Michael Pettis Profile picture
Nov 27, 2020 14 tweets 3 min read Read on X
1/14

This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...

economist.com/finance-and-ec…
2/14

account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
3/14

goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
4/14

We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
5/14

country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
6/14

get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
7/14

with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.

For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
8/14

corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
9/14

Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...

yalebooks.yale.edu/book/978030024…
10/14

that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.

This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
11/14

French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
12/14

countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
13/14

costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.

What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
14/14

a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.

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More from @michaelxpettis

Feb 4
1/8
Jason Furman: "A weaker dollar may improve the economy’s long-run balance, but it does so by forcing Americans to cut back on spending. That is like telling children to eat more spinach today so they will be healthier in the future."
nytimes.com/2026/02/03/opi…
2/8
Furman is right. Currency appreciation reduces consumption costs in the short term by making imports cheaper, but in a hyperglobalized world, it also undermines domestic manufacturers by making them less competitive against foreign manufacturers.
3/8
Academic economists (mainly in the US) will argue that this is a good thing because the goal should be to maximize consumption, but the only sustainable way to maximize consumption over the longer term is to maximize production.
ft.com/content/89110b…
Read 8 tweets
Feb 3
1/4
Yicai: "China's macro leverage ratio – a measure of total debt relative to nominal GDP – rose by 11.8 percentage points to 302.3 percent in 2025, exceeding the 10.1 point increase recorded in 2024, according to a new research report by CASS.
yicaiglobal.com/news/chinas-de…
2/4
There is a lot of disagreement about the real debt-to-GDP ratio in China, especially given the difficulty of counting hidden debt, along with an "abnormal" rise in payables and receivables that reflects inability to pay debt more than it reflects rising revenues.
3/4
If we use the official total social finance number as the measure of debt, the ratio is 315%. The BIS and other entities show even higher ratios. But whatever the real number, it is among the highest in the world, perhaps exceeded only by Japan among major economies.
Read 4 tweets
Feb 2
1/7
SCMP: "Chinese scholars have called for greater urgency in reducing reliance on US dollar assets, particularly after Washington and its allies froze about US$300 billion in Russian foreign exchange reserves in 2022."
scmp.com/economy/global…
2/7
Although this may be a favorite new topic among academics – and not just Chinese academics - few seem to understand that a country cannot restructure global capital flows without also restructuring global...
3/7
trade flows, nor that a country cannot change its external imbalances without either changing its internal imbalances or changing the external imbalances (and thus the internal imbalances) of its trade partners.
Read 7 tweets
Jan 22
1/12
This talk about Europe's ability to wield its holdings of US Treasuries as a political tool is as divorced from reality as the talk about China's ability to wield its holdings of US Treasuries as a political tool.
via @ftft.com/content/7d6436…
2/12
For all the huffing and puffing, Chinese holdings of US assets actually increased. This shouldn't have been a surprise. If you run massive trade surpluses, you have no choice but to acquire foreign assets, and if you won't acquire the alternatives, you must buy US assets.
3/12
These analysts seem to forget that you cannot change your capital account without also changing your trade account, and that you cannot change your external imbalances without also changing your internal imbalances.
Read 12 tweets
Jan 21
1/7
EU commissioner for trade Maroš Šefčovič is absolutely right to question the usefulness of the WTO: "If the WTO is to meet today’s challenges, its rules must be fair and deliver balanced, legitimate outcomes. Currently, they do neither."
ft.com/content/2ff1d4…
2/7
The fact that decades of the largest, persistent trade imbalances in history have largely been WTO compliant suggests strongly that the WTO is more about maintaining legal fictions than it is about discouraging the adverse impact of trade intervention on the global economy.
3/7
As Keynes (and many others) pointed out nearly a century ago, evidence that a country is intervening in trade shows up very clearly in the form of persistent, beggar-thy-neighbor trade surpluses. If the latter exists, then the former exists.
Read 7 tweets
Jan 21
1/6
Reuters: "Chinese leaders have pledged to "significantly" lift household consumption’s share of the economy over the next five years, but have not given a specific target."
reuters.com/world/asia-pac…
2/6
If we assume that Beijing hopes to raise the consumption share of GDP by 3-5 percentage points (roughly a third of what it would need to be a more "normal" low-consuming economy), consumption would have to grow by 1-2 percentage points faster than GDP over the period.
3/6
That's a pretty big gap, and one we have never yet seen in the past 3-4 decades of Chinese growth. The good way to manage this, of course, would be for consumption growth to accelerate, although it is not at all clear what would cause that acceleration.
Read 6 tweets

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