The concern expressed in this article is a direct consequence of the lack of transparency and democratic accountability for the government’s decisions on local lockdowns. thetimes.co.uk/article/no-cor…
There are serious equality concerns about what is happening.
And apparent different treatment of Tory constituencies - by at least the infection rate/100k metric which seems to have been a major factor in decision-making.
The problem is that, in the absence of any transparency about the criteria being used (what other ones are there apart from the rate/100k metric?) you simply can’t tell whether political bias is entering into decision-making.
It’s hard to see anything that is more likely to damage public confidence that the suggestion that Ministers are looking after their own party’s areas.
And without transparency you can’t assess what trade-offs are being made, or what is the impact on existing inequalities of those trade-offs.
The lack of transparency is part and parcel of the lack of effective democratic scrutiny: because such scrutiny would force transparency (as well as, in itself, improving legitimacy and public confidence).
But absent transparency and proper scrutiny, the suggestion of gross political bias, and the suggestion that poorer areas are being hit hardest, will take root. With substantial damage to public confidence - on which the success of these measures - and lives - depend.
That is why there is no tension between proper democratic governance and effectiveness here: on the contrary, the two go hand in hand: proper democratic governance (transparency/scrutiny/accountability) is essential to public confidence and hence to effectiveness.
It’s worth noting that all these points and concerns - including issues about geographical selectiveness and equality) were powerfully raised in July by a @SocLabLaw paper on easing (and re-imposing) the lockdown (to which I contributed). …c-4eeb-be13-51b5736f1b93.filesusr.com/ugd/01ea09_7a8…
See
Some things have moved on. And we didn’t foresee that gross political bias might be a possible concern. But the basic points remain on the nail.
NB: there are real technical difficulties here, in particular that making the relevant regulations under the draft affirmative procedure (ie only taking effect after a positive vote by both Houses) takes too much time.
But a government that actually welcomed scrutiny, and saw its importance, would have found a way to ensure it (using its majority to make any necessary procedural changes).
Unfortunately, we don’t have such a government.
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The concerns set out by @GeorgeMonbiot here have powerful and authoritative backing from the 2022 @CMAgovUK report into children’s care. Its conclusion:
Since then, the inability of the children in care system to deal adequately with children in care with complex needs has led to an explosion in “Deprivation of Liberty Orders” (DOLs) - so many that there is now a special court to deal with them. judiciary.uk/launch-of-nati…
Some brief comments on the European Commission’s proposal to get a mandate to negotiate a youth mobility agreement with the UK. ec.europa.eu/commission/pre…
1. The EU is not there yet. The mandate has to be agreed by the Council of Ministers: probably by qualified majority. And it isn’t clear whether a final agreement would need to be ratified by all Member States as well as the EU itself.
2. If the EU does agree a mandate, that is likely to slam the door on any attempt by the UK to negotiate youth mobility agreements with individual Member States (because they have a duty of sincere cooperation). So any agreement would have to cover (say) 🇧🇬 as well as (say) 🇫🇷.
1. No plan to “stop the boats” (chase them into French waters, destroy them on (French?) shores) or to send refugees who do land here to other countries (safe, because otherwise UK public opinion, let alone law, won’t wear it) works without cooperation of those countries. Esp. 🇫🇷
2. Those countries won’t do deals or cooperate just because it suits the UK. And France is (and French voters are) well aware that France takes many more refugees than we do.
1. It is of course true that big business (and the professions) can be a bit politically uniform. When I started out in the early 90s, the commercial Bar ( the profession I know best) was pretty much solidly Conservative (and certainly conservative).
To the point that aspiring pupils were sometimes advised not to mention eg chairing their university Labour club in their application.
Full report Windsor Framework (WF) report by @LordsEUCom Protocol sub-committee here . I will concentrate on areas where I gave evidence to the Committee. https://t.co/eyeHRrgNjncommittees.parliament.uk/publications/4…
On State aid. I entirely agree with @jamesrwebber’s points, made separately. And with the conclusions. The basic point: Art 10 remains a serious issue for any major cross-UK subsidy programme (Green New Deal/pandemic subsidies): in practice it will have to be cleared by the EU.
It also remains potentially applicable even to measures that don’t immediately and on their face cover NI: see eg James’ car battery example.