Michael Pettis Profile picture
Nov 27, 2020 14 tweets 3 min read Read on X
1/14

This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...

economist.com/finance-and-ec…
2/14

account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
3/14

goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
4/14

We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
5/14

country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
6/14

get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
7/14

with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.

For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
8/14

corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
9/14

Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...

yalebooks.yale.edu/book/978030024…
10/14

that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.

This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
11/14

French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
12/14

countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
13/14

costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.

What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
14/14

a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.

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More from @michaelxpettis

Nov 30
1/10
WSJ: "What saves American finance is the dollar’s status as the must-have global asset and trading currency. Both roles face challenges, though, and the more the U.S. exploits foreigners, the higher the risk they look elsewhere."

via @WSJwsj.com/finance/invest…
2/10
While this is widely believed, it isn't true. Foreign capital inflows don't fund fiscal deficits. They fund current account deficits, and they must be matched domestically either by higher US investment, higher US unemployment, or higher US household and fiscal debt.
3/10
For those who understand accounting identities, these are the three main ways foreign inflows can result in wider gap between investment and saving. When there is an increase in net foreign inflows, in other words, one (or some combination) of these must occur.
Read 10 tweets
Nov 28
1/12
Weijian Shan is right: China does need to let the renminbi rise, and substantially. An appreciating currency would "subsidize" imports and "tax" exports – the opposite of what tariffs are supposed to do. Given that households are net importers...
ft.com/content/5bb8ed…
2/12
and manufacturers are net exporters, an appreciating currency is effectively an income transfer from manufacturers to households.

This, as former PBoC governor Zhou Xiaochuan explained many years ago, would be a very effective part of the income rebalancing process.
3/12
In fact any policy that correctly rebalances the distribution of income towards more domestic consumption works the same way, raising the household share of GDP – by increasing wages relative to productivity, raising interest rates, expanding social welfare spending, etc.
Read 12 tweets
Nov 28
1/8
Xinhua: "China aims to "achieve a notable increase in household consumption as a share of GDP," and to increase the role of domestic demand as the principal engine of economic growth over the next five years, according to the new MIIT plan".
english.news.cn/20251127/5539c…
2/8
But while everyone in government now acknowledges the urgent need to raise the consumption share of GDP, and wants to be seen doing something to achieve the goal, it isn't clear that they know what to do. This new "comprehensive" plan "to improve the alignment of...
3/8
the supply and demand of consumer goods" seems mainly to focus on producing more and better consumer goods, as if the problem in China is that households have plenty of money to spend, and are eager to spend it, but just don't have anything to spend it on.
Read 8 tweets
Nov 26
1/18
Martin Wolf wonders whether the US or China will be the first to abandon its current follies on trade imbalances, but I don't think this is the right way to understand the current "fracturing" of globalization.
via @ft@ftft.com/content/b5157c…
2/18
As I see it, everyone (even Europe, eventually) is relearning what we used to know: a highly globalized trading regime can only work when all major economies choose more or less the same tradeoff between global integration and economic sovereignty.
3/18
That's because economies that exert more control than their trading partners over their external accounts (i.e. choose more economic sovereignty and less global integration) are also able to exert more control over their internal accounts, i.e. they are able to structure...
Read 18 tweets
Nov 26
1/7
Good FT article on declining investment growth in China: "A sharp decline in reported investment in China suggests President Xi Jinping’s campaign against excessive industrial competition may be having an impact on the Chinese economy."

via @ftft.com/content/008738…
2/7
While some of the decline may reflect “a statistical correction of previously over-reported data”, as Goldman suggests, at least part of it shows that Beijing's battle against involution is working.
3/7
But here's the problem. The massive, post-2022 surge in investment in the industries that later suffered from involution was no accident. It was the engineered response to the collapse in property investment after 2021-22.
Read 7 tweets
Nov 26
1/14
This very good Robin Harding article points out that the purpose of trade should be the exchange of goods, and not the mercantilist accumulation of assets abroad.
ft.com/content/f294be…
2/14
However he makes a mistake when he says: "There is nothing that China wants to import, nothing it does not believe it can make better and cheaper, nothing for which it wants to rely on foreigners a single day longer than it has to."
3/14
That is not why China (or any other surplus country) doesn't import nearly as much as it exports. There are always foreign goods that people would like to import, especially from Europe, and in a well-managed global trading system, even in the extremely unlikely case that...
Read 14 tweets

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