Today's GRU indictment is an incredible document. The Five Eyes intelligence communities, I would suspect, must have stunning visibility into Russian military intelligence operations if today's disclosures are considered dispensable justice.gov/opa/press-rele…
Note: Russian military intelligence camouflaged as North Korean
Whoever wrote that paragraph probably had a smirk on their face
Possibly the first indictment with a Mr. Robot reference
Defendant Kovalev is having a bad day today
🕵️🕵️🕵️ ... when the FBI outlines a GRU operation for an indictment, complete with exploit codenames, but somehow forgets to mention that those exploits were developed and named by the NSA ...
How it started: How it's going:
Also, just kudos to the FBI for consistently including names in non-Latin alphabets
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It appears that foreign influence operations on this platform are picking up, as expected. So here are a few high-level observations. Under normal circumstances I would write a proper longer piece. But in the interest of time, here you go. A few trends, questions, and hypotheses:
Most of the exposed Russian tradecraft is sloppy, and often the engagement on X is fake. But not always. One day after this remarkable WIRED story came out, the U.S. IC confirmed the attribution to Russia to reporters (Confirmation npr.org/2024/10/22/nx-…) wired.com/story/russian-…
The U.S. IC is reacting very fast. They expose content as foreign malign influence without amplifying it at the same time. That is excellent. It would be even better if there was one central reference point for all announcements, including press-call drops, perhaps with delay.
"Influence and Cyber Operations: An Update," the new OpenAI threat intelligence report, out a few hours ago. The document is interesting for one specific reason that hasn't been mentioned in public reporting so far cdn.openai.com/threat-intelli…
This is the money paragraph, from today's OpenAI report "Influence and Cyber Operations: An Update."
tldr: AI labs sit at a middle section of adversary kill chains—if staffed & equipped properly, the labs are potentially uniquely well positioned for threat intelligence insights
The report also has some interesting LLM TTP examples
JUST OUT — September was a wild month for scholars of modern covert influence operations. No longer do we have to rely on a campaign's digital footprints alone. My first analysis of ~3K leaked internal files and fresh FBI evidence on "Doppelganger."
This video was an internal production by the Social Design Agency, a disinformation firm in Moscow, produced in early August 2023, likely to be viewed by Vladimir Putin. Note the memo reproduced in the description, discussing the video.
Several weeks ago German media (WDR, NDR, SZ) received a leak of internal files from the biggest Russian disinformation contractor, Social Design Agency, often referred to as Doppelganger. "Western security officials" confirmed authenticity. First story by @FlorianFlade et al
Another exclusive @tagesschau, this one is excellent. I wish they would excerpt or screenshot the source documents though tagesschau.de/investigativ/n…
If I taught my DISINFORMATION class again, and if I wanted to include a session on the most self-defeating, the most unethical, really just the dumbest influence campaigns in history, this one would be close to the top of the list. reuters.com/investigates/s…
Okay, first, the DoD deserves some credit at least for openly admitting it was engaged in this kind of covert influence activity, when asked by Reuters.
This is pretty much the textbook example for an unethical influence operation: calling into question the effectiveness of a vaccine (that was later WHO-approved), without evidence, during a deadly pandemic, at a moment of global uncertainty, lockdowns, even panic.