This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...
account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
3/14
goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
4/14
We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
5/14
country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
6/14
get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
7/14
with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.
For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
8/14
corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
9/14
Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...
that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.
This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
11/14
French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
12/14
countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
13/14
costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.
What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
14/14
a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.
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1/9 The Economist discusses the determination of South Korea's president, Lee Jae Myung, to expand RoK industrial policy aggressively. "His plan involves diverting capital from the housing market to... economist.com/finance-and-ec…
2/9 industry, especially chipmakers instrumental to the global artificial-intelligence boom, and supplementing this with government cash."
The Economist describes these industrial policies as "trade-distorting intervention", and wonders how successful they will be.
3/9 They certainly do affect trade. Diverting lending from the housing sector to targeted high-tech manufacturing sectors is likely to reduce the consumption share of total production while diverting production from services and the property sector to manufacturing.
1/8 China’s first-quarter GDP grew by 5.0%, faster than the 4.8-4.9% most polls suggested, but the composition of the growth was more unbalanced than ever, especially in March. ft.com/content/f2b53a…
2/8 Retail sales were up a very disappointing 1.7% in March and up 2.4% for the first three months of 2026. As always, industrial activity was the bright spot, rising 5.7% year-on-year in March, and 6.1% for the first three months.
3/8 This tells us both that domestic consumption is struggling more than ever and that the gap between production and consumption remained extremely high, especially in March.
This gap can only be resolved by higher investment or a higher trade surplus.
1/5 China's March trade numbers were a big surprise, with exports up less than expected and imports way up. Given how volatile things have been, we don't want to read too much into one month's numbers, but if they reflect a new reality, they matter. english.news.cn/20260414/f5b3a…
2/5 Exports were up a measly 2.5% year on year in March, well below the 21.8% surge in the first two months of the year. Imports, driven mainly by higher commodity prices, were up an astonishing 27.8% in March, versus an already high 19.8% in the first two months of the year.
3/5 The result was that China's trade surplus in March ($51.1 billion) was less than a quarter of the trade surplus in the previous two months. If sustained, this will be good for the world, but bad for China, which relies on huge trade surpluses to balance weak domestic demand.
1/9 Very good FT article on why overcapacity is structurally embedded into the Chinese economy. It quotes one (anonymous, of course) investor who notes that "Officials are scared of missing their GDP targets. Nobody is scared of overcapacity."
via @ftft.com/content/7d51a6…
2/9 I was nonetheless impressed by the number of Chinese who spoke openly about the difficulties created by the current growth model. This didn't use to be the case, but the fact that we're seeing more and more of this suggests that we may finally be seeing a change in the way policymakers think.
3/9 One point that I have often made, and that comes out in this article, is that Chinese manufacturers may be incredibly competitive globally, but they might not be particularly efficient once direct and indirect subsidies are considered.
1/15
IMF: "If coordination proves difficult, the best course of action for each country is clear: start addressing domestic imbalances now, regardless of what others do."
This is one of several discordant lines in an otherwise interesting paper.
2/15
It is good that the IMF (along with others) increasingly recognizes the adverse consequences of persistent trade imbalances, and recognizes that "the relevant metric is the overall position of a country against the rest of the world, not bilateral or sectoral balances."
3/15
But I still don't think they understand how imbalances are transmitted. They assume that every country determines and controls its internal imbalances, and so also determines and controls its external imbalances.
But this implies that the world balances by coincidence.
1/7 Martin Wolf, in an important piece on unsustainable current account imbalances, makes a point that most American economists miss: "the counterpart of external deficits tends to be unsustainable domestic borrowing."
via @ftft.com/content/49e38e…
2/7 He goes on to say: "The Keynesian hypothesis looks right: the inflow of net foreign savings, shown in capital account surpluses made big fiscal deficits necessary, because domestic demand in the US would otherwise have been chronically inadequate."
3/7 This, by the way, is consistent with Joan Robinson's argument that trade surpluses are "beggar thy neighbor" when they export unemployment. The difference is that in economies in which credit is not constrained by gold, the alternative to unemployment can be debt.