Michael Pettis Profile picture
Nov 27, 2020 14 tweets 3 min read Read on X
1/14

This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...

economist.com/finance-and-ec…
2/14

account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
3/14

goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
4/14

We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
5/14

country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
6/14

get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
7/14

with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.

For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
8/14

corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
9/14

Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...

yalebooks.yale.edu/book/978030024…
10/14

that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.

This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
11/14

French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
12/14

countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
13/14

costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.

What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
14/14

a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.

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More from @michaelxpettis

Oct 2
1/9
FT: " UBS's Paul Gong played down the chances of an EV industry-wide consolidation in the near term, as deep financial support for lossmaking groups from provincial governments and capital markets stands in the way."
ft.com/content/5f73d2…
2/9
This is a very appropriate example of János Kornai's distinction between economies that operate under hard-budget constraints and those that operate under soft-budget constraints. The hard-budget constraint sets a limit to the extent of losses a business can have.
3/9
In market economies, Kornai argued, hard-budget constraints prevent entities from persistent loss-making activities unless investors truly believe that future profits are likely to be enormously large. It is economics, not politics, that determines the extent of investment.
Read 9 tweets
Oct 2
1/8
Eduardo Porter argues in this FT piece that Latin America's import substitution industrialization (ISI) in the 1960s and 1970s "ended in a massive debt crisis that ushered in a period of economic decline known across the region as the “lost decade”."
ft.com/content/2f9dea…
2/8
This is a very common misperception. The ISI period ran from the late 1930s to the early 1970s, and peaked in the 1950s and 1960s. During this period, ISI economies in Latin America grew extraordinarily quickly and produced many of the first development "miracles" in history.
3/8
In fact at the time, it was widely accepted that several of the larger Latin American economies would reach European levels of development before the end of the century.

That all came apart by the end of the 1970s, but to blame it on ISI makes little sense.
Read 8 tweets
Oct 1
1/10
While I agree with much of what Stephen Bush argues here, I think this claim is overly simplistic: "This shouldn’t need saying in 2025 but markets and globalisation are good."
ft.com/content/2fa342…
2/10
There is no single thing called "globalization", and "globalization" is neither a good thing nor a bad thing. There are in fact many kinds of globalization and, as Keynes noted, they have different impacts both on the global economy and on individual countries.
3/10
At the basic level, as Dani Rodrik has argued, each country chooses to trade off global integration with economic sovereignty. Is choosing more global integration, which is what I assume Stephen Bush means, a good thing for England?
rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_w…
Read 9 tweets
Sep 29
1/10
This paper by Daniel McDowell describes the role of the dollar (and potential alternatives) as a global reserve currency. It's a very good and balanced paper, and I agree with his conclusions, but I can't help making one objection.
@daniel_mcdowell
atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-resea…
2/10
He says: "To overly simplify it, being the reserve currency issuer is akin to having a credit card with an unusually high borrowing limit and the lowest interest rates available. This gives the United States unparalleled macroeconomic flexibility, allowing Washington to..."
3/10
keep taxes low while spending more freely on priorities like national defense than it could if its currency were not so special."

As widely held as this belief may be, it isn't true. Having the reserve currency is not at all like having a credit card.
Read 10 tweets
Sep 29
1/10
I just finished reading Sven Beckert's history of the development of the global cotton industry. It's a bit repetitive in its main theses, and sometimes a bit of a slog, but well worth reading for those interested in the history of trade and industrial policy. Image
2/10
One of the interesting aspects of these economic histories – and something which mainstream academic economists have so much trouble understanding – is the extent to which trade patterns and comparative advantage are not "natural" but emerge directly out of policies and institutions.
3/10
Cotton merchants, Beckert writes "understood early that their trade was embedded deeply within local, national and global politics. They understood instinctively that the state does not intervene in the market, but constitutes it."
Read 10 tweets
Sep 28
1/4
According to a new IMF study, "trade imbalances boost incomes in surplus economies at the expense of deficit economies."

The reason? "This is the consequence of scale economies concentrated in the traded sector."
elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/…
2/4
"A trade deficit," the study continues, "shifts labour towards non-traded activities, while a surplus shifts labour towards the traded sector. In the presence of scale economies concentrated in traded production, this reduces labour productivity and real income in...
3/4
deficit economies and raises productivity and income in surplus economies."

As the paper notes, this was understood by Keynes and his peers in the 1930s. Unfortunately, it is not so well understood by mainstream American economists today.
Read 4 tweets

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