Michael Pettis Profile picture
Nov 27, 2020 14 tweets 3 min read Read on X
1/14

This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...

economist.com/finance-and-ec…
2/14

account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
3/14

goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
4/14

We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
5/14

country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
6/14

get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
7/14

with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.

For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
8/14

corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
9/14

Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...

yalebooks.yale.edu/book/978030024…
10/14

that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.

This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
11/14

French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
12/14

countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
13/14

costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.

What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
14/14

a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Michael Pettis

Michael Pettis Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @michaelxpettis

Nov 19
1/13
It is helpful to think about Taisu Zhang's list of the EU's perceived weaknesses in the context of global trade, and especially in the context of a global trading system that exhibits the beggar-thy-neighbor characteristics that Joan Robinson warned about.
2/13
To take the first, the EU's lack of political unity means that it cannot respond unilaterally in a world in which its major trading partners (China, Japan, India and, increasingly, the US) are determined to control their external accounts and are able unilaterally to do so.
3/13
A country's ability control its external accounts affects the extent to which it can control its internal imbalances while externalizing their costs, along with the structure of its economy and its mix of manufacturing and services.
foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…
Read 13 tweets
Nov 19
1/8
SCMP: "China should add a quantitative target for consumption growth as part of its long-term modernisation goals to help sustain growth momentum as the country’s population declines, a prominent Chinese economist said."
via @scmpnewssc.mp/qmm5m?utm_sour…
2/8
The article continues: "Currently, household consumption accounts for about 39% of China’s GDP, according to Cai Fang, an academician at CASS. Over the next decade it should rise to around 61% as China strives to become a “moderately-developed” country by 2035."
3/8
Most prominent economists in China have already called for increases of anywhere from 5 to 10 percentage points of GDP, and while Cai is right that household consumption of 61% of GDP would indeed make China a more "normal" country, I wonder if he has done the math.
Read 8 tweets
Nov 18
1/8
NYT: "The biggest recipient of Chinese financing over the past two decades has been the United States, where Chinese banks have extended $200 billion in financial support to American companies and projects."
nytimes.com/2025/11/18/bus…
2/8
This shouldn't surprise us, even if it seems to go against what we've been reading in headlines in recent years. China is the largest net export of capital in the world, which is just the flip side of its running the biggest trade surpluses in the world.
3/8
While we often read about Chinese capital exports to the developing world, in fact these flows probably peaked in 2015-16, when problems in Venezuela taught Beijing just how risky this can be. This meant surpluses had to be recycled mostly to the advanced economies.
Read 8 tweets
Nov 18
1/8
Good FT piece on the increasing difficulty economists have in understanding, correlating and reconciling Chinese economic statistics. This leads to concerns among many analysts that GDP may be overstated, and fairly substantially.
ft.com/content/5b9e74…
2/8
For the FT (and for many others), the biggest puzzle is over how GDP growth can stay constant at 5% even as investment (which plays a bigger role in driving Chinese GDP growth than in any other country in history) is reportedly declining.
4/8
Part of the answer may be that GDP growth has in fact declined, and rapidly, over 2025, albeit from extremely high levels. Another part of the answer may be the surging trade surplus, which is extraordinarily high for such a large economy, and clearly not sustainable.
Read 7 tweets
Nov 16
1/10
Important Benn Steil article on globalization, free trade, and the cost of underwriting both. He cites Wendell Willkie in 1944 as "recognizing how perilous it would be to integrate market economies with state-directed ones."
@ProSyn @BennSteil
prosyn.org/LkdDyx7
2/10
"When global prices fail to reflect supply-and-demand dynamics," Steil cites Willkie as arguing, "they distort production and trade flows, killing off more efficient enterprises, fueling imbalances, and breeding resentment."
3/10
This is a point I've often made, although in a different way, including in an upcoming piece in Foreign Affairs.

We start with the widely-recognized insight that every country's internal imbalances must always be perfectly consistent with its external imbalances.
Read 10 tweets
Nov 14
1/7
China's fixed-asset investment declined 1.7% year on year in the first 10 months of 2025, more than twice the expected rate of decline, and well above the 0.5% decline during the first nine months of the year.

english.news.cn/20251114/2bcf2…
2/7
Excluding a 14.7% decline in the property sector, investment rose by 1.7% during the first ten months of 2025, led by a 2.7% rise in manufacturing investment.

As I see it, the weakness in investment growth suggests that the fight against "involution" is working so far.
3/7
It suggests that the post-2022 surge in investment in preferred manufacturing sectors, such as EVs, batteries and solar panels, is being reversed.

But this leaves us with the same questions that we were left with following the post-2022 collapse in property investment.
Read 7 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(