Friday was Danger Day. 11 years ago at this time, I was leading an extremely uncomfortable outage assessment WebEx session, moreso because I didn’t technically consult there anymore and there had been some hands waved.
Around 1am was when the Oracle guy watched the last disk scan for Oracle ASM headers on the LUNs on the Hitachi come back negative and indicated they couldn’t help under the circumstances.
Then the poor T-mobile DBA said “We’re fucked.”
I had rolled back off before the disk array was repaired, the story being relayed later that a firmware upgrade reverse reordered every disk in 24-disk RAID groups and the data strangely became unavailable. That’s secondhand.
This was widely blamed as an early “cloud” failure but really didn’t resemble one; there was a central unified database cluster that had been created years earlier in startups mode of the time ... top end enterprise HW for key role, but not redundant / adequately backed up. SPOF.
The economic damage of writing off a 1.2 million customers smartphone brand and replacing all the devices over the next year has to have approximated a billion dollars.
Microsoft was blamed but the problem preexisted the Danger acquisition, and MS after some convincing had sprung for new hardware to (largely) cover addressing it. It had just reached the loading dock that Thursday.
Fragility of complex systems in all the fields I work in is a big problem. IT, where I still deal with mixtures of thousands of physical computers as well as cloud resources; aerospace, with space launch & spacecraft; nonproliferation & geopolitics, where stability is fleeting.
I have subsequently seen mistargeted projects waste more money than that, companies fail with lesser failures. Treaties collapse for stupid reasons unrelated to their goals and effects. The occasional exploding spacecraft. These things happen.
They should happen less.
The number of organizations actually working consistently to manage and engineer resilience at all levels is shocking small. If you’re an executive or board member, your business is more at risk than you probably have a handle on. Spend some time on that.
The NDA expired a year ago; this really needs to be a conference presentation sometime soon, but I’m not particularly enthusiastic about doing that via Zoom. When Covid has faded away.
If you’re working in any industry or organization or government, and you see something that could break and cause the organization to fail, and there’s no backup plan... call it out. People won’t always listen, but call it out and keep doing that.
Most of the time they don’t fail. Sometimes they do. Being right all along doesn’t wash the taste of ashes out of your mouth as the organization burns down. If you were fighting to fix it, that’s the best you could do. Fight for the fixes.
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Steel’s time has come and gone. We should be looking at composite over titanium for both armor and hull structures.
Kerosene / diesels time has come. Tank flammability needs to go down. Batteries, JP-7, other fuels that don’t burn at STP, …
2/ Ammunition is too flammable. The cases that burn off are too easy to externally ignite. Options should include traditional cases, lighter cases with internal fireproofing coating, hard to ignite propellant with ElectroThermal Chemical ignition / energy boost.
3/ Explosive shells should all be insensitive munitions.
European crew protection standards should be minimum if not significantly improved.
Why is the gun in the crew space? Gun + ammunition in a separate compartment (+ autoloader, by necessity).
Ok. Spinning up some analysis after going through all the available reports on the Iranian attack against Israel today.
There are slightly conflicting reports on numbers of weapons used, but around 110-120 ballistic missiles preceded by around 50 cruise missiles and 140 drones.
It appears that all of the cruise missiles and drones were shot down. It seems like local US and Saudi and Jordanian air defenses (and possibly jets) plus Israeli jets did the shooting down.
Some would probably have reached Israel without the fighters in the air, but together both ended it.
Degree of formal cooperation between countries is unclear but appears that Jordan and Saudi Arabia allowed Israeli Air Force overflights.
@DuitsmanMS B/ When KN-08 first paraded in 2012 the state of missile OSINT was somewhat more primitive. We didn’t have easily available recent satellite imagery, NK photo availability was poor, and experts were more widely dispersed.
@DuitsmanMS C/ The earliest size analysis of KN-08 ICBM missiles went straight to “what’s the engine(s)?” This was the era of size estimation still using the large transporter tires, just for reference.
@DuitsmanMS D/ We knew that North Korea and Iran had (probably together) copied the small 4D10 side vernier engines. They were in use in upper stage engines on NK and Iranian missiles and space launchers. But did they copy the 4D10 main engine?
1/ Short thread on what we think North Korea launched today. We think it’s going to turn out to be this chonky boi, the Hwasong-17 ICBM.
2/ Hwasong-17 was first seen on military parade (shown here) then at an arms show, where we learned our guess that it was designated HS-16 was incorrect.
3/ We believe that it has two of the two-chamber RD-250 derived rocket motors that we saw one of on the earlier Hwasong-15 ICBM. HS-15 was large enough, we* assess, to deliver the North Korean 300 ish kiloton warhead to anywhere in the US.
So… with additional evidence available now it looks a lot like Ukraine hit the Russian amphibious ships unloading armor and weapons in occupied port of Berdyansk with a Tochka or Tochka-U short range ballistic missile. One ship burning badly probably lost.
1/ Update from Ukrainian nuclear agency on damage to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant from earlier attacks. Two points of concern. snriu.gov.ua/en/news/update…
2/ First, they are confirming damage to the external “reactor compartment” building of the Unit 1 reactor. No information or claim about internal damage, which presumably means none found.
3/ They also say two artillery shells hit the dry cask storage area for spent or used nuclear fuel. This is some but limited risk of outside contamination.
Dry cask storage is the second phase of used or spent nuclear fuel storage.