n).
What does democratising central banking look like in practice? One idea: sunset clause on mandates. Let them lapse & renegotiate (or renew, if all good) every 7-10 yrs. For more ideas: check out @DezernatZ & friend’s AfterCorona ideas on this: ideasaftercorona.de/tag/democratic… (10/n)
That’s the rough/simplified argument. Excited for the full version to appear soon! Big thanks @nullnein for being a fantastic coauthor, @stefeich for valuable feedback, and to him & @adam_tooze for that key research on the Great Inflation. If you havent yet, read their essay! end
My review of @fritz_bartel's Triumph of Broken Promises now out at @phenomenalworld. A fantastic book: must-read for Cold War nerds + anyone interested in recent history of capitalism or pol economy of climate change. 2 nuggets and 3 implications (1/7):
Nugget 1: Bartel's East-West comparison is eye-opening. In retrospect, Eastern Bloc economies appear sclerotic, West looks strong. But 1970s analysts saw oil discoveries, no inflation & pol stability in East, vs angry unions, noisy street protest & stagflation in the West (2/7)
Nugget 2: Energy-finance nexus is crucial. Oil prices ↗️ -> petrodollars -> nugget 1 views -> East can borrow on intl cap mkts as growth rates decline, Western gvts mistrusted, hence early conflict w/ investors (UK IMF bailout 1976, USD 1970s scares, France 1981-3) (3/7)
🚨New Paper Alert🚨
Understanding Italy's Stagnation 📉🇮🇹
Today is #Eurogroup. In the €, Italy is a puzzle. 1980s: among highest per-hour GDP. Today: long stagnation & problem child of €Zone. We tried to understand why. Here's what we found. 1/n
First, what's the problem? From 🇩🇪 & 🇪🇺 perspective, debt often foregrounded. Fear of default, too big to fail etc. etc.
True: Italian debt stock among largest in Eurozone (left chart). But the deeper problem is growth (right chart).
2/n
So what happened to growth? Some say: regional story, southern Italy. And the Mezzogiorno did fall behind. But even Italy's fastest-growing region (North east) lagged Italy's European peers. It's a whole-of-Italy story. 3/n
Back in March I published this paper on the relationship between capitalism & democracy and didn't do my usual summary thread. It's just been switched to open access AND the German translation is out this week. So now is the time!
The paper's Q: how have key figures in the history of thought understood the relationship between democracy & capitalism?
The answer:
- it's a story in 3 acts
- prior to ~1950s, most thought dem & cap can't go together
- it's Modernization Theory that flips the script in 50s
Act 1: starting in the 18th C, plenty of Anglo- (Hume, Smith, Madison) & Francophone (Constant, Guizot) thinkers can't see universal suffrage and private property going together. If the many get the vote, they'll soak the rich. That was the widespread suspicion.
I tried to thread together the recent debates (esp from @NewStatesman@NLR and @PhenomenalWorld) around markets & planning, policy & politics of green transformation. Punchline: planning is good policy; political hope lies in tipping points. 🧵 1/n
1st, policy. As I’ve argued in @FT before, planning is essential to deliver rapid transformation. Ignore dogmatic planning-vs-markets arguments. Focus on specifics of this case. Here, mkt-coordinated investment runs into 3 problems, b/c transformation means high uncertainty. 2/n
1) Under high uncertainty, the transmission mechanism from externality pricing to investment choices becomes precarious. The links between externality-pricing-adjusted prices and expected future profits fray. Keynesian beauty contest takes over. 3/n
Crypto is like a housing bubble on crack. Why? Mini-thread.
A classic housing bubble has two ingredients: an inherently scarce asset (land) plus out-of-control credit creation (usually b/c of some "financial innovation" that gets around previous leverage limits) (1/n)
This maps 1-to-1 onto crypto. 1. The inherently scarce "assets" are the core "currencies": bitcoin, ethereum, etc. Their proof-of-work design generates human-made but real scarcity. Their use-case for criminal activity guarantees their status as asset in some minimal sense (2/n)
2. The out-of-control credit creation is provided by the so-called stablecoins, tether, USDC etc. Allegedly, they are backed by high quality liquid assets. But weirdly enough, no one of repute is allowed to check that (3/n)
THREAD: It's a distribution- not an inflation time bomb that's ticking.
Why? In Europe, inflation is sectorally concentrated, esp. in energy & food. It's bottleneck- (and savings-overhang-), not wage-driven. We're temporarily poorer than expected. (1/n)
Put simply, there is less food / gas / semiconductors / wood / etc. than anticipated. The problem here is not widespread inflation, but "who takes this hit on the chin"? It's not a massive hit, economies are holding up well, but still, that's a question of distribution. (2/n)
It may ofc TURN into an inflation problem. If rich, middle class and poor all have the political power to shield themselves against taking the hit, we would see a generalised inflation tax. 1970s scenario. But given recent wage data, this currently seems unlikely in Europe. (3/n)