This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...
account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
3/14
goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
4/14
We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
5/14
country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
6/14
get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
7/14
with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.
For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
8/14
corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
9/14
Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...
that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.
This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
11/14
French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
12/14
countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
13/14
costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.
What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
14/14
a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.
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1/8 Very interesting CNA article on Beijing's strategic pivot towards upgrading the quality of China's existing housing stock. It turns out that much of its housing stock, including much that was built in recent years, is of unacceptable quality. channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/chin…
2/8 CNA: "“This strategic pivot to ‘good housing’ is fundamentally about rebalancing the economy – shifting from speculative inventory to quality living,” Lin Han-Shen, China country director at The Asia Group, told CNA. “Restoring household confidence is central".
3/8 The article also cites the Conference Board’s Zhang Yuhan who warned that "the shift towards higher-quality housing is “likely to support confidence gradually”, but cautioned it does not resolve oversupply or developer liquidity pressures on its own."
1/6 People often say that the problem with the global trading system is mainland China, but that's not true. Taiwan, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, Singapore and many others have run similar positions. The problem is with the global trading system itself.
2/6 As long as countries like the US (and the EU soon?) continue to accommodate global saving imbalances, our current trading system allows for a kind of Kalecki paradox in which individual economies can be rewarded for behavior that undermines growth in the system as a whole.
3/6 Keynes explained this in 1944: economies that repress domestic demand in order to subsidize their manufacturing reduce overall global demand, but are able nonetheless to grow more quickly by taking a larger share of other countries' demand.
1/14
Unfortunately I don't subscribe to Krugman's substack, so I cannot comment on the whole article, but I can say that the first few paragraphs lay out the issue very accurately and with commendable simplicity. He certainly understands the main issues. open.substack.com/pub/paulkrugma…
2/14
He notes: "In the past, China achieved stunning economic growth in part through a combination of very high savings and very high investment. Its savings remain very high, but investment in China is running into diminishing returns in the face of slowing technological...
3/14
progress and a shrinking working-age population. Yet the Chinese government keeps failing to take effective steps to reduce savings and increase consumer demand. Instead, China is in effect exporting its excess savings via its massive trade surplus. It is using consumer...
1/11
Philip Coggan: "It is a mug’s game trying to predict the end of a boom with any precision. They last much longer than anyone might reasonably expect. That is true of bull markets, as well as economic advances. The reason is that markets and... ft.com/content/2ae4ac…
2/11
economies find ways to support themselves. George Soros, the well-known investor and philanthropist, has a term for it: reflexivity."
Coggan then explains that reflexivity is Soros' name for positive feedback loops embedded in economies and financial systems.
3/11
This is a very important concept that too few economists recognize and embed in their analyses, although most traders and investors understand it intuitively.
The point that Hyman Minsky would have added is that positive feedback loops are nothing mysterious.
1/7 SCMP: "As China grapples with persistent deflationary pressure, scholars from one of the country’s top universities have urged the government to take more forceful action to prevent the economy from becoming trapped in a Japan-style downward spiral." scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/7 The article continues: "“Japan’s experience has shown that once households form the expectation that prices won’t rise over the medium to long term, it becomes nearly impossible to break that mindset,” said He Xiaobei, a professor at Peking University."
3/7 She argues that Beijing should adopt a binding inflation target and make reviving price growth a top priority. She's right, but I am not sure what this means in policy terms. In the US or Europe, it would mean expanding money rapidly enough to set off price increases.
1/7 SCMP: "China is tapping the brakes on some subway expansions, including in certain affluent cities, reflecting a shift from the debt-fuelled infrastructure boom of the past to a new era of fiscal discipline and investment efficiency." scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/7 I've long argued that much of the infrastructure investment in the past decade was not economically viable. It was implemented mainly to keep economic activity from dropping, and not to create economic value, and is why the debt used to fund this investment was growing...
3/7 so much faster than the economy itself. But while there are still a few diehard analysts who insist that misallocated investment isn't a problem, it seems increasingly to have become the official point of view that it is, even if they have trouble saying it explicitly.