THREAD: In this NYT op-ed, I place the new discoveries about coercive labor training & transfer in Tibet in the wider context of Beijing's evolving ethnic minority policy.
My core argument is that this policy in essence harks back to the theories of... nytimes.com/2020/09/24/opi…
...China's eminent anthropologist Fei Xiaotong and his concepts of the "Chinese Nation-Race" (中华民族) and the "pluralist unity" (多元一体), claiming that minorities such as Tibetans/Uyghurs are gradually melding into a Han Chinese "core" as a historical process.
Beijing, which needed a new minority policy approach after Deng Xiaoping's laissez-faire, adopted Fei's concepts under Jiang Zemin, who drew on them e.g. in a 1998 speech in Xinjiang: China had "too many languages", and the gradual reduction of languages is a universal trend.
Initially, the state sought to push along Fei's proposed gradual long-term ethnic assimilation trend through a heavy dose of top-down development: the Great Western Development initiative, launched by Jiang in 2000, led to an influx of Han to Xinjiang/Tibet, plus infrastructure.
But the 2008/09 riots in Lhasa and Urumqi were ultimate examples that Beijing's policy of gradual assimilation and tightening restrictions on minority autonomy / culture / language / religion had failed. Under Hu Jintao, the state sought to counter this with alternative...
...state-sponsored "morality education" & "scientific worldview" (religion = backward). This set the minority policy focus on a firm path toward socialist modernization, secularization, assimilation. But still in a more gradualist way. The 08/09 riots however also promoted...
...another trend: the drastic securitization of minority societies. Here, Chen Quanguo was the man, both in Tibet and XJ. Extensive surveillance systems, big data policing, neighborhood police stations, expanded police forces, grid management, "double-linked households".
This securitization of minority societies was, on the surface, successful. Hardly any self-immolations in the Tibet Autonomous Regions, no reported uprisings, etc. As Xi Jinping's poverty alleviation deadline comes closer (end of 2020), ...
...the infrastructure created by securitization is now deployed to enforce state-mandated poverty alleviation, of which labor training & transfer has become the key tool. In the past, this was sort of voluntary & not tightly enforced. It didn't really work. Many simply...
...returned home after a while. But current schemes in XJ & Tibet are extremely tightly managed & enforced. This reveals, in many ways, not a new vision of Beijing's ethnic policy - which is still based on Fei Xiaotong's vision of the amalgamating Chinese Nation-Race, but...
...its implementation is now different. Not relying on some vague, longer-term processes that work by incentivizing minorities to assimilate (get a Chinese education to get better jobs), but to micromanage their livelihood "choices" ("choices" that are now tightly managed...
...within the very detailed new poverty-alleviation schemes). In a nutshell, Beijing's ethnic policy method and logic now strongly rely on the principle securitization, even militarization (military-style vocational training), because that logic ensures that the results...
...of its ethnic policies and tools are now largely guaranteed (the minorities can't just opt out). The militarized labor training and transfer process teaches minorities one key principle: the state is fully in charge. This is happening.
The end goal is a secularized society where minorities have a "modern" lifestyle in Chinese factories, where they are concentrated, easily controlled, have to speak more and better Chinese, probably earn more money (besides obvious exploitation issues, see Uyghur testimonies)...
... their kids grow up in boarding schools (the state loves being the "parent"), Fei's envisioned mixing and melding of ethnic groups is happening, ethnic intermarriages are more likely, and so on. And, these changes are designed to be permanent.
Securitization is Xi's magic weapon. It seems to work for everything: control COVID (and manage health), control minorities, control the Han, control your own cadres, control the environment, etc. [until, one day, it perhaps won't]
Details on how Xinjiang's poverty alleviation scheme interfaces with securitization and forced labor: jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-cam…
Section 2.0
@SophieDRich Related op-ed by @benedictrogers, arguing that member states must be clear and specific in pointing out Beijing's egregious human rights violations. He suggests 10 points that could be raised. ucanews.com/news/chinas-ri…
BREAKING: U.S. sanctions first Chinese central government official over atrocities in Xinjiang:
Hu Lianhe, who defended the camps at the U.N. in 2018.
Hu is a deputy head of the central government's Xinjiang Leading Small Group and of the United Front. home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
The justification for sanctioning him follows closely my analysis of Hu's role in my research article from 2021.
The Xinjiang LSG he co-leads was closely involved in the De-Extremification Regulation, which justified the re-education camps. jamestown.org/program/eviden…
Specifically the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (中央新疆工作协调小组办公室) was closely involved in supervising the draft of the original Regulation, published in March 2017, and its revision, published in October 2018. Thus, he had close knowledge of the camps.
New Xinjiang Police Files evidence shows that Uyghurs were sent from re-education camps directly to vocational institutions that organized job fairs with Volkswagen & advertise degrees with Volkswagen as a typical work destination. One victim: the Uyghur Adiljan Hashim. /1
Police records show that Adiljan Hashim was detained in October 2017, then placed into the Xinjiang Light Industry Technical College (新疆轻工职业技术学院) in January 2018. This "release" was highly controlled and based on pre-agreed conditions (担保释放人员).
The Xinjiang Light Industry Technical College offers majors in fields such as automobile manufacturing (汽车制造). The college lists examples of a cooperation with companies including FAW-Volkswagen Xinjiang on its website, and advertises Volkswagen as a graduate employer.
Pleased to publish another peer-reviewed article today on Xinjiang forced labor (4th this year), arguing why this forced labor requires reversing the burden of proof.
I would like to thank the Journal of Human Trafficking (@JournalOfHT) for publishing this article.
It's important to have work on Xinjiang forced labor published in a journal that specializes on forced labor, human trafficking, and modern slavery.
The article advances the to-date first systematic review of: (1) the evolution of ILO efforts to measure forced labor, and of (2) the suitability of the ILO’s 2012 Survey Guidelines in several Central Asian state-imposed forced labor contexts (XJ, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Taj).
Major investigative report uncovers how large corporations including @bp_plc, Hilton & Spotify bought carbon credits at direct risk of Uyghur forced labor.
My team provided crucial research findings, implicating the world’s largest carbon consultancy: 🧵 theguardian.com/environment/20…
The Bachu carbon project developed by the world's largest carbon consultancy @southpoleglobal in Kashgar burns cotton stalks to generate climate neutral power.
These stalks are sourced from a region with multiple coercive labor transfers targeting Uyghurs to pick cotton.
Bachu is part of Xinjiang's most coercive labor transfer policies, see .
Our research identified multiple specific local cases of coercive state transfer efforts within the 50km radius within which the plan sources cotton stalks.tandfonline.com/doi/permission…
My new op-ed argues that Xinjiang's drastic foreign trade growth (over 100% in Uyghur regions) is not a coincidence, but linked to intensified & expanded labor transfers: 🧵 thehill.com/opinion/intern…
Recent data shows that Xinjiang's foreign exports increased by 49% in the first three quarters of 2023. Increases in Uyghur regions were over 100% (for 2022).
I argue that this drastic growth is not by coincidence.
Export growth was driven by a 50 percent increase in labor-intensive products — the types of goods most at risk of involving forced Uyghur labor.
Since 2021, Xinjiang intensified its labor transfer and employment policies - see detailed discussion in tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…