This very good article illustrates just how much confusion there is in understanding the accounting identities that describe the balance of payments. When a country saves more than it invests, there is no difference between its running a current...
account surplus and its running a capital account deficit: one doesn't "lead" to the other because they are simply the obverse sides of the same coin. In either case the country exports its excess savings in the form of real resources such as manufactured...
3/14
goods, commodities, services, etc., and gets paid with real claims on foreign assets. The former side of the transaction we call the current account surplus and the latter side we call the capital account deficit. Both sides simultaneously define the transaction.
4/14
We only talk about the capital account driving the current account, or vice versa, as a way of later explaining what drives individual bilateral imbalances. And this is where it gets complicated. The claims on foreign assets through the capital account that a surplus...
5/14
country receives do not have to be from the country against whom it is running the current account surplus. If Japan has excess savings (i.e. domestic savings exceed domestic investment), it can run a current account surplus with France, for example, but can decide to...
6/14
get paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets. In that case while France runs a bilateral deficit with Japan, by effectively having to swap claims on its own assets for claims on US assets, the French economy has to adjust by running a current account surplus...
7/14
with some other country that matches its deficit with Japan.
For convenience we will assume that this other country is the US, but while it doesn’t have to be, the current accounts have to keep adjusting until eventually the US runs the current account deficit that...
8/14
corresponds to the original Japanese surplus. This is because by giving up claims on American assets to the Japanese, the US ultimately must run a current account deficit in which it receives goods and services from abroad.
9/14
Note that in this case it is Japan that is “responsible” for the US current account deficit, even though the bilateral deficit arises from trade with France. That is why Matt Klein and I, in our book, argue that it is the capital account...
that “drives” the current account imbalances, even though technically this isn’t true: the capital account is simply the obverse of the current account.
This is also why Trump’s tariffs never had a chance of working. Assume in this case that the US imposed tariffs on...
11/14
French goods so as to resolve its deficit with France. As long as Japan continues to export its excess savings in the form of goods and services to France (or indeed to any other country) and demands to be paid directly or indirectly with claims on US assets, all the...
12/14
countries involved would have to adjust in such a way that Japan ran a current account surplus, the US a current account deficit, and everyone else balanced trade (albeit with bilateral imbalances). Tariffs on French would goods simply distort trade and raise overall...
13/14
costs for American consumers and French producers without in any way affecting the US imbalances.
What this demonstrates is that if the US does not want to be forced to absorb Japan’s domestic demand deficiency, it must either prevent Japan (or other foreigners) from...
14/14
a net acquisition of claims on US assets or it must raise tariffs on all imports high enough that it forces enough of a downward adjustment in the savings of the rest of the world that the rest of the world absorbs Japan’s demand deficiency.
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1/12
This talk about Europe's ability to wield its holdings of US Treasuries as a political tool is as divorced from reality as the talk about China's ability to wield its holdings of US Treasuries as a political tool.
via @ftft.com/content/7d6436…
2/12
For all the huffing and puffing, Chinese holdings of US assets actually increased. This shouldn't have been a surprise. If you run massive trade surpluses, you have no choice but to acquire foreign assets, and if you won't acquire the alternatives, you must buy US assets.
3/12
These analysts seem to forget that you cannot change your capital account without also changing your trade account, and that you cannot change your external imbalances without also changing your internal imbalances.
1/7 EU commissioner for trade Maroš Šefčovič is absolutely right to question the usefulness of the WTO: "If the WTO is to meet today’s challenges, its rules must be fair and deliver balanced, legitimate outcomes. Currently, they do neither." ft.com/content/2ff1d4…
2/7 The fact that decades of the largest, persistent trade imbalances in history have largely been WTO compliant suggests strongly that the WTO is more about maintaining legal fictions than it is about discouraging the adverse impact of trade intervention on the global economy.
3/7 As Keynes (and many others) pointed out nearly a century ago, evidence that a country is intervening in trade shows up very clearly in the form of persistent, beggar-thy-neighbor trade surpluses. If the latter exists, then the former exists.
1/6 Reuters: "Chinese leaders have pledged to "significantly" lift household consumption’s share of the economy over the next five years, but have not given a specific target." reuters.com/world/asia-pac…
2/6 If we assume that Beijing hopes to raise the consumption share of GDP by 3-5 percentage points (roughly a third of what it would need to be a more "normal" low-consuming economy), consumption would have to grow by 1-2 percentage points faster than GDP over the period.
3/6 That's a pretty big gap, and one we have never yet seen in the past 3-4 decades of Chinese growth. The good way to manage this, of course, would be for consumption growth to accelerate, although it is not at all clear what would cause that acceleration.
1/7 Good Martin Wolf piece on the global return of mercantilism. What is new about this piece is that it seems part of a growing recognition among global opinion makers that mercantilism and trade war didn't start when deficit economies with... ft.com/content/cd68b3…
2/7 open external accounts began to implement trade restrictions and otherwise control their external accounts. It started earlier, when economies that controlled their external accounts implemented trade and industrial policies that led to beggar-thy-neighbor trade surpluses.
3/7 We are returning, in other words, to Joan Robinson and her 1937 explanation of how trade conflict emerges. What I would add is that in a hyperglobalized trading system (i.e one in which transportation costs, communications costs, and the costs of... ia802806.us.archive.org/16/items/essay…
1/6 Wall Street bankers and owners of movable capital would hate it, but if the rest of the world were to reduce its dependence on the US dollar, this would be good for the US economy, good for US manufacturing, and good for US farmers and workers. wsj.com/finance/curren…
2/6 The claim that the US benefits from the global use of the dollar is one of those things that people believe even though they can't explain why – except perhaps in terms of sanctions. None of the world's fastest-growing economies (including... foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…
3/6 advanced economies like the US in the 100 years before the 1970s, Germany in the same time period, or post-war Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) had major reserve currency status, and yet they all had rapidly growing economies driven by even more rapid growth in manufacturing.
1/4 Bloomberg: "“Even with strong determination and sufficient resources, transforming China’s economy into one driven by consumption and services will take years,” Goldman said. “With a more reluctant, measured approach, it could take decades.”" bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/4 Goldman is right, of course, unless a debt crisis, or a serious acceleration of trade war, forces a much faster, disruptive adjustment. While the latter might happen, the former is, for now at least, pretty unlikely.
3/4 A long adjustment, however, means a Japanese-style adjustment over two or three decades, in which consumption growth continues at more or less the same pace it had in the past while GDP growth drops sharply, and investment growth goes negative.