The CHIS (Criminal Conduct) Bill is a pretty extraordinary read as is the ECHR Memorandum accompanying it. Points that emerge on a first read:
#1. The criminal conduct authoriseable (subject to the HRA override) is unbounded, from petty criminal damage to the most grave offences.
#2. The HRA override is a triumph of formalism without robust mechanisms to test ostensible authorisations either in advance or after grant/as used. IPCO oversight and the qualified route to IPT is no substitute for judicial prior authorisation or embedded adversarial challenge
#3. IPC error reporting to victims- which must be serious and in the public interest - is hopelessly weak and will generate yet more secret jurisprudence.
#4 The Govt line that CHIS action is not attributable to the state (Memo para16) where the intention is disruption or it would take place anyway is laughable and troubling in equal measure.
#5 There is going to be a mass of secret case law on points of real principle - the legality of authorisations, of policies on when and where to authorise, what to authorise etc as well as IPC powers. No provision is made to address the profusion of secret law and policy.
#6. The interaction with private law is going to be a nightmare where the conduct is tortious. Claims for assault etc will not go to the IPT and CMOs are only available for national security. The Bill and those it authorises go far wider e.g Gambling Commission (gulp).
#7. This means PII common law processes will have to be used and a means found to use PII advocates to challenge authorisations as part of establishing whether PII should be granted - but does invalid authorisationnmean no PII. Rock v Carnduff problems AHOY!
#8. The scheme of the Bill is in effect full immunity not just from prosecution but also tortious liability. Where the victims are innocent or suffer horribly (violence, sexual offences etc) how can this be a “fair balance” to deny all compensation?
#9. The interaction with the Criminal Injuries Compensation scheme could be “interesting” as there is no wrong or crime to compensate for. This will need to be carved out (if only not to amount to a breach of NCND).
#10. Limitation will never run in many cases since claimants will be deprived of key facts for their claim this meeting the s.32 LA threshold (even allowing for the fact that this is a defence to some torts; not so the HRA s.8 claim).
#11. The only way to make any of this acceptable is to limit such powers as far as possible by serious and sustained independent internal challenge pre and post fear of authorisation.
#12. It is bizarre ultimately that there will be far greater and better safeguards for a civil search order (based ultimately on Art 8 considerations from Chappell v UK) than there will for far more intrusive, damaging and unfair intrusions on non-derogable protected rights.
#13. I fear this Bill will receive no sustained opposition since Cons and Lab and Lib (in coalition) bought into the former secret policy whilst in Govt. How far former Judges and others in police and justice are compromises by former awareness of the policy is an open Q. END
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I have now read the Safety of Rwanda Bill, an extraordinary document. What makes it so is the combination of 2 factors: the use of conclusive legislative fictions ousting Cts; and the requirement to act even though it will or may breach PIL designed to protect fundamental rights.
Legal fictions - including ones that oust the adjudicative function of the court - are not per se unacceptable from a RoL perspective, though always deserving of close scrutiny and narrow construction: it all depends upon context and unproblematic uses abound (eg in tax).
However, where the use is conclusively to determine fundamental rights contrary to the basic scheme of such rights the context is obviously hugely problematic. Such problem is amplified where the effect is to reverse a recent determination of the very issue by our highest Court.
I remain convinced that the Cab Rank Rule is entirely the wrong target and a counter-productive one at that for people rightly concerned about how legal experts (in energy, water, planning, in farming or industry, PPPs) use (or don’t use) their expertise. theguardian.com/environment/20…
The concern of a gross mismatch of expertise and resource is real, make no mistake and this is a particular problem in the field of climate change amongst others (benefits law, consumer law, regulatory law).
A large multinational turning over £bns with an in-house legal team & seasoned external advisors (solicitors barristers with high levels of expertise) will overmatch with external funding many times over a small claimant, an NGO, even an experienced claimant/class claim firm.
Given all this insistence on the pro Boris camp about complete simulation of court norms, we must assume BJo has not been coached (beyond his opening statement) by his lawyers. For instance, rC9.4 prohibits it in all settings for barristers.
But he will like many witnesses in big litigation have gone through “witness familiarisation” courses - effectively role play to teach how to give evidence, not what evidence to give.
He is now running the classic “how big must be the conspiracy?” line, a key assumption of which is that he was entitled to rely exclusively on advice and had no obligation to question it.
So, as a barrister specialising in EU law disputes for nearly 30 years in a very wide area of application here is my hot-take on this.Truss vows to scrap remaining EU laws by end of 2023 risking ‘bonfire of rights’ theguardian.com/politics/2022/…
Let's start with the obvious point: it is undeliverable, unless is a sleight of hand (like pretending to repeal the ECA during the transition period and then immediately re-enacting it via EUWA). There are c. 100+ Acts of Parliament and thousands of SIs affected by this.
Some of it is in dry, recondite areas like product or health and safety standards but even here the material can be immensely complex and deciding what to keep, what to amend, what to introduce is a massive issue for affected businesses which make 3, 5, 10 year plans.
The decision in #LloydvGoogle, and the sole speech of Lord Leggatt, is hugely important for effective access to justice for: (i) mass consumer claims, whether privacy-based or not; (ii) against big tech or other similarly scaled Defendants. These are my takeaways 1/
First, the speech is realistic about the practical impossibility of “opt in” GLO proceedings for modest sums (two figure or low three figure damages): see [25]-[28]; and identifies that the “opt out” CPO model in competition law is designed to address those flaws: [29]-[32] 2/
Second, the speech is open, after an exhaustive historical and comparative review of authority, to the purposive interpretation and reinvigoration of representative proceedings as a means to plug some of the same holes plugged by opt out CPOs. 3/
OK, having now read the Parliamentary Commissioner report on Owen Paterson, and his summary of complaints against it, I can say if were hearing a 30 min permission hearing: a. I would require a huge amount of persuasion that he had not had a full opportunity to put his case 1/
The submissions he made were obviously legally sophisticated (and pretty ambitious); the pivot of the charges was the objective analysis of his approaches, whether there was a serious wrong (in milk food etc) and whether benefit were conferred/sought for those paying him. 2/
The 17 odd witnesses statements appear likely to be wholly irrelevant to these central issues, as is the fact that his interests were registered. The whole point of the paid advocacy rules is that they impose restrictions that go beyond mere declaration/registration 3/