1/7 This is a little surreal. For years certain countries like Germany saw their productivity-adjusted wages decline dramatically relative to those of their trading partners – especially their EU trading partners in the period before the 2008-08 crisis.
2/7 They nonetheless refused any policy that might reduce or reverse the beggar-thy-neighbor impact of this relative wage decline, however, and ended up running huge surpluses as they exported their domestic demand deficiencies abroad.
Now that currency movements are forcing...
3/7 those income-distribution adjustments anyway (a stronger euro effectively transfers income from EU manufacturers to EU households), the EU is beginning to complain that other countries may also be implementing beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
4/7 This doesn’t make sense. Massive trade surpluses are not the consequence of manufacturing efficiencies. Improving terms of trade are. Persistent large surpluses mainly reflect income distribution policies designed explicitly or implicitly to improve international...
5/7 competitiveness. It is unfortunate that countries like France, Spain and Italy will suffer most from a sharp rise in the euro, but the problem isn’t a weakening dollar. It is many years of an excessively weak “German” euro.
The best way to resolve this problem is not by...
6/7 continuing to protect Germany’s massive surpluses at the continued expense of German workers and Germany’s trade partners. It is for Germany to increase infrastructure investment in Germany and the EU and to reverse wage policies that undermined the income share of German...
7/7 workers and middle class. A country that has been running among the largest trade surpluses in history cannot seriously complain when other countries retaliate. Among other things this was the American lesson of the 1930s.
1/6 China’s total social financing (the best official measure of debt) rose in the first quarter by 8.8% year on year, to RMB 390.3 trillion. This is the lowest rate of increase in over 20 years, which may at first seem like a good thing from...
2/6 a debt-sustainability point of view, but according to China's NIFD, the country's "macro leverage" ratio, a proxy for debt-to-GDP, "inched up" (according to Caixin) by 6.8 percentage points in the first quarter of 2024, to 294.8%.
http://114.115.232.154:8080/
3/6 In fact that's a very large increase. It rose by just twice that amount, or by 13.5 percentage points, in all of 2023, which already represented a pretty bad year for debt. In the three years before COVID, for example, it rose by 3-4 percentage points a year on average.
1/15
Foreign ministry spokesperson Li Jian says that the U.S. "overcapacity" narrative is a very blunt US policy tool whose purpose is to undermine Chinese industry. He isn't completely wrong: there is a lot of confusion over what "overcapacity" means.
2/15
China's domination of certain industrial sectors, for example, isn't in itself overcapacity. As Li noted, "The US exports 80% of its chips, especially advanced chips, and is a large exporter of pork and agricultural products. Is that 'overcapacity' according to US logic?"
3/15
A week earlier vice finance minister Liao Min said something similar – "the so-called 'overcapacity' is a manifestation of the market mechanism at work, where supply-demand imbalance is often the norm".
1/8 Although Russell Napier is right to identify China's high and soaring debt as a major problem for the economy, he then says: "China needs to not just reflate its economy but to inflate away its debts."
2/8 That would be a terrible mistake, and I think the PBoC understands why.
You cannot just "inflate away" debt. Inflation is just a mechanism for resolving debt by passing on the costs to net monetary savers.
3/8 In China's case, businesses, SOEs and the government are net borrowers, while households are high net savers. Inflating away the debt simply means forcing household savers to subsidize businesses, SOEs and borrowers.
1/6 This NYT article shows just how confused many economists continue to be about trade. They worry that because in recent years a few economies have been implementing trade and industrial policies, this means an end to free trade and free markets.
2/6 This turning away from free markets, they say, will constrain future growth.
Leave aside that industrial and trade policies have often expanded growth, their worries show just how little they understand what free trade and comparative advantage mean.
3/6 The world turned away from free trade decades ago. The large, persistent surpluses that have characterized global trade since the 1980s are largely the consequences of beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies aimed at boosting domestic growth a the expense of trade partners.
1/5 Chinese GDP grew by 5.3% in the first quarter of 2024, well above expectations, reinforcing concerns that GDP growth in China means something quite different than GDP growth in economies that operate under hard-budget constraints.
2/5 While most economists inside and outside China recognize that sustainable GDP growth in China requires that consumption play a stronger role in driving growth, with investment and the trade surplus playing a declining role, the opposite happened in the past three months.
3/5 Retail sales continued to lag in the first quarter, while much of the period's growth was driven by higher investment in infrastructure and (especially) manufacturing and a large trade surplus. China is still having trouble boosting domestic consumption, in other words.
1/5 FT: "Japan’s central bankers and government officials say the country may finally become a “normal” economy. Companies will be able to pass on increased costs to consumers in the form of higher prices, and workers will demand better pay."
2/5 We've heard this story before, and I think there are at least two reasons to remain skeptical. First, while wage-driven growth in domestic consumption would certainly be a good thing in the medium term, in the short term it runs into the same old problem.
3/5 Manufacturing accounts for 20% of Japan's GDP (versus 16% for the world), and its international competitiveness is still partially underwritten by implicit and explicit transfers from households. Reversing those transfers, which is necessary for any revival in domestic....