This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...
account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
3/14
goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
4/14
We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
5/14
country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
6/14
get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
7/14
with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.
For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
8/14
corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
9/14
Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...
that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.
This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
11/14
French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
12/14
countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
13/14
costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.
What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
14/14
a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.
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1/10
President Macron says "We must acknowledge that these imbalances are both the result of weak EU productivity and China’s policy of export-driven growth."
2/10
Countries don't run trade deficits because of low productivity, any more than they run surpluses because of high productivity. That is not at all what global trade imbalances around the world tell us, and that is not why countries have lower or higher saving rates.
3/10
American productivity, to take one obvious example, is higher than that of Europeans, and several times higher than that of the Chinese, and yet it is the US that runs huge deficits and China, with the highest saving rate in the world, that runs huge trade surpluses.
1/8 It's hard to find anything good in the November economic data for China, just as it is hard to find anything new to say. All the important indicators continue to weaken, as they have throughout the year, in some cases even decelerating further. english.news.cn/20251215/a5915…
2/8 Retail sales, for example, were expected to grow a very disappointing 2.9% year on year in November. In fact they only grew 1.3%.
For all the talk of a greater role for consumption in driving growth, in the first 11 months of the year, retail sales were up just 4.0%.
3/8 Meanwhile industrial output rose 4.8% in November, a little below expectation and well below the 6.0% growth in the first 11 months of the year.
For me the main worry is the gap between the two, with the former so far this year growing 2 percentage points more slowly than...
1/8 Caixin: "While concerns about weak demand and external uncertainties persist, this year's Central Economic Work Conference, which concluded on Thursday, marked a shift in tone. The official readout framed China's core economic challenge as... caixinglobal.com/2025-12-12/chi…
2/8 a “prominent contradiction between strong supply and weak demand” — a structural issue rather than just insufficient consumption."
"The change" Caixin writes, "suggests Beijing sees supply-side imbalances, not just inadequate consumption, as a constraint."
3/8 Perhaps, but the only way you reduce a “contradiction between strong supply and weak demand” is either by reducing GDP growth, which Beijing doesn't seem to want, by increasing growth in consumption, which for all its efforts Beijing has been unable to do, or by increasing...
1/4 WSJ: "President Trump’s barrage of tariff increases threatened to chill global trade flows, but commercial exchanges continued to increase as most of the international commerce system functions as it did before the onslaught."
via @WSJwsj.com/economy/trade/…
2/4 Contrary to what WSJ says, Trump's tariffs never really threatened to "chill global trade flows" except in the view of those (including far too many economists) who mistakenly thought of trade in incremental terms rather than in systemic terms.
3/4 As I wrote two years ago, the word "resilience" was going to be used over and over to describe trade as Trump's tariffs shifted trade and trade imbalances around without fundamentally changing them. That's because the only way the US can cause a reduction in its trade...
1/4 The IMF formally recognizes that it is a depreciating RMB, not rising manufacturing efficiency, that drives China's growing trade surplus. ft.com/content/9c92aa…
2/4 That's because a depreciating currency is both a subsidy for manufacturing (and tradable goods) and a tax on consumption. It works by reducing the household share of GDP, especially when reinforced by other production subsidies paid for directly or indirectly by households.
3/4 The net result of boosting manufacturing with subsidies and restraining consumption with taxes is to force the production of manufactured goods to grow faster than consumption – which also means forcing up the saving rate.
1/4 China's CPI was up 0.7& year on year in November, the biggest monthly increase in nearly two years, but those who see this as a revival of inflation are getting it wrong. On the contrary, after four months of flat to positive month-on-... english.news.cn/20251210/cd188…
2/4 month changes, CPI prices were actually down 0.1% month on month in November. Even that was flattered by higher food prices caused by bad weather and a surge in gold prices that drove the “miscellaneous goods and services” category up by more than 14%.
3/4 I credited the stable or rising prices between July and October to the fight against involution, but expected deflation to resume early next year as investment shifted out of the involuted manufacturing sectors to the non-involuted sectors.