It’s hard to keep up with the #FinCEN files, so here’s an attempt to summarize the main articles published in Europe and the US.
On HSBC we hear of a Ponzi scheme for 30m$ for which the bank filed a SAR, but there are allegations that HSBC should have stopped it earlier.
In Sweden, DI reports that there are 76 SARs, split between some of the usual suspects: SEB 41, SHB 6, Nordea 1 and the mighty Lansforsakringar (I’m pretty sure I misspelled that one)… 26. But all for very small volumes (a few SEKm max, some only for a few kSEK)
In Norway, DNB is linked with 1bn NOK of transactions but i'm struggling to find more info. We know they are involved in the Samherji fisheries scandal, so it could be that.
In Denmark, as far I can see it’s mostly old stories about the great Danske Estonia, with its 40000% ROE and totally legitimate business and 5462% market share and 15794% CAGR.
In the Netherlands, we can see some link between ING and the Deutsche mirror trades through ING Slaski. Again that’s a rather old story afaict (ING has already been fined for this.)
ABN and the Belgian banks seem to do ok - I can only see references to very small transactions for Belgian banks and nothing on ABN.
And now, dear followers, your favourite topic #ItsAlwaysDeutsche.
And now, dear followers, your favorite topicart of the reporting. This is again an old story but there are a few new snippets worth mentioning.
What did we learn? 1) The fact that it should/could have been stopped earlier is new (but hardly unexpected.) The 100 alerts raised by internal system sound bad.
2) Also bad, the (alleged) meetings between BOFA & Achleitner. Escalating such a matter to the chairman is kind of Wow... The bofa guys must have been really spooked.
3) the dodgy audit of the Russian subsidiary is fantastic. The only missing bit is a **** ESG rating for the Moscow office and a fantastic staff retention scheme. It does sound like the (internal) auditors really enjoyed Moscow and its nightlife.
What’s also bad here is that the current head of Deutsche was the head of audit back then… even if not directly involved, it reflects poorly.
But tbh, the worse is probably that it was Bofa that had to file the SAR. I mean Bofa isn't exactly the red cross.
If even *another bank* thinks what you’re doing smells shit, and reports you to authorities, it can’t be good.
The files also mentions the correspondent banking stuff for DB, especially with Danske, but tbf all you needed to do was read the recent transaction with the DOJ to get the juicy details (or my thread on it.) So nothing new.
And to finish, I can’t see anything significant on the large French banks. Well done, guys, or am I missing something ?
If you see more, please do share, I’ll try to update this thread!
What did Twitter do with that tweet! It was supposed to read:
"#ItsAlwaysDeutsche.
And now, dear followers, your favourite topic.
The Deutsche Mirror trade is a big part of the global reporting. This is again an old story but there are a few new snippets worth mentioning."
An old theme is coming back to haunt them: Basel 4!
Quick thread.
After almost 10y of discussion the package was finally enacted with full implementation in 2033.
Everyone felt, after many EBA reports & banks' disclosures, that impact would be mild.
But for first time banks are publishing capital ratios w/ the new rules and for DB it's ugly
How does it work? Banks are still allowed to use internal models, but the RWA (in 2030/2033) must be at least 72.5% of the standard (non internal models) RWA. ("output floors") and for DB that's a 33% increase!
CET1r would go from 13.8% to 10.35%! Ouch!
Why is the latest EC proposal on securitization a big deal for banks and how does it change the SRT market?
A slightly geeky thread - with some backround on the SRT market if you're not aware of this important market.
First what’s a SRT?
Following secular finance practice of reinventing the wheel but changing its name, the new trendy capital optimization transactions are “significant risk transfers”, but they’re just good old securitizations (invented in the 1860s 😊.)
(cash or synthetic)
The reason they’re now called SRT is a regulatory one.
The 2013 CRR (Art 244/245) allowed banks to get capital relief under some conditions, essentially that “significant risk” was transferred to someone else.
Bloomberg has some nice charts on the tariffs’ impacts.
The first one argues that tariffs on China are coming globally: too many countries will see a spike of imports from China & that's not sustainable.
The second shows GDP impacts, taking into account direct effects + indirect via trade partners (using a WTO macro model, so, you know...)
SE Asia impact is massive, -1% for EU, -1.3% Japan and -2.5% Korea. Mexico bonanza.
Some details on who’s going to stop which exports – very interesting split (especially if you try to model loan losses 😊). Overall 30% drop in US imports of goods (with retaliation modelled as 50% of US). China is -85%, Vietnam -75%, Taiwan, Japan, Korea Thailand -50%, EU -40%.
A week ago the Swiss gvt bravely decided to leave the decision on UBS capital requirement to Parliament.
I’m not sure that was such a great idea – as the recent proposal of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party shows.
If implemented, it would be a massive game changer. A thread.
First, a reminder: the SDP is not a fringe party, they’re #2 in the National council (41/200) & #3 in Council of States (9/46) & they’re also not particularly extreme (I mean, Swiss rarely are.)
But their proposals for UBS are a bit wild.
Let’s unpack.
1) A new leverage ratio surcharge of 3% for assets >300bn$ - in practice it means 40bn$ more capital required (out of approx 85bn of equity).
Ouch.
And having the biggest req on a non-risk adjusted basis is not exactly a very safe approach imho