This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...
account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
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goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
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We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
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country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
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get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
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with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.
For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
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corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
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Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...
that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.
This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
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French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
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countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
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costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.
What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
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a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.
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1/9 Good piece in Nikkei Asia by former acting deputy U.S. trade representative Wendy Cutler on trade-related discussions during Trump's upcoming trip to China. She argues, however, that for a president focused on... asia.nikkei.com/opinion/trump-…
2/9 rebalancing, Trump must "hold China's feet to the fire," including pressing for export restraints in sectors like steel and autos and tougher action on transshipments – or tariff dodging via third countries.
3/9 She continues: "By seeking Chinese agreement to impose export restraint in specified product areas, discouraging Chinese companies from transshipping their goods through third countries to the U.S. and reducing tariffs and nontariff measures in nonsensitive sectors, both...
1/7 Bloomberg: "China is balancing productivity gains from AI with labor stability, as automation could displace workers and trigger an economic spiral."
2/7 Getting workers to become more productive doesn't cause workers to be fired. In fact that's the only way to make them richer.
What really matters is whether or not wage growth for the overall economy keeps pace with productivity gains.
3/7 If they don't, growth in production will outstrip growth in consumption, and while this can temporarily be resolved by rising household debt, ultimately it means that production will be reduced and unemployment rise.
1/5 SCMP: "“China needs to move decisively towards consumption-led growth,” Sonali Jain-Chandra, IMF mission chief for China, said in an interview with the South China Morning Post." scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/5 Yes, but how? The IMF has urged China to put into place a stronger social safety net, but even if China were to do so, until it is credible (which will take years, even decades) it will have little impact on current consumption.
3/5 I'd argue that the only sustainable way "to move decisively towards consumption-led growth" requires a major shift in the distribution of national income away from either businesses or the government (or both) towards workers and middle-class households.
1/5 Bloomberg: "The scale of the problem is staggering. Trade data released Thursday showed a record $112 billion gap between what China reported exporting to the US and what US Customs said actually arrived last year." bloomberg.com/news/features/…
2/5 "Put simply," Bloomberg continues, "that suggests that as much as a quarter of what Asia’s top economy shipped to American shores last year slipped under the tariff radar."
3/5 It also suggests why a hodgepodge of sectoral and bilateral tariffs are less efficient than a simple tariff on all imports. While the former mostly shift trade around, the latter is equivalent to a currency devaluation for a country that doesn't intervene in its currency.
1/6 Bloomberg: "Instead of fighting over quotas and rules, officials should be rolling up their sleeves and thinking honestly about where the EU has a fighting chance of competing — not “picking winners, but letting the losers go.”" bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
2/6 This might be perfectly good advice in a "normal" trading environment, in which countries maximize exports in order to maximize imports and domestic consumption, trade is broadly balanced, and production shifts according to comparative advantage.
3/6 But that is not the world we live in. Consider China. It accounts for roughly 18% of global GDP, only 13% of global consumption, and a massive 31% of global manufacturing.
But it did not get there by “picking winners, and letting the losers go.”
1/4 As this WSJ article points out, countries are keeping their exports competitive in the face of US tariffs by increasingly subsidizing them, with the subsidies ultimately being paid for in the form of suppressed consumption. wsj.com/economy/trade/…
2/4 This means that we are increasingly caught up in a globalized Kalecki Paradox: when one country subsidizes manufacturing exports at the expense of wage growth, it can grow more quickly, but when all countries do it, they collectively grow more slowly. engelsbergideas.com/notebook/europ…
3/4 That's because by reducing demand, they are also reducing demand for their exports. They have to double down to remain competitive, even as a collective doubling down worsens the overall outcome.
As the article points out, this makes the US deficit the key variable.