Obviously, I need time to digest the huge amount of data , but here’s a preliminary view on an extremely important topic. (Sorry if you don't like it.)
As a citizen or even an investor, I’m obviously appalled by some banks’ past or present behaviours. Anyone who’s read some of my AML threads on Deutsche, Swedbank or others, knows that. But I don’t think what ICIJ does is a good thing.
First, it’s too much at the same time. We’re swamped with information. The general public ends up not being able to make the difference between an investment in an offshore fund and laundering the money of a drug cartel. It’s all “dirty bank stuff”. And that’s terribly bad.
Even for law enforcement; what do you do with all this? It’s mixing truly criminal behaviour and normal financial stuff which you may not like, but is perfectly legal. The way everything is shown will not help you find your way in the quagmire.
As a result, there are very few consequences for the people involved (even the banks). I mean, Panama Papers and then what? Sure, the PM of Iceland had to resign, but that was basically it.
Compare and contrast with what a thorough and dedicated investigation can produce, such as @FD and others' work on Wirecard or @BondHack and @cynthiao on H20?
This new reporting is arguably even worse because they’re basically using SARs, which are “Suspicious Activity Reports” the authorities already have. How does making the content of those public (even if they’re not directly published) help fight crime?
Unless you make the assumption that there is gigantic cover-up in the US government, this is simply unhelpful. Imagine you’re the lawyer for one of the suspects, you’ve just been given a slam dunk to show any jury will be biased or to know what the authorities are focused on.
There is a reason why it’s a crime to publish FinCen’s work – and that reason is not to help cover-ups.
So we’ll all probably enjoy a bit of bank bashing for a few weeks, and even put some media pressure on some banks (for stories that are sometimes more than 15 years old…), but I’m afraid it won’t actually achieve much.
The truth is, money laundering is extremely difficult to fight and the solution is a complicated mix of creating the right incentives, better technology, a more efficient governance (especially in the EU.), more investor pressure, etc
The media can and does help, of course, but I really believe it is by focusing on the worst cases, with dedicated and deep investigations on a specific story. This is what, for example, some papers have done in Denmark or Sweden
More public resources are also probably required – and it won't cost anyhting because it’s actually a very lucrative area of government! The fines can be huge!
So at the end of the day, I understand ICIJ has obviously good intentions, but you should always remember: this topic is complex, and the solutions are not always as simple as downloading 10gb of data on a server - even if it all sounds very exciting for a few weeks.
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An old theme is coming back to haunt them: Basel 4!
Quick thread.
After almost 10y of discussion the package was finally enacted with full implementation in 2033.
Everyone felt, after many EBA reports & banks' disclosures, that impact would be mild.
But for first time banks are publishing capital ratios w/ the new rules and for DB it's ugly
How does it work? Banks are still allowed to use internal models, but the RWA (in 2030/2033) must be at least 72.5% of the standard (non internal models) RWA. ("output floors") and for DB that's a 33% increase!
CET1r would go from 13.8% to 10.35%! Ouch!
Why is the latest EC proposal on securitization a big deal for banks and how does it change the SRT market?
A slightly geeky thread - with some backround on the SRT market if you're not aware of this important market.
First what’s a SRT?
Following secular finance practice of reinventing the wheel but changing its name, the new trendy capital optimization transactions are “significant risk transfers”, but they’re just good old securitizations (invented in the 1860s 😊.)
(cash or synthetic)
The reason they’re now called SRT is a regulatory one.
The 2013 CRR (Art 244/245) allowed banks to get capital relief under some conditions, essentially that “significant risk” was transferred to someone else.
Bloomberg has some nice charts on the tariffs’ impacts.
The first one argues that tariffs on China are coming globally: too many countries will see a spike of imports from China & that's not sustainable.
The second shows GDP impacts, taking into account direct effects + indirect via trade partners (using a WTO macro model, so, you know...)
SE Asia impact is massive, -1% for EU, -1.3% Japan and -2.5% Korea. Mexico bonanza.
Some details on who’s going to stop which exports – very interesting split (especially if you try to model loan losses 😊). Overall 30% drop in US imports of goods (with retaliation modelled as 50% of US). China is -85%, Vietnam -75%, Taiwan, Japan, Korea Thailand -50%, EU -40%.
A week ago the Swiss gvt bravely decided to leave the decision on UBS capital requirement to Parliament.
I’m not sure that was such a great idea – as the recent proposal of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party shows.
If implemented, it would be a massive game changer. A thread.
First, a reminder: the SDP is not a fringe party, they’re #2 in the National council (41/200) & #3 in Council of States (9/46) & they’re also not particularly extreme (I mean, Swiss rarely are.)
But their proposals for UBS are a bit wild.
Let’s unpack.
1) A new leverage ratio surcharge of 3% for assets >300bn$ - in practice it means 40bn$ more capital required (out of approx 85bn of equity).
Ouch.
And having the biggest req on a non-risk adjusted basis is not exactly a very safe approach imho