Legal texts (main communication, five legislative proposals, soft law, roadmap, staff working document) - https://t.co/4Ai5rcWD6n
Main points in today's EU migration and asylum package.
Not everything is new - the Commission is reverting back to its prior proposals on qualification of refugees, reception of asylum seekers, resettlement of refugees, the EU asylum agency, and return of irregular migrants
Key new/amended proposals - on fast tracked screening of asylum seekers at the border. Not automatic rejection but limited procedural rights etc. Likely to raise human rights concerns.
The 2016 proposal to replace the Dublin Regulation is dead; long live the 2020 proposal to replace the Dublin Regulation. The bits on relocation of asylum seekers were impossible to agree last time. The new "return sponsorships" might attract more support.
Some proposed changes to the core Dublin rules on responsibility for asylum seekers. Family unity rules still apply. New rule if the asylum seeker has a diploma from a Member State! Longer responsibility if asylum seeker crosses border irregularly; explicitly applies to rescue.
A significant proposal to integrate refugees and people with subsidiary protection: it would be possible to get EU long term resident status after three years, not five. Includes possibility of moving to another Member State (although not full free movement of people).
New emphasis on expelling non-EU citizens without a right to stay - not just the legislative proposal, but a head honcho for expulsions
The Commission keeps saying it thinks voluntary returns of irregular migrants (avoiding detention and use of force) are important.
It's a day with a 'y' in it, so the Commission wants to collect, store, process, yada yada more personal data of non-EU citizens
A separate proposal to deal with asylum crises. Impossible to agree on before (leaving aside the emergency short term relocation decisions of 2015, which were barely implemented anyway). Maybe possible to agree if it will never be used, like the 2001 EU temporary protection law.
Legal migration too: the Commission wants to relaunch its proposal to revise the Blue Card scheme for higher paid non-EU migration, discussed here: eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/07/the-ne…
Relevant to Brits moving to the EU after the Brexit transition period.
Also plans (coming next year) to propose revision of the laws on long term residents (especially re movement between Member States)and non-EU workers in general. Also relevant to Brits soon; the long term residents law is also relevant to Brits covered by the withdrawal agreement
Finally, from the Commission guidelines on smuggling of migrants: search and rescue at sea cannot be criminalised, in accordance with international law of the sea
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1/ Imagine taking this guy seriously as a source of interpretation of EU law. In my field, the ultimate example of the Dunning-Kruger effect. Let's look at the claim in more detail.
2/ "illegal": Digital Services Act expressly provides for the possible negotiation of commitments from the platform
"Secret": Art 80 DSA expressly requires publication of those commitments
"Other platforms did a deal": according to the Commission, all other cases are pending
2/ "illegal": Digital Services Act expressly provides for the possible negotiation of commitments from the platform
"Secret": Art 80 DSA expressly requires publication of those commitments
"Other platforms did a deal": according to the Commission, all other cases are pending
2/ EU/UK youth mobility treaty proposal - questions and answers
Note equal treatment in tuition fees, points re traineeships, visa fees, health surcharges, application to all Member States - would UK government accept all this? (Also a question to ask Labour)
3/ EU/UK proposed youth mobility treaty - text of proposed Council decision and explanatory memo
Note it would also include family reunion (not further detailed at this point). Dispute settlement system of the Brexit deal would apply (not the CJEU) commission.europa.eu/publications/c…
2/ The context of the bill is the recently agreed Rwanda treaty. The issues in clause 1.3 *might* be enough to convince courts to change their mind on the safety of Rwanda since the Supreme Court judgment, but as we'll see it's a moot point: the bill dispenses with courts anyway.
3/ clause 1.4.b is correct: an Act of Parliament that breaches international law is still valid *domestic* law. BUT it will remain a breach of international law.
(We are likely to hear from people who do not understand these basic points)
2/ The spiel in the link confuses the two EU courts, which is not impressive. In fact the applicants in this case lost earlier in the EU General Court, then lost their appeal this year to the CJEU. And this omits to point out that the CJEU had ruled on the substance in June 2022.
3/ My comments on the previous judgment: '.
Because the Court ruled here that Brits lost EU citizenship because UK left the EU, it said this year that Brits had no legal interest to sue the EU to challenge the withdrawal agreement to get it back.eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2022/06/its-en…
Profoundly ignorant on both points. A) the Good Friday Agreement requires compliance with the ECHR. That necessarily entails the Strasbourg Court. There's no legal route to saying that it applies but to the peace process only. 1/
2/ And the idea that it applies to the "peace process" but not "foreign nationals" is confused - for the obvious reason that some of those covered by the former ground may be Irish citizens.
3/ The Strasbourg Court jurisdiction is relevant to Northern Ireland for a very, very obvious reason: it had ruled that the UK had breached the ECHR in Northern Ireland after British courts had ruled that it had not. "Just rely on British courts" therefore misses the point.