This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...
account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
3/14
goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
4/14
We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
5/14
country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
6/14
get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
7/14
with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.
For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
8/14
corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
9/14
Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...
that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.
This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
11/14
French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
12/14
countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
13/14
costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.
What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
14/14
a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.
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1/6 A decision by China to offer more debt relief could be a “game changer for the poor and the system,” said Kevin Gallagher, the director of the Boston University Global Development Policy Center. “It’s really in China’s strategic interest to do that.”
2/6 Ironically, debt relief is also in the economic interest of creditor countries, especially if, as in the case of China, the economy is highly dependent on export surpluses.
That's because capital flows are just the reverse of trade flows.
3/6 To put it another way, every dollar an overly-indebted developing country earns from its exports must be recycled, either in the form of debt repayment or in the form of imports. The less that goes to the former, the more that is available for the latter.
1/8 The euro is up 14% against the dollar this year, as well as against the yuan (11%) and the yen (4%), driven by financial inflows rather than by economic fundamentals (i.e. higher relative productivity grown).
2/8 If sustained, it will almost certainly have an adverse impact on EU manufacturing. In that case ECB rate cuts may keep unemployment from rising (by boosting domestic consumption), but they won't prevent the EU economy from shifting out of manufacturing towards services.
3/8 It seems absurd that major, open economies like the EU and the US should allow imbalances in their domestic economies to be determined by changes in global financial flows, and especially by changes in the way less open surplus countries decide to balance their surpluses.
1/4 I just finished Martin Daunton's excellent survey and analysis of the last 100 years of globalization. There is an enormous amount of material here (nearly 900 pages) and it may not be an easy read for those who aren't already very familiar with much of this history.
2/4 But for those who are, or who want to be, it's well worth the effort. While the book is ostensibly about the process of globalization, and the role of government and government institutions in that process, especially in pivotal periods during the 1930-40s, the 1970s and...
3/4 in the past decade, a major theme is the enormous distortions caused by the unfettered flow of capital, the ways in which these flows dislocated domestic economies, and the various (mostly unsuccessful) attempts individually and collectively to control them.
1/4 Good John Authers article on business profits in the US: "After-tax profits account for an unprecedented 10.7% of gross domestic product, when in the last 50 years of the 20th century, they never exceeded 8%."
@johnauthers_ bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
2/4 "The only time approaching their current share of the economy was in 1929 on the eve of the Great Crash. If the nation is to deal with inequality, money must be redistributed from somewhere; corporate profits are an obvious source of funds."
3/4 Speaking of 1929, we need to re-read Marriner Eccles (FDR's Fed chairman) on the relationship between income inequality, weak domestic demand, rising debt needed to boost domestic demand, and the eventual collapse in production once rising debt can no longer be sustained.
1/4 Caixin: "China is in dire need of more domestic consumption as global uncertainties hamper external demand. Key to this is increasing incomes, a Chinese economics professor said at the Summer Davos Forum in Tianjin on Thursday."
2/4 It's good that there is finally a consensus that low consumption is China's most serious economic problem, and the main cause of its other problems (soaring debt, deflation, overinvestment in infrastructure and manufacturing, over-reliance on a rising trade surplus).
3/4 It's also good that there's a growing consensus that the only sustainable way to raise consumption is to raise household incomes.
But it isn't yet fully acknowledged that China doesn't need rising consumption per se so much as rising consumption relative to GDP.
1/15
Kenneth Rogoff says: "There is, for example, a terrific chapter in which Ray Dalio brutally critiques Japanese policymakers for failing to force debt writedowns after the country’s early 1990s financial crisis.'
2/15
"Instead," he continues, "they allowed debt overhang to hamstring the financial system and sap two decades of growth."
I haven't read Dalio's book, but this is an extremely important point, and one that Beijing should note.
3/15
Beijing has an enormous of debt that is ostensibly backed by the book value of associated assets (most Chinese debt was used to fund investment), but the economic value of these assets are not worth nearly as much as their book value. ft.com/content/630f82…