Michael Pettis Profile picture
Nov 27, 2020 14 tweets 3 min read Read on X
1/14

This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...

economist.com/finance-and-ec…
2/14

account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
3/14

goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
4/14

We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
5/14

country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
6/14

get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
7/14

with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.

For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
8/14

corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
9/14

Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...

yalebooks.yale.edu/book/978030024…
10/14

that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.

This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
11/14

French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
12/14

countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
13/14

costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.

What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
14/14

a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Michael Pettis

Michael Pettis Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @michaelxpettis

Nov 14
1/7
China's fixed-asset investment declined 1.7% year on year in the first 10 months of 2025, more than twice the expected rate of decline, and well above the 0.5% decline during the first nine months of the year.

english.news.cn/20251114/2bcf2…
2/7
Excluding a 14.7% decline in the property sector, investment rose by 1.7% during the first ten months of 2025, led by a 2.7% rise in manufacturing investment.

As I see it, the weakness in investment growth suggests that the fight against "involution" is working so far.
3/7
It suggests that the post-2022 surge in investment in preferred manufacturing sectors, such as EVs, batteries and solar panels, is being reversed.

But this leaves us with the same questions that we were left with following the post-2022 collapse in property investment.
Read 7 tweets
Nov 13
1/5
Good Setser piece on rising global imbalances. Thanks in part to his work, central bankers and mainstream economists are slowly beginning to acknowledge that rising global imbalances can be a problem for the global economy.

Eventually they all will.
@Brad_Setser
cfr.org/blog/chinas-ma…
2/5
Most mainstream economists know that every country's internal imbalances are always perfectly consistent with its external imbalances, just as its external imbalances are always perfectly consistent with the external imbalances of its trade partners.
3/5
But they are rarely able to understand the implications. When each country's external economy is linked through nearly-frictionless trade and capital flows, each country's domestic economy is also linked through the same mechanism. A country with deep internal imbalances...
Read 5 tweets
Nov 13
1/4
Caixin: "A significant increase in the household consumption ratio hinges on Beijing’s ability to solve a chronic problem of low household spending, a challenge rooted in sluggish income growth, widening inequality and inadequate public services."

caixinglobal.com/2025-11-13/ana…
2/4
It is by now widely recognized among academics and policy advisors that China's weak consumption is a function of a low household income share of GDP, and that the solution is to implement "demand-side measures to boost employment, income and confidence."
3/4
What still isn't much discussed, at least publicly, is the structural relationship between China's supply-side strength and its demand-side weakness. For all the talk of boosting domestic demand, in other words, no one has really wanted to discuss...
Read 4 tweets
Nov 7
1/5
FT: “German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has backed protectionist measures to shield the country’s ailing steel industry from cheap Chinese imports, in a striking departure from the country’s traditional commitment to free trade.”
via @ftft.com/content/a02d77…
2/5
I’d argue that what Germany traditionally displayed wasn’t a commitment to free trade so much as the standard trade-surplus country’s insistence that their trade partners don’t intervene against their abilities to run trade surpluses.
3/5
Germany’s post-2003 trade surplus, after all, didn’t emerge from free trade. It emerged from labor reforms that effectively pushed down the household share of GDP, combined with the role of the newly-created euro in preventing “normal” currency and interest rate adjustments.
Read 5 tweets
Nov 4
1/10
NYT: "China has offset the decline from America with breathtaking speed. Shipments to other parts of the world have surged this year, demonstrating that China’s manufacturing dominance will not be easily slowed."
nytimes.com/interactive/20…
2/10
"That’s because." the New York Times explains, "China was prepared. It has been seeking out new customers for years, and its massive manufacturing investment allows it to sell goods at low prices."

This explanation shows just how confused analysts remain about trade.
3/10
It also illustrates why my mentor at Columbia, Michael Adler, threatened to fail any student who mentioned bilateral trade imbalances. In a our hyperglobalized world of extremely low transportation costs, bilateral trade imbalances tell us almost nothing about trade pressures.
Read 10 tweets
Oct 24
1/4
Interesting article by Yanmei Xie: "Why does involution defy repeated attempts to purge it?" she asks. "Because the foundational structure of China’s political economy breeds it."
ft.com/content/e768df…
2/4
She's absolutely right. "Involution:" is just the latest name for a decades-old problem arising from a development model built around the need to keep increasing investment in capacity, even when capacity is already excessive.
carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/08/…
3/4
Xie points out that what creates this excess capacity is simply the flip side of the very thing that creates global competitiveness, concluding that "what begins as glut at home could end as supremacy abroad."
Read 4 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(