This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...
account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
3/14
goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
4/14
We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
5/14
country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
6/14
get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
7/14
with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.
For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
8/14
corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
9/14
Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...
that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.
This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
11/14
French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
12/14
countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
13/14
costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.
What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
14/14
a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.
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1/8 Bloomberg: "China urged Mexico to “think twice” before levying tariffs, a warning that could signal Beijing’s willingness to retaliate over a move it sees as giving into demands from the US." bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/8 Mexico announced plans earlier this week to impose duties of as much as 50% on cars and other products made by China and several Asian exporters.
These are the kinds of stories I think we'll see more of in the next year or two.
3/8 In the past ten years Chinese exports to Mexico have nearly doubled, and its trade surplus has surged, to $71 billion last year.
This bilateral evolution must be understood as part of a global shift.
1/14
Barry Eichengreen warns, correctly, that "The dollar’s international primacy isn’t eternal. To be sustained, it has to be actively fostered and preserved."
But why sustain the dollar’s international primacy? Is this merely a modern monetary fetish? wsj.com/finance/curren…
2/14
While the primacy of the dollar is certainly good for bankers, financiers, and very wealthy owners of movable capital, what's much less obvious is the extent to which it benefits or harms American workers, manufacturers and middle class households.
3/14
Some analysts will argue that being able to transact in dollars benefits American exporters and importers by reducing currency hedging costs, but the more honest ones will acknowledge that the benefits are tiny, at best, and that their lack doesn't seem to hamper rivals.
1/10
Interesting new IMF paper on the extent of industrial policy subsidies to Chinese manufacturers and SOEs (to the extent information is available) and their impact on productivity. imf.org/en/Publication…
2/10
It measures national-level cash subsidies, tax benefits, subsidized credit, and subsidized land, which collectively amount, it says, to a high 4% of GDP. The authors note that other subsidies exist, including sub-national subsidies, but these are harder to measure.
3/10
I'd include in the latter what is perhaps among the biggest subsidies, which is over-spending on logistical infrastructure. To the extent that these cost more in resources than they create in economic value, they represent a large transfer to the users of the infrastructure.
1/5 Is the expansion in robotaxis driven by the needs of the economy or by policy decisions? This is not a topic on which I have much information or knowledge, but last week I told a Chinese friend of mine (a well-known economist) that I had heard that as many as 30% of the...
2/5 cars in Beijing streets were Didi drivers (China's Uber). This struck me as an incredibly high number.
He told me that he thought in fact 30% might actually be a low estimate. He also told me that he believed Didi drivers aren't able to get more than one fare an hour.
3/5 Whatever the real numbers are, no one seems to doubt that driving Didi or delivering packages has become the job of last resort for a worryingly high number of urban dwellers. If that's the case, it's not clear how improvements in the productivity of taxis or of...
1/7 Although August CPI deflation widened year on year to -0.4%, compared to 0.0% in July and well above expectations of -0.2%, leading many analysts to worry that deflation in China is accelerating, I think prices actually did fine. en.people.cn/n3/2025/0910/c…
2/7 CPI was driven down mostly by a 4.3% decline in food prices, with core inflation up 0.9%, its sixth straight month of higher year-on-year prices. More importantly, in my opinion, month-on-month CPI prices were flat in August, after rising 0.4% in July.
3/7 The fight against “involution” may be responsible for at least part of the deceleration in deflation in the past two months, although if this is the case, it leaves open the question of how long Beijing can keep deflation at bay.
1/7 NYT: "Through August, China exported $141 billion to Africa, while importing $81 billion. The widening trade imbalance with Africa stems from surging exports of Chinese-made batteries, solar panels, electric vehicles and industrial equipment." nytimes.com/2025/09/08/bus…
2/7 "The swell in exports to Africa," it continues, "along with record volumes of goods sold to Southeast Asia and Latin America, underscores the resilience of Chinese manufacturers in finding new markets for the products they continue to churn out in enormous quantities."
3/7 Meanwhile, as Chinese trade surpluses surge, so do American trade deficits. This is not mainly because of transshipments, as many assume. It is because countries with expanding trade surpluses with the US use their higher revenues to fund deficits with the rest of the world.